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FIGURES OF CONSPIRACY: FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE AESTHETICS OF
SPECULATION

by

JOHN W. ROBERTS

Under the Direction of Angelo Restivo, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
This dissertation intervenes to theorize the implications of late 20th and early 21st century
economic financialization for media studies and visual culture by considering the ways in which
both the contemporary economy and contemporary culture share a central emphasis on
speculation, a term which ambivalently refers both to the capacity to see, as well as the capacity
to hypothesize and imagine. The central issue at stake is the question of how imaginary,
speculative, and representational values in the economy can have real effects not only on stock
prices but also on the material conditions of lived experience of individuals, as in the emblematic
case of the 2008 global financial crisis. To answer this question, the dissertation develops a
theory of the figural, drawing on the writings of Erich Auerbach, Gilles Deleuze, Walter
Benjamin, and others, in order to explain how abstract processes of speculation can come to have

concrete, material consequences. At stake is the notion that social reality and aesthetics are
intimately imbricated through figural relations. Consequently, it is to mediated aesthetic
renderings of the process of speculation that the dissertation looks to locate and comprehend
these economic and cultural transformations. I focus on objects that deal centrally with
conspiracy and investigation, which I argue following Fredric Jameson is the dominant
representational locus of the cultural imagination of global finance. Body chapters contain close
formal analyses of the amateur conspiracy chart style known as “Chart Brut,” the medical
mystery television series House M.D., the found-footage horror film Sinister, and the videos
news thriller Nightcrawler. A conclusion considers how the film Arrival constellates the formal
and thematic issues at stake in the body chapters together into a potentially unified figure.

INDEX WORDS: Financialization, Figurality, Conspiracy, Diagram, Detection

FIGURES OF CONSPIRACY: FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE AESTHETICS OF
SPECULATION

by

JOHN W. ROBERTS

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of the Arts
Georgia State University
2019

Copyright by
John William Roberts
2019

FIGURES OF CONSPIRACY: FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE AESTHETICS OF
SPECULATION

by

JOHN W. ROBERTS

Committee Chair:

Committee:

Angelo Restivo

Alessandra Raengo
Jennifer Barker
Fredric Jameson

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Academic Assistance
College of the Arts
Georgia State University
May 2019

iv
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, to my brother, and to Clare, who knows
more than anyone the exact price of the risk that this project carried.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Augustine writes of his own membership in a kind of conspiracy, “But alone I would not
have done it, could not conceivably have done it by myself.” This could not be more true of this
project, which had help from many supporters along the way. I must first gratefully acknowledge
the profound support of my advisor, Angelo Restivo, who encouraged me to play the go-forbroke game of cultural history. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation
committee for their time and insight: Alessandra Raengo, Jennifer Barker, and Fredric Jameson. I
am especially indebted to Dr. Raengo’s seminars and an independent study, which furnished the
intellectual space in which much of the conceptual core of this project was formed. Lastly, I
would like to recognize the immense support of my fellow graduate students and writing group
companions for their support and friendship: Daren Fowler, Jenny Gunn, Cameron Kunzelman,
and Jennifer Olive. Truly, I could not have done it alone.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ V
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... VIII
1

INTRODUCTION: THE FIGURAL LOGIC OF THE CONSPIRACY

DIAGRAM..................................................................................................................................... 1

2

3

1.1

Blown Up Figures ................................................................................................ 1

1.2

Diagramming the Constellations of A Beautiful Mind ................................... 16

1.3

Speculative Capital............................................................................................ 30

1.4

Speculative Aesthetics ....................................................................................... 35

1.5

The Schema, Diagram, The Abstract Machine .............................................. 42

1.6

Figural Constellations ....................................................................................... 48

1.7

Chapter Summaries .......................................................................................... 61

HISTORICITY, FIGURALITY, CONSPIRACY ................................................. 68
2.1

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 68

2.2

Erich Auerbach’s Conspiracy Theory............................................................. 74

2.3

Chart Brut: Conspiracy Theory in Practice ................................................... 88

2.4

Conclusion: Julie Mehretu’s Speculative Gaze ............................................ 105

SCANNING THE NEOLIBERAL BRAIN: HOUSE M.D. AND THE

BIOPOLITICAL T.V. SCREEN ............................................................................................. 112
3.1

Introduction: The Biopolitical T.V. Screen .................................................. 112

vii

4

3.2

Medical Imaging .............................................................................................. 129

3.3

Differential Diagnosis as Risk Management ................................................. 145

3.4

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 155

“YOU CAN NEVER EXPLAIN SOMETHING LIKE THIS”: NARRATIVE

AND ECONOMIC SPECULATION IN SINISTER ............................................................. 158

5

4.1

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 158

4.2

Recession Anxiety, or the Haunted House .................................................... 167

4.3

Spectatorship as Surveillance, Surveillance as Labor ................................. 176

4.4

Media Transition and the Hauntology of the Digital ................................... 186

4.5

Conclusion: Speculation, Theory ................................................................... 193

“DO YOU KNOW WHAT FEAR STANDS FOR?” RACIALIZED

EMBODIMENT AND ABSTRACTION IN NIGHTCRAWLER ......................................... 197

6

5.1

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 197

5.2

Boundary Transgression and Spatial Reconfiguration ............................... 200

5.3

Valorization and Racialization....................................................................... 214

5.4

Financialization and the Derivative Form .................................................... 227

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 236

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 252

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Blow Up......................................................................................................................... 1
Figure 1.2 Blow Up......................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 1.3 Blow Up......................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 1.4 The New Yorker ............................................................................................................ 9
Figure 1.5 All the President’s Men ............................................................................................... 20
Figure 1.6 The Parallax View ....................................................................................................... 21
Figure 1.7 A Beautiful Mind ......................................................................................................... 23
Figure 1.8 A Beautiful Mind ......................................................................................................... 24
Figure 1.9 A Beautiful Mind ......................................................................................................... 25
Figure 1.10 A Beautiful Mind ....................................................................................................... 25
Figure 1.11 A Beautiful Mind ....................................................................................................... 26
Figure 2.1 Minority Report ........................................................................................................... 69
Figure 2.2 Chart Brut Featuring Sunil Tripathi ............................................................................ 90
Figure 2.3 Chart Brut Featuring GamerGate ................................................................................ 91
Figure 2.4 Chart Brut Featuring the Mandalay Bay Mass Shooting............................................. 92
Figure 2.5 Chart Brut Featuring the Boston Marathon Bombing ................................................. 95
Figure 2.6 Chart Brut Featuring the Boston Marathon Bombing ................................................. 96
Figure 2.7 Homeland .................................................................................................................. 100
Figure 2.8 Mural ......................................................................................................................... 106
Figure 2.9 Mural (Exterior)......................................................................................................... 108
Figure 2.10 Mural (Detail) .......................................................................................................... 108
Figure 3.1 TIME ......................................................................................................................... 113

ix

Figure 3.2 TIME ......................................................................................................................... 115
Figure 3.3 House M.D. ............................................................................................................... 132
Figure 3.4 SignaPulse: The Magazine of MR ............................................................................. 134
Figure 3.5 Popular Science ......................................................................................................... 138
Figure 3.6 Popular Science ......................................................................................................... 140
Figure 3.7 TIME ......................................................................................................................... 142
Figure 3.8 TIME ......................................................................................................................... 144
Figure 3.9 House M.D. ............................................................................................................... 146
Figure 4.1 Sinister ....................................................................................................................... 171
Figure 4.2 Sinister ....................................................................................................................... 175
Figure 4.3 Sinister ....................................................................................................................... 179
Figure 4.4 Sinister ....................................................................................................................... 181
Figure 4.5 Sinister ....................................................................................................................... 188
Figure 5.1 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 210
Figure 5.2 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 212
Figure 5.3 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 225
Figure 5.4 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 226
Figure 5.5 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 228
Figure 5.6 Nightcrawler .............................................................................................................. 233
Figure 6.1 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 239
Figure 6.2 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 240
Figure 6.3 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 241
Figure 6.4 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 245

x

Figure 6.5 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 246
Figure 6.6 Arrival........................................................................................................................ 247

1

1

INTRODUCTION: THE FIGURAL LOGIC OF THE CONSPIRACY DIAGRAM

The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at
his destination. This destination is the marketplace.
–Walter Benjamin1

1.1

Blown Up Figures
In a well-known scene from Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow Up (1966) Thomas (David

Hemmings), a fashion photographer who believes he may have inadvertently photographed an
attempted murder while taking pictures of a romantic liaison at a park, hangs the eponymous
blown up photos he has taken in a sitting area of his studio in an attempt to ascertain what
exactly it is that he has captured on film (fig. 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Blow Up
1

Walter Benjamin, “Central Park,” in Selected Writings, Volume 4 1938-1940, ed. Howard
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 170.

2

Initially perplexed by the woman’s (Vanessa Redgrave) seemingly worried glances into the
surrounding shrubbery, things start to become clearer to Thomas when he first begins to organize
the photos spatially, so as to produce the semblance of an eye-line match between the woman
and the object of her gaze, and then organizes them into a roughly linear temporal sequence
around him. In a self-reflexively cinematic gesture, the narrative that emerges from these
images—or that is produced by their precise arrangement into what Seymour Chatman has
described, in this specific context, as a “narrative array, a ‘textualization’ or ‘entexting’ of what
would otherwise be a random group of photographs” (that the woman noticed someone lurking
in the bushes with a gun, evidently about to shoot the man)—crystallizes for Thomas once both
the spatial and temporal dimensions of his photographs are organized to suggest chains of cause
and effect, and the emergence of his understanding is conveyed to the spectator of Blow Up
through a montage of Thomas’s still images that differentially evokes the nature of cinema itself
as a medium defined by spatial movement through time.2
The cinematically-induced suggestion that Thomas has captured a meaningful narrative
‘event’ on film is, however, quickly (and in the end, irredeemably) attenuated by the grainy
ambiguity of his blown up images themselves, which push to the limit photography’s ability to
indexically capture and disclose something recognizable as meaningful or actionable information
(fig. 1.2).

2

Seymour Chatman, Antonioni, or, the Surface of the World (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985), 149.

3

Figure 1.2 Blow Up
As Robin Wood (any many other commentators besides) long ago explained, “The main drift of
Blow Up seems to me very clear: we are shown a young man inhabiting a world in which
everything combines to undermine the firmness of his hold on reality. The mystery surrounding
the murder comes as a test: he is subjected to a deliberate undermining of his confidence in his
own perceptions, and he crumbles.”3
For some critics like Wood, Blow Up thus delivers a pessimistic take on the
disintegration of objective reality, although more recently a more optimistic interpretation of the
film has been espoused. Both the pessimistic and optimistic interpretations of the film turn on
how the ending of the film, in which Thomas, having abandoned hope of communicating his
experience to others, encounters and decides to participate in a mimed tennis match, which is

3

Ian Cameron and Robin Wood, Antonioni (New York: Praeger, 1971), 131.

4

being conducted without a ball. On the one hand, Wood is representative of the pessimistic view,
in which “Thomas’s retrieving of the ‘ball’ marks his final surrender: his grasp of objective
reality fatally undermined, he is a lost (because disintegrated) soul.”4 On the other, Thomas’s
willingness to participate in the imaginary tennis game indicates a hope for the future, and the
possibility of a sense of community and consensus overcoming Thomas’s isolation and
existential malaise. This view is summed up by Peter Brunette:
Thus, by participating in the celebrated ball-less game of tennis with the mimes at
the end, Hemmings can be seen as shaking off his narcissism (which amounts, in
the epistemological context of the film, to a kind of solipsism), by implicitly
admitting that reality is always unconsciously constructed, and constructed
socially, that is, along with other human beings. Anything can mean anything,
anything can stand for or represent anything else, anything can be anything, but
only to a group, never to an individual (at least not for long).5
Brunette interprets the social construction of reality suggested by the ending as a positive
gesture, towards community and away from narcissism, towards the freedom of anything to “be
anything” and away from the stultifying paralysis of ambiguity. Sam Rohdie similarly connects
Blow Up to the rest of Antonioni’s oeuvre through a thematic emphasis on ‘the new,’ in a
passage worth quoting in its entirety:
The new in Antonioni appears within what is sure and established as a present yet
hidden surface making itself seen and felt within what Barthes would call the
‘interstices’, the line between alternative realities, something new contained in the
ordinary and conventional, and which often threatens it, not to be replaced by
another ‘thing’, but rather not to be replaced at all, as when a figure, or an object
dissolve into patterns, a landscape, or fog or rain overwhelm a ‘subject.’ It is
something akin to the progressive enlargement of a photograph as occurs in BlowUp: an event becomes an image; the image loses its figure to become dots and
tones; these in turn coalesce into another image, finally into other ‘events,’ but
equally unstable, impossible to fix.6

4

Ibid., 138.
Peter Brunette, The Films of Michelangelo Antonioni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 117.
6
Sam Rohdie, Antonioni (London: BFI, 1990), 49.
5

5

What these two interpretations by Brunette and Rohdie make clear is that, between Wood’s
writing in 1971 and Brunette and Rohdie in the 1990s, the ‘disintegration’ of Thomas’ “soul”
and the distinctly modernist ennui associated with the ambiguity that pervades the film at every
level has become less of a pressing issue for interpreters of the film, and that in fact it is precisely
the instability of meaning at play in Thomas’s world that enables a kind of ‘reassembly of the
social’ along more communal and less solipsistic lines. The film, on this view, marks not so
much the dead-end of aesthetic modernism in the dissolution of stable subjectivity, but a turn
toward semiotic play and the production of the new that is characteristic of aesthetic
postmodernism. Indeed, in its movement away from the human subject as the epistemic and
narrative core of the film, and towards a less anthropocentric emphasis on the object-world of
which the human is only a de-privileged component, that has led Laura Rascaroli to characterize
the film as “proto-postmodern.”7 There are perhaps many reasons for this shift in the critical
evaluation of Blow Up, including the simple passage of time and the benefit of retrospective
analysis, but one factor that merits mention, since it is central to all that follows, is the influence
of Deleuze on film theory and criticism in the intervening years between 1971 and 1990,
particularly with the publication of Cinema 2 in 1985 (and in English in 1989). Richard Rushton
makes the connection between Deleuze, Rascaroli, and Rohdie clear in his summary of
Deleuze’s usage of Antonioni in the early pages of Cinema 2:
These humans whom Deleuze describes as being absent from the world and
absent from themselves; might this merely echo like the reiteration of a thousand
other commentators on Antonioni, that he charts a modernist, existential
alienation which features humans in various stages of late capitalist angst?
Certainly, yes, but Deleuze also wants to try to argue that Antonioni is a
profoundly optimistic director who believes in the kinds of positivities opened up
7

Laura Rascaroli, “Modernity, Put into Form: Blow-Up, Objectuality, 1960s Antonioni,” in
Antonioni, Centenary Essays, ed. Laura Rascaroli and John David Rhodes (London: BFI, 2011),
68, 77-8.

6

by modern experience….While Antonioni offers a devastating critique of modern
life, by way of this critique he also opens up the possibility of redeeming or
rediscovering that modern world.8
Thus, the desubjectification and shift in emphasis towards the object-world described by
Rascaroli becomes legible as part of a broader flattening of the ontological register of
Antonioni’s films, part of the production of a system of what Deleuze calls a system of exchange
between the objective and subjective, real and imaginary, physical and mental poles of pure
optical and sound situations. For Deleuze, this system of exchange “[guarantees] passages and
conversions, tending towards a point of indiscernibility (and not of confusion).”9 Here we can
also see the seed of Rohdie’s eloquent analysis of the new in Antonioni as a process of figural
de- and reterritorialization of images, both in the representational-photographic sense in Blow
Up, but also in Deleuze’s sense of an image as a block of pure space-time. Indeed, as Brunette
suggests, “anything can be anything,” but never to an individual, only to a group or plurality
through and across whom such ‘exchanges’ can occur.
As I have indicated, all this is (perhaps?) well known and thoroughly rehearsed within the
history of film studies. So, too, is the shift marked by Blow Up from aesthetic modernism to
postmodernism in art cinema, and the ways in which Antonioni’s oeuvre both straddles and
complicates such a distinction. In Blow Up this is achieved in part through Thomas’ ultimate
ambivalence about his novel experience, along with his evident, if ambiguous, willingness to
participate in the simulacral mime of a tennis match that concludes the film. It is also achieved
through the film’s emphasis on the way in which photographs of a thing or event come to
displace and substitute for the thing or event itself, one consequence (or cause?) of which the

8

Richard Rushton, Cinema After Deleuze (London: Continuum, 2012), 68.
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Minneapolis, University
of Minnesota Press, 1989 [1985]), 9.
9

7

film explores as both lucrative in the form of photographic fashion advertising, and threatening
in the form of a loss of confidence in the historical representatability of events embodied by
Thomas’ failure to prove that a murder did indeed take place despite possessing, even after his
studio is ransacked, a photograph of the murdered body (fig. 1.3).

Figure 1.3 Blow Up
If Blow Up is a paradigmatically significant film in the way it marks the kinds of economic,
aesthetic, and technological transformations entailed by the postmodern turn, it is also ground
zero for a series of contemporary changes in global image culture, in which the questions raised
by Blow Up—what can an image disclose, either indexically or historically? How can
representations of things circulate economically in place of the things themselves, and what if
any are the limits of such substitutability?—have become both intensified and transformed by the
rise to prominence of digital forms of mediation, and as we shall see, also by the innovation of
digitally circulating financial instruments.

8

The fundamental significance of Blow Up in this context is perhaps most readily apparent
in the way its most visually striking, or at least most iconically enduring set-piece, Thomas’s
organization of his blow ups into a meta-mise-en-scène—what Adrian Martin terms a dispositif
of cinematically-technologically mediated perception—has become wholly absorbed into the
grammar of commercial filmmaking in the form of the ‘conspiracy wall.’10 The ‘conspiracy
wall,’ as I am terming it, operates as a visual shorthand for an process of labor-intensive and
cognitively taxing investigation, and in particular signifies the investigative aporia of the
information network too large or convoluted to be tidily unpacked and explained—Fredric
Jameson’s ‘geopolitical aesthetic’ condensed to a single visual figure. These iconic images can
be found not only in political thrillers and conspiracy films, but across virtually all contemporary
genres and forms of American media, from animated family films like The Peanuts Movie (dir.
Steve Martino, 2015) and network TV comedies such as Parks and Recreation (2009-2015), to
commercial advertisements and cartoon strips in The New Yorker (fig. 1.4).

10

Adrian Martin, Mise en Scène and Film Style (Basingstroke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 179.

9

Figure 1.4 The New Yorker
The conspiracy wall is discussed at greater length in chapter 1, but the semantic and
affective charges it carries derive genealogically from Blow Up, in which the mise-en-scène
operates as a figural condensation of the film’s broader thematic content, where by figural I
mean here something like a formation that spans and articulates both the schematic and
expressive aspects of an aesthetic or rhetorical function. Indeed, Blow Up anticipates the ways in
which the more contemporary media objects discussed in this study unite two conceptually
distinct theorizations of the figural itself. On the one hand, Thomas’ illegibly grainy images,
particularly the final one he is left with after the others are taken, evince Lyotard’s argument in
Discourse, Figure that there is a kind of chiasmatic tension between linguistic-discursive and
plastic-figural modes of communication.11 An image with a clear discursive content (a landscape,

11

See Jean-François Lyotard, Discourse-Figure, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2011 [1971]), 205-218.

10

anthropomorphic figures) is blown up until that content’s referentiality dissolves into the figural
shape of the image itself, its play between light and dark patches. Just as Lyotard points out how
the letter and the lines that form it cannot ultimately be separated as distinct categories of
signifier and signified or content and form, so the body in the picture cannot be clearly
distinguished from the surrounding environment, and the figure falls back into the image’s
ground. On the other hand, Thomas’ images become figures, in Erich Auerbach’s sense of the
term as an historical event that prefigures a later event that fulfills them both, when he
retroactively interprets them as evidence of a deferred, non-linear historical event. Blow Up
effectively brings together these respectively spatial and temporal approaches to figurality,
demonstrating how deeply imbricated the two senses are with each other, and how both
Lyotard’s and Auerbach’s attention to the figural turns on the question of the aesthetic and its
role in the production not only of discourse and plastic form, but knowledge and the temporality
of historical events, within the context of the postmodern turn. In doing so, it provides a clue, in
the form of a certain figure, and in its attentiveness to the expressive capacities of figuration
itself, that uncovers a much vaster range of conspiratorial articulations between the visual and
the temporal, the plastic and the historical, and the (re)productive and the social.
Blow Up’s concern for the epistemic limits of imagistic reproduction, the circulation of
simulacra, and the negation of historical time entailed by a crisis of representational realism, all
help to explain its continuing cultural relevance and the extent to which its visual iconography
has been appropriated as an expedient means of reiterating these concerns, all of which have
intensified since the film’s release in 1966. What Blow Up cannot yet comprehend in 1966,
although to be sure there are prefigurations of it in the film’s treatment of fashion photography,
is the extent to which the economic structures undergirding and shaping the tectonic cultural

11

transformations of the 1960s would become more fully financialized over the course of the 20th
century, and into the 21st.12 If Blow Up marks the transition from Fordist modernity to postFordist postmodernity, then the film’s quixotic coda stands, from the perspective of the 21st
century, less as a conclusion to Thomas’s story but as an open-ended gesture to the future, which
has since 1966 become our own inherited time.
But how do the economic and cultural transformations already under way in 1966 affect
the epistemological stakes for visual representation once these changes have more fully matured?
The critical literature on Blow Up offers a clue. Robin Wood adroitly anticipates Deleuze by
writing that in the film, “The distinction between appearance and reality blurs and
dissolves….All sense of values disintegrates.”13 Although Wood is essentially making the same
observation as Deleuze regarding the dissolution of rigid polarities distinguishing the real from
the imaginary, the implications of this dissolution are themselves diametrically opposed:
modernist existential paralysis of the subject versus post-modernist flows of asubjective affect. I
want to focus more precisely, however, on Wood’s use of the term ‘values’ to characterize that
which disintegrates in the film. Chatman also raises the question of values, quoting an interview
with Antonioni in which the director claims that Blow Up is a film that questions the nature of
reality: “‘I’m really questioning the nature of reality. This is an essential point to remember
about the visual aspects of the film since one of its chief themes is to see or not to see properly
“the true value of things.”’ (Value here surely means ‘import’ or ‘quality,’ not ‘worth’ or

12

Angelo Restivo makes a similar case regarding the reception of Antonioni’s next film,
Zabriskie Point (1970), arguing that the film produces an “unreadable historical sign” composed
of “signifiers in a historical moment in which it was impossible for them to cohere.” See Angelo
Restivo, “Revisiting Zabriskie Point” in Rascaroli and Rhodes, p. 86-7.
13
Wood, Antonioni, 131.
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‘price.’)”14 Chatman assures us that when Antonioni refers to “value,” he really means
existential/moral ‘significance,’ and surely not value in an economic sense of the term. I would
like to suggest that not only is Chatman’s confidence misplaced, but that the question of value is
in fact central both to the ways in which the post-Deleuzian interpretations of the film cohere,
and to the ways in which the film proleptically gestures toward a post-modern, post-Fordist
mode of economic and social organization that has become our contemporary history (to the
extent that such a thing is ideologically possible after Fukuyama). In other words, whether or not
Antonioni in the 1960s was referring to “import” in an interview (although given the etymology
of the word, this may not be any better for Chatman), our present circumstances have fulfilled
Antonioni’s film, and this fulfillment also transfigures the question of value itself into one that
anticipates the paradoxical circulation of immaterial commodities, as in the paradigmatic case of
the commodified affects produced by advertising, which is of course Thomas’s whole
professional stock-in-trade.
In other words, I would like to suggest that it is not a mere coincidence that Deleuze uses
the term “exchange” as a central figure for the ways in which Antonioni stages the production of
the new. Nor is it a coincidence that the concept of the figural plays a key role in Deleuze’s
theorization of that exchange. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari cite Lyotard’s then-new
Discourse, Figure as a text that effectively grasps the ‘illiteracy’ of capitalism in its tendency to
decode flows, rather than overcode them through processes of ‘despotic’ signification.15 As
opposed to Chatman’s confident assertion that Antonioni’s term ‘value’ signifies a moralizing,
humanistic content, Deleuze and Guattari approvingly summarize Lyotard: “It is not the figures

14

Chatman, Antonioni; or the Surface of the World, 152.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin, 1977 [1972]), 241.

15
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that depend on the signifier and its effects, but the signifying chain that depends on the figural
effects—the chain itself being composed of asignifying signs—crushing the signifiers as well as
the signifieds, treating words as things, fabricating new unities, creating from nonfigurative
figures configurations of images that form and then disintegrate.”16 This fabrication of new
unities, the formation and disintegration of image configurations, characterizes not only
Antonioni’s film, but also the decoding and axiomatizing operations of capitalism itself, its
fundamental formal characteristics. A key insight of Deleuze and Guattari’s study of “capitalist
representation” is that Marx’s general formula for capital, M-C-M, is both a conceptual model
and a practical account of the processes of de- and reterritorialization entailed by the mysterious
transformations of the commodity itself. M-C-M identifies the schizophrenic process of the
transubstantiation of the abstract into the concrete and the concrete into the abstract, the virtual
into the actual and its return, and the reciprocal movement of representamen into referent, and
vice versa.17 The question of (exchange-)value is therefore inseparable from the question of
representation, but as Deleuze and Guattari point out, capitalism is not a semiotic regime of
Saussurean signs, but rather a regime of Lyotardian figures of desire, producing material effects,
and affects, that expressively produce forms, and only subsequently anything recognizable as
meaning or writing.
Consider again Rhodie’s account of the new in Blow Up as that which appears in the
interstices between realities, something accessible when stable figures or forms dissolve into
their molecular constituent elements, or when an event becomes an image, only for that image to
become an event in turn. In the context of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analysis, we can now grasp

16
17

Ibid., 244.
Ibid., 249-50.
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Blow Up’s investment in photographic representation as a figure (in Lyotard’s sense of the term)
for the value form itself, and of the emergent forms of late 20th century economic organization
that would come to complicate any clear distinction between images and events. Rhodie’s
description of Antonioni also resonates, in compellingly specific ways, with the practice,
endemic to fully virtualized finance capitalism, of ‘slow market,’ or latency arbitrage, in which
high frequency stock traders are able to exploit microsecond differences in the transmission of
pricing information across globally networked stock exchanges to buy the same stock lower in
one location, then immediately sell those shares in another location, where the price is
temporarily higher.18 The market is, in this sense, like Thomas’ photos—what appears as a
coherent and unified representational form becomes, when blown up to view its smallest
components, an irreducible spatial and temporal multiplicity, and a network of disjunctions that
belies any sense of self-identical objects. In the case of the stock market, high-frequency trading
algorithms extract value from the spatiotemporal interstices between two places and two
temporalities, two different realities of the value of a particular financial instrument. At the
macro level, prices appear stable, but at the smallest micrological levels, these ‘dots and tones’
both provide for, and in a sense are, the diachronic flows of liquidity that constitute global
finance capitalism. It is only by paying a service fee to such algorithmic arbitrageurs that any
sense of the market as synchronically self-identical is possible.
As Alison Shonkwiler puts it with reference to the anticipatory orientation of finance
capitalism, “finance must be understood as a process of abstractification and concretization.
Finance continuously seeks the path of the shortest, fastest, and highest return. It works by
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running the possibilities, comparing hypotheticals and actuals, and trading on the difference,
thereby realizing that which had been hypothetical or unreal.”19 The distinctive futurity of
finance is also echoed by Cédric Durand, who argues that “fictitious capital represents claims
over wealth that is yet to be produced. Its expansion implies a growing preemption of future
production.”20 Hence, the quixotic conclusion of Blow Up takes on a new valence as a double
gesture, on the one hand toward precisely this future moment of futurity, in which exchanges
between the virtual and the actual can be productive of new flows of desire, new forms of social
organization, and new modes of aestheticized bodily address, as Rushton claims. On the other
hand, in the context of Antonioni’s own oeuvre, the film’s finale gestures decisively toward the
increasing alienation produced by the emergence of precisely these new forms of organization
wrought be 20th century economic financialization. With Blow Up, we are simultaneously
confronted with the possibility of the production of the new, and the nascent realization that the
mode of such a production is a fully capitalistic one, and that as Durand suggests, it has
preemptively leveraged its options on the future production of the new itself.
Crucially, Blow Up also shows how speculation is central to this production of the new.
Thomas’s investigation of the possible murder ultimately hinges fundamentally on a question of
aesthetic speculation, in the literal sense of aesthesis: is there a figure, or not? This fraught
aesthesis in turn has historical implications: did an event occur, or didn’t it, and how ought
Thomas act in response? Lastly, as I have already indicated, the film’s ultimate staging of an
exchange between the actual and the virtual, and the ambiguous potentials inherent in the
recognition of such exchanges, gestures toward (and indeed speculates on) the economic
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transformation from industrial to post-industrial, ‘fictitious’ capitalism, and the real subsumption
of ostensibly individual and private aesthesis under capital.21 In using speculation as a ground for
rendering these social and economic concerns, Blow Up anticipates contemporary, post-digital
cultural developments, while also staking out speculation, in both its aesthetic and economic
moments, as an aesthetic, cultural, and political problematic within the domain of moving-image
media. To the extent that financial speculation has become more central to the global economy
since 1966, and to the extent that aesthetic judgment, and in particular Kant’s antinomy of taste,
has also become both more central to the creation of cultural products through the
technologically facilitated ability to measure, valorize, and amplify the individual tastes of
increasingly narrow demographic groups as a form of neoliberal ‘self-branding,’ speculation has
become a more pertinent and central problematic spanning each of these arenas.22
1.2

Diagramming the Constellations of A Beautiful Mind
This dissertation explores the intertwined representational and cultural problematic of

speculation, claiming centrally that this nexus of questions is articulated culturally through the
figure of the conspiracy wall, which provides an aesthetic and epistemological schema or
diagram through which the relationship between economic financialization and contemporary
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visual culture can be articulated. As an aesthetic concept, the conspiracy wall emerges out of the
milieu of the conspiracy film genre and designates the assemblage of visual information as part
of an investigation, most stereotypically organized on a cork board in an investigator’s office.
Crucially, I am claiming that it also expresses the formal structure of subject-object relations
between informatic assemblages and investigating observers, whose investment in the production
of knowledge or truth constantly threatens to slide into paranoia, conspiracy thinking, and
ultimately Deleuzo-Guattarian schizophrenia. In this sense, the conspiracy wall functions as a
contemporary analogue of Foucault’s interpretation of Las Meninas as an aesthetic object that
formally triangulates relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity in a manner that renders
the epistemic and political structure of a particular historical formation in condensed form.23 The
aesthetic objects under scrutiny here each incorporate the figure of the conspiracy wall, as I am
terming it, and in each the formal rendering of the interrelated processes of investigative
detection and the production and organization of images is the central prism through which these
texts come to allegorical grips with the ramifications of financialization and the increasing
centrality of speculation of all stripes to mass culture under capitalism. Across a variety of genres
and media forms, the figure of the conspiracy wall signals the attempt to grasp the social
implications of the extensive and indeed profoundly ontological changes in capitalism since the
1970s, by phrasing these implications in terms of digital image production and circulation, logics
of preemption, and the paradoxical materialities of an increasingly dematerialized, financialized
capital. All of the objects under consideration here, despite their differences in genre, no less
than in medium, share a concern for these implications of the ontological changes wrought by the
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financialization of capitalism, and frame that concern in terms of a dialectical tension between
abstraction and concretion.
In this sense, the objects of this study are contemporary descendants of the 1970s
conspiracy thrillers analyzed in Jameson’s Geopolitical Aesthetic, albeit with several crucial
distinctions. First, the financialization of global markets was only a newly emergent phenomenon
in the 1970s, and its full consequences were not yet known when films like The Parallax View
(dir. Alan Pakula, 1974) and All the President’s Men (dir. Alan Pakula, 1976) were made. The
end of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1973, which had stabilized the value of global
currency in the service of American geopolitical hegemony in the postwar period, inaugurated
far-reaching changes that facilitated the development of financialization in the latter quarter of
the 20th century and beyond.24 Secondly, and following from this, it is precisely the digitization
of communications technologies that has enabled the metastasis of financial instruments and
accelerating financialization in the intervening decades. While the communications technologies
in The Geopolitical Aesthetic are largely analog technologies, it is to digital image production
and circulation that we must look in order to locate the expression of finance in culture. Lastly,
none of the objects under discussion here would be readily identifiable generically as
‘conspiracy’ films, in the conventional sense of that term as indexing narratives of shady
governmental operatives, secret plots, or overtly manifest political contents. Since the 1970s,
however, the generic tropes of the conspiracy film have become increasingly commonplace, to
the point where they too quickly become self-reflexive pastiches of their own ostensible
contents. More than two decades have passed since The X-Files (1993-) transformed the generic
narrative of investigation of a totalizing government conspiracy into a series of de-politicized
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narrative clichés, and more than three years have now passed since The X-Files was itself
nostalgically revived.25 After The X-Files, whatever modernist potential may have been
embedded in the controversy of J.F.K. (dir. Oliver Stone, 1991) has been effectively transformed
into an alibi for selling a bemused brand of detached, speculative skepticism as a commodified
affective experience, as is evident in the slew of commercial programs dedicated to ‘considering’
various conspiracy theories, of which Ancient Aliens (2010-) and various cable news programs
are perhaps the most well-known and viewed.26
Importantly, although the roots of the conspiracy wall as an aesthetic paradigm date back
at least to Blow Up, it is still only partially formed in the 1970s cycle of conspiracy thrillers. In
All the President’s Men, Bob Woodward’s home/office space features a bulletin board covered
with index cards and slips of paper, presumably to help organize the expansive and tedious
Watergate investigation, but the board is only fleetingly present in the film (fig. 1.5).
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Figure 1.5 All the President’s Men
More significant and more strongly emphasized as a set-piece is the mosaic image produced by
high school students’ signs in The Parallax View, where the tiled and fragmentary signs of the
students gesture toward the aesthetic unity of portraits of U.S. presidents and the to-beassassinated senator (fig. 1.6).27
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This image also owes a stylistic and conceptual debt to the “Shanghai Lil” musical number in
Busby Berkeley’s Footlight Parade (1933), in which a similarly tiled mosaic of Franklin
Roosevelt’s portrait is rendered by a grid of performers. This in turn also articulates the
genealogy of the conspiracy wall to Siegfried Kracauer’s concept of the mass ornament as a
figure for capitalist ratio, about more which below.
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Figure 1.6 The Parallax View
Here, the contradiction between aesthetic unity and perceptual fragmentation allegorizes the
historical desire to elect the senator while simultaneously attesting to its tenuousness and
contingency, both of which are dialectically inverted by the senator’s ensuing assassination,
which affirms the contingency of political history while also showing the democratic will of the
people to be a sham that covers for the more unitary and singular political will of the Parallax
Corporation and its clients.
While The Parallax View marks a continuation of the aesthetic and political problematic
of the conspiracy wall inaugurated by Blow Up, it is not until the 21st century that the motif
solidifies into its contemporary, recognizable form, replete with pieces of string connecting
pieces of information together in a figure that carries the full weight of the aesthetic and
epistemic problems it crystalizes, in Ron Howard’s Best Picture-winning film A Beautiful Mind
(2001), which fictionalizes the life of John Nash, the schizophrenic mathematician responsible
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for crucial insights into game theory.28 Here, not only is the form of the conspiracy wall fully
articulated, but it is deployed precisely in order to indicate the difference between rational,
productive, and creative thought on the one hand, and paranoid irrational, and self-destructive
thought on the other. A Beautiful Mind marks a pivotal shift in the representational function of
the conspiracy wall in several ways, the first of which is that the conspiracy thriller is no longer
the generic dominant of the film, but is itself made recognizable as genre, as a narrative content
rather than a narrative form, in order to more effectively signify Nash’s schizophrenia to the
viewer. This in turn indicates a broader diffusion of the generic tropes of the classic conspiracy
thriller, which can now be quoted as a gestural stand-in for the political content of films like The
Parallax View. In part, this diffusive absorption of the distinctive formal components of the
conspiracy thriller into other genres like the prestige drama in the case of A Beautiful Mind, the
blockbuster action film in many of the contemporary superhero films, but especially Captain
America: The Winter Soldier (dir. Joe and Anthony Russo, 2014) and Captain Marvel (dir. Anna
Boden and Ryan Fleck, 2019), and the other genres under discussion in the chapters below,
indicates that the conspiracy thriller may no longer be recognizable as a distinct genre only
because it has become infused into and across a wide and diverse array of generic forms.
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The Usual Suspects (1995, dir. Bryan Singer) functions as another transitional object in this
genealogy of the conspiracy wall. During the film’s climactic narrative twist it is revealed to
the audience that Verbal Kint/Keyser Söze has been improvising his account of the film’s plot
by drawing inspiration from the interviewing detective’s cork board and incorporating details
from the contents of the board into his narrative. While in this film the corkboard does function
in the service of the construction of a unified narrative out of an assemblage of charged
fragments, it is also being knowingly wielded by a criminal mastermind possessed of epistemic
mastery, displacing the necessary element of cognitive aporia and epiphany away from the
diegesis and onto the film’s own audience. The epistemic omniscience of the Spacey character,
who knows the truth all along, recuperates the generativity of the conspiracy wall in the service
of a conventional narrative reversal.
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A Beautiful Mind presents two versions of the conspiracy walls. In the ‘good’ version, the
figure stands for the rational comprehension and explanation of complex behavior (fig. 1.7),
while in the ‘bad’ version, it indexes Nash’s descent into paranoid and hallucinatory mental
illness, in which he can no longer discern the real from the imaginary and believes himself to be
caught up in a Cold War codebreaking conspiracy (fig. 1.8).

Figure 1.7 A Beautiful Mind
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Figure 1.8 A Beautiful Mind
Between these two poles the film offers several variations on its theme, from the opening
sequence of the film in which Nash is shown recognizing the geometrical patterns undergirding
the ugliness of a colleague’s necktie (fig. 1.9), to a scene in which he epiphanically perceives the
hidden patterns embedded in numerical code while working in a defense project (fig. 1.10), to a
romantic scene in which Nash uses his genius for pattern recognition to produce new
constellations in the night sky as a romantic gesture at the behest of his date and future wife (fig.
1.11). Thus, through the film’s aesthetic and contextual repetition and variation, it crystallizes
the form of the conspiracy wall as an aesthetic figure, but does so in its abstraction of that form
into a set of relational principles that extend beyond the generic circumstance of the conspiracy
thriller.
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Figure 1.9 A Beautiful Mind

Figure 1.10 A Beautiful Mind
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Figure 1.11 A Beautiful Mind
The film’s work of representational and conceptual abstraction therefore iteratively
unpacks how the conspiracy walls in the film constructively figure subject-object relations,
problematizing the act of speculation in an almost literally Kantian sense of these terms. In one
scene Nash is institutionalized as a result of his psychosis, but believes his powers of reason and
problem-solving will allow him to find the solution, to which his psychotherapist replies that
Nash cannot reason his way out of mental illness on account of the fact that the illness is
afflicting his ability to reason in the first place, marking a Kantian dilemma if ever there was one
and framing Nash’s illness and genius in terms of his ability to look at the world and see its
underlying patterns, a faculty which is disrupted by the unwanted proliferation of illusions into
his empirical experience of the world-as-appearance. Through its investment in mapping the
different configurations between subjects, objects, and epistemological modes of knowing, A
Beautiful Mind effectively, if unwittingly, renders the form of the conspiracy wall as a kind of
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diagram, a discursive form governing and distributing relations between subjects and objects and
expressing these relations as a multiplicity of potential instantiations, from the aesthetics of
fashion to the stars themselves.
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, and in particular his
emphasis on Foucault’s distinction between propositions and statements, helps to illuminate the
discursive functioning of A Beautiful Mind’s conspiracy walls. For Foucault, discursive
statements are general functions of possible expressivity, whereas propositions constitute the
expressed, or signifieds of a particular semiotic and discursive regime.29 Deleuze expands this
distinction into an immanent relation between schematic functions that organize and delimit the
possibilities of expression, and the actual expressions that are produced in accordance with those
functions. Deleuze explains that statements refer not to a unique force or particular fact of
expression, but to “certain intrinsic positions which are extremely variable and form part of the
statements itself.”30 Importantly, and hence the synonymic wordplay, discursive statements do
not only establish relations between subjects and objects of discourse, but they express those
relations, and generatively produce them at the same time that they stand as representational
models or diagrams of those same productive forces. “If statements can be distinguished from
words, phrases or propositions,” Deleuze writes, “it is because they contain their own functions
of subject, object and concept in the form of ‘derivatives.’”31 If the individual instantiations of
the conspiracy wall in A Beautiful Mind correlate with propositions, or signifieds, whether of the
conspiracy genre itself, or of Nash’s epiphanic genius or mental illness, then when taken together
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as a set of variations, the film’s conspiracy walls express the diagrammatic organizing
parameters immanent to, and ultimately constitutive of, this discursive operation of the
production of generic or narrative legibility.
Moreover, A Beautiful Mind marks a significant turning point in the genealogy of the
conspiracy wall not only because of its metapictorial theorizing of its own conditions of
representability, but also because the film’s narrative resolution of Nash’s illness, in which he
comes to terms with persistent fictional hallucinations in order to remain intellectually
productive and romantically gratified, allegorizes the financialization of the 20th century global
economy. Specifically, the film allegorizes the transcendence of the zero-sum game of the Cold
War by the accommodation of the productive fictions of globalized, neoliberalized, and
financialized capitalism. Crucial to this interpretation is the fact that Nash’s personal and
domestic problem, that is his schizophrenia, is successfully overcome by the same gametheoretical reasoning for which he is famous: he and the hallucinations reach a cooperative
compromise (one is tempted even to say a kind of utopian conspiracy, a dialectical reversal of
Nash’s psychotic paranoia), ironically echoing the innovation of the concept of the Nash
Equilibrium at the core of the film’s historical narrative. The film literally suggests that the
accommodation of fictitious entities is necessary in order to maintain domestic and professional
stability and productivity, effectively dramatizing finance capital’s encompassing of its own
absolute exterior ‘schizophrenic’ limit, an event thought structurally impossible by Deleuze and
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus.32 This notion in the film has its allegorical correlate in the embrace of
fictitious capital, in the form of financial derivatives, as a cornerstone of the late 20th century
globalized economy, primarily as a consequence of its perceived efficiency by neoclassical
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economists in mediating between global supply and demand.33 Thus, the film’s allegorical
content and its aesthetic form are intimately related, as both express potential relations between
knowing subjects, the possible illusion of empirical reality, and the epistemic means through
which those subjects and objects are produced in mutual relation to each other. Here, where the
film’s aesthetic concern with the figural, its discursive expression of these relations, and its
contextualization of this concern and its investigation in relation to economic financialization, is
where the film most profoundly expresses the cultural and representational problematic of
speculation, which also animates Blow Up and the 1970s conspiracy thrillers. This nexus of
concerns is also where A Beautiful Mind provides a kind of figure, or as the film itself reflexively
suggests, a constellation—in the fully figural and fateful sense of Benjamin’s usage of it—for
21st century visual representations of investigation, particularly those that tend toward the
speculative and conspiratorial, rather than the procedural and linear. Hence, I take the film as
crystallizing a set of interrelated and interlocking economic, metaphysical, and aesthetic
concerns that is itself representative and in anticipation of later motifs in visual media, the most
pronounced and widespread of which is the conspiracy wall itself. These concerns turn, more
specifically, on considerations of finance capital and financialization, the concept of the
Deleuzian diagram, and the figural as such, as well as what each of these concepts has to do with
the others. In the following sections, I will briefly sketch the ways I am using these terms, as
well as their relationship to each other within the framework of this project.
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1.3

Speculative Capital
The concept of finance capital, or of financialization, has been defined in a variety of

ways. Summarizing and reflecting on a white paper by sociologist Greta Krippner, Gerald
Epstein remarks that
as [Krippner] summarizes the discussion, some writers use the term
‘financialization’ to mean the ascendancy of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of
corporate governance; some use it to refer to the growing dominance of capital
market financial systems over bank based financial systems; some follow
Hilferding’s lead and use the term ‘financialization’ to refer to the increasing
political and economic power of a particular class grouping: the rentier class; for
some financialization represents the explosion of financial trading with a myriad
of new financial instruments; finally, for Krippner herself, the term refers to a
‘pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production.34
While each of these perspectives offers valuable insight, here I want to trace a line of thought on
financialization that follows Marx’s initial sketch of fictitious capital, while emphasizing the
figurality of financial instruments. In the briefest possible terms, finance capital represents a
“problem,” as Fredric Jameson has termed it, in that it short-circuits Marx’s general formula for
capital, M-C-M, allowing money to exchange for money without passing through the commodity
form, in an abbreviated M-M’ form.35 This is the same circumstance identified by Marx in
volume 3 of Capital and elaborated on by David Harvey, in which the problem of money’s
having to be invested in material goods or labor in order to produce interest—a process which
reduces the flexibility and general exchangeability of money—is solved by the lending and
exchange of advances on that expected and hypothetical interest as capital; or in other words,
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credit.36 Crucially, as Harvey explains, the economic innovation of credit involves the temporal
separation of the purchase and sale that compose an economic exchange: “The category of
‘fictitious capital’ is in fact implied whenever credit is extended in advance, in anticipation of
future labor as a counter-value.”37 Rudolf Hilferding, in his landmark early study of finance,
affirms this temporal disjunction as the essence of credit and debt.38 Importantly, the time gaps
opened up by the innovation of credit and debt instruments also opens a space for financial
speculation, in which titles to interest on loans rather than commodities are exchanged, paving
the way for increasingly complex derivative financial instruments to be created and traded.39
These kinds of wagers on price changes define the modern concept of the ‘derivative,’ as “a
species of transactable contract in which (1) there is no movement of capital until its settlement,
(2) the change in the price of the underlying asset determines the value of the contract, and (3)
the contract has some specified expiration date in the future.”40 The financial derivative, like
earlier instruments of speculation, credit, and debt, similarly relies upon (because it bets on) a
temporal window created by the disjunction of the purchase and sale in a monetary transaction.
The history of finance and financialization is long, and arguably, as Giovanni Arrighi and
Ian Baucom have suggested (although with quite different points of emphasis), perhaps
ultimately inextricable from the history of capitalism itself. However, As LiPuma and Lee
explain, as governing or dominant economic paradigm financialization begins in the 1970s with
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the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the innovation of the Black-Sholes model of risk
quantification. The end of Bretton Woods system in 1973, which enabled central banks to fix and
regulate currency exchange rates, led to a system of floating exchange rates, in which the market
would itself determine currency prices, in turn leading to an increase in volatility in currency
prices. The Black-Scholes model, also developed in 1973, allowed investors to quantify
volatility, or risk, of financial assets, leading to the development of a boom in the creation of
derivative financial instruments.41 As LiPuma and Lee argue, these changes to the global
financial system in the 1970s helped transform it into a new and distinctive economic system that
valorizes the circulation of capital over the production of commodities.42
Several significant implications can be drawn from this brief sketch of financialization.
Firstly, finance capital is anticipatory or preemptive, in the sense that it anticipates and wagers
upon future changes in asset prices. At the micro level, this preemptive anticipation is baked into
the formal structure of credit, as well as of derivatives, while at the macro level, as Cédric
Durand notes, “fictitious capital represents claims over wealth that is yet to be produced. Its
expansion implies a growing pre-emption of future production.”43 The temporal paradox of
finance capital is, as Durand explains, that while future returns are preempted by present
exchanges, suggesting increased flexibility and freedom today, the valorization of the present is
increasingly dependent on the anticipation of a stable futurity that forecloses alternatives,
producing an economic and temporal determinism with no alternative.44
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At the same time, a novel futurity is paradoxically also necessary for the expansion and
continued growth of capital. The pricing of financial derivatives is predicated on the ability to
statistically model price volatility on the basis of historical data regarding similar forms of risk,
but as LiPuma and Lee cogently explain,
While any single derivative “predicts” or discounts the future, derivatives as a
class of financial instruments significantly influence that future. Certainly, the
calculus that agents use to determine the value of a derivative assumes that its
effect on the future is so minimal as to be discounted in the discounting
mechanism. However, while this may be more or less true with respect to an
individual transaction, derivatives as a collective action transform the economic
landscape.45
In short, a derivative itself is created by a financial agent who relies on prior historical
performance data to calculate the derivative’s price, rightly discounting the possibility that the
individual derivative itself will have a statistically significant impact on the market as a whole.
Collectively, however, derivatives have a transformative effect, and can drastically and violently
reshape the economies of entire nations. Derivatives thereby create the novel futurity they need,
a futurity marked by ever-increasing volatility and leverageable risk, in order to continue
expanding and circulating through the market. In this sense they function, like disciplinary
diagrams or celestial constellations, to produce and seal the fates of the circumstances they
organize and give order to. For Jameson, the peculiar temporal arrangement organized by finance
capital finds its cultural expression not only temporally, but also spatially, through a postmodern
aesthetic of fragmentation and renarrativization, in which the postmodern fragment is capable of
seamlessly renarrativizing and producing meaning, as opposed to the “empty,” “meaningless,”
and “autonomized” fragmentation of modernism.46 Thus, postmodern fragmentation indexes the
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self-sustaining flow of abstracted and financialized capital through the global circuits of the
economy, continually producing recombinations of the same as the form of the new.
Moreover, finance capital is not only preemptive and productive, but as the emblematic
case of derivatives makes clear, also distinctively figural. Derivatives objectify statistically
modeled risk, volatility, or in even more basic terms, price change and difference. These objects
then circulate globally, and fetishistically, as though they are absolutely divorced form the
underlying social conditions of risk that engender them (i.e. geopolitical strife or environmental
crisis), but which in fact come to reshape, and often exacerbate, the very forms of risk that are
underlying the derivatives themselves. LiPuma and Lee explain that
On the one hand, [the derivatives market] assumes that the analysis of a derivative
can discount and quantify risk because the social reality that it models will remain
constant over the life of any specific transaction. On the opposite hand,
derivatives as a class of financial instruments are powerful because they transform
that social reality and therefore the character of the risk that engenders the social
interdependence of the principals….The pricing of derivatives thus presupposes
that they simply reflect economic reality rather than having a hand in creating it,
meaning that to the extent that the global market for derivatives, in concert with
other social and historical forces, transforms political and economic conditions, it
will be impossible to accurately calculate volatility and thus price a derivative
accurately.47
Derivatives therefore produce the social reality that they purport only to objectively represent,
and they do so by mosaically aggregating historical data into a single figural representation,
which in turn functions as part of an aggregate assemblage to shape that underlying reality. They
exemplify Deleuze’s concept of the statement (which I argue below is closely related to his
notion of the diagram) as a self-organizing function that produces and regulates possible
organizational and material outcomes, and they also materialize the figural relations between the
past and the future that are constitutive of Auerbach’s concept of the figura as a phrase yoking
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the historical past to the redemptive future. As LiPuma and Lee note, “the power of the financial
system depends greatly on its power to produce the categories through which it is grasped.”48 In
the following sections, I lay out the significance of the concept of the diagram as a way of
apprehending the self-reflexively generative nature of speculation, and then explain how the
figure functions as an aesthetic and formal instantiation of that speculative diagram.
1.4

Speculative Aesthetics
If value appears to be distinctively productive under finance capital, as exemplified by

the case of derivatives, then so have representations of value, which have also become
representational values. Therefore, the what is at stake in the financial turn is not just the
representability or figurability of capital, but the capitalization of representability, as in the
innovation of the Black-Scholes system, as a means of production of the real. Alberto Toscano
and Jeff Kinkle hint at this in characterizing cognitive mapping as a “forcing into being a certain
kind of political visibility” and as a “force-field in which our conceptions of both modes of
production and aesthetic regimes are put to the test,” but if capitalism is indeed “the true ground
of being in our time,” then a more robust theoretical apparatus capable of giving expression to
the very ontogenic expressiveness of capitalism as a metaphysics is required.49 Toscano and
Kinkle note, at the tail end of their study, that “Having surveyed many of the ‘maps’ thrown up
by anxious desire to represent our mode of production, it is difficult not to conclude that, bar
some inspiring exceptions, capital has been a theme or content, not an occasion to truly rethink
and refunction our available genres, styles, figures and forms, to recast our methods of inquiry in
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the arts as in the sciences of society.”50 But if this is the case, it is in part due to the limitations of
the very logic of representation that is taken to bear on the aesthetic objects that are interpreted
as examples of cognitive mapping.
In other words, ‘mapping’ must be reconceived as a productive rendering of space-time
in the world-system, rather than as some kind of passively representational act of orientation
within a larger system. It must become, in Donald Mackenzie’s suggestive description of the
productive function of financial models, “an engine, not a camera.”51 This is in part why the
concept of the figural plays a central role in this study, since it more effectively captures the
chiasmatic, generative tension between words and images, between representations and capital,
and between the past, present, and future. The concept of the figural is also grounded in the claim
on a formal and conceptual parallelism between the related logics of the commodity and of
financialized capital, as forms of representation, and W.J.T. Mitchell’s concept of the
‘imagetext’: a set of image-text relations in which it is not the differences between the image and
the text, but rather the differences those differences make—a second-order abstraction in which
incommensurable dimensions, image and text, line and letter, become commensurable with each
other.52 Hence the importance of the figural in situating and compositing these conceptual
elements in the project’s broader analytical framework.
If, as Toscano and Kinkle provocatively suggest, “Capitalism, after all, is a religion of
everyday life, an actually-existing metaphysics,” then what kind of ‘actually-existing
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metaphysics’ is it?53 I would suggest that LiPuma’s and Lee’s account of derivatives as
productive of social reality, as well as Shonkwiler’s account of financialized capital, as a process
of abstractification and concretization that realizes what had been unreal by trading on the
difference between hypotheticals and actuals, is Whiteheadean après la lettre, and that
Whitehead’s process philosophy, and in particular his inversion of Kant, provides just the kind of
metaphysical account of concretization, abstraction, and process necessary to grasp the profound
representational and aesthetic challenges brought about by finance capital.
In Process and Reality, Whitehead argues that “The philosophy or organism is the
inversion of Kant’s philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason describes how the process by
which subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The philosophy or
organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction. For Kant, the
world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the
world—a ‘superject’ rather than a ‘subject.’”54 Instead of beginning, as Kant does, with the
subject as the center of the metaphysical universe, Whitehead takes the event, as an unfolding of
contiguous processes, as the fundamental object of his philosophical investigation.
Consequently, Whitehead inverts the order of Kant’s critiques, placing aesthetics, rather than
ontology or ethics, at the center of philosophical inquiry, arguing that affect (what Whitehead
terms “emotion”) is the metaphysical ground for these other concepts, rather than vice versa. As
Whitehead explains,
The philosophy or organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the
philosophical position which Kant put his Critique of Pure Reason. This should
also supercede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy. Thus
in the organic philosophy Kant’s ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ becomes a distorted
53
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fragment of what should have been his main topic. The datum includes its own
interconnections, and the first stage of the process of feeling is the reception into
the responsive conformity of feeling whereby the datum, which is mere
potentiality, becomes the individualized basis for a complex unity of realization.55
In other words, Whitehead’s process philosophy takes aesthetics, and more specifically Kant’s
aesthetic of the beautiful, which accounts for how subjects can engage in judgment without a
determinate concept, through a ‘free play of the cognitive faculties,’ as the primary explanatory
mechanism through which reality, which is fundamentally composed of affective “prehensions,”
constitutes itself and changes over time. Steven Shaviro explains that for Whitehead, “Beauty is
therefore an event, a process, rather than a condition or a state.”56
Marxist criticism, including Toscano and Kinkle, as well as Jameson’s writings of the
1990s, figure global capital as a sublime and unthinkable totality, but Whitehead orients us
towards a different set of questions regarding aesthetics and capital by providing precisely the
kind of metaphysics that finance capital seems to require. Capitalism, as Marx’s theory of the
commodity suggests, is already a system predicated on a form of representational exchange that
operates via abstraction. Finance capital raises this abstraction to a higher power, by allowing
monetary abstractions to represent and exchange for each other, and by incorporating processes
of speculative judgment about the future into the very fabric of the present. What is needed now
is perhaps not an account of how individual subjects map their relation to the sublime totality,
but an account of how processes of aesthetic representation and judgment (which is also to say
events of Whiteheadean beauty) precede and inform processes of subject formation, constituting
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the very economic and social fabric necessary as a prerequisite to the consequent production of
subjectivities which can strive to apprehend the sublime reaches of global capital.
The commodity is an aesthetic object, in the precise sense that Marx provides in his
formula for the relationship between exchange-value and use-value, in which “exchange-values
cannot be anything other than the mode of expression, the ‘form of appearance,’ of a content
distinguishable from it.”57 That the value of the commodity appears in the form of its physical
and sensuous properties is the basis of commodity fetishism. Exchange-value is an abstract
quantity, while use-value is qualitative, and therefore inescapably aesthetic. Commodity
fetishism occurs when exchange-value mistakenly appears as use-value, as a property of things
themselves. As Marx explains, “The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists
therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own
labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural
properties of these things.”58 In a particularly Whiteheadean turn, Marx immediately goes on to
explain commodity fetishism through an analogy to vision:
In the same way, the impression made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived
not as a subjective excitation of that nerve but as the objective form of a thing
outside the eye. In the act of seeing, of course, light is really transmitted from one
thing, the external object, to another thing, the eye. It is a physical relation
between things. As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the
products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with
the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this.
It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things.59
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Here, Marx analogizes commodity fetishism to an outmoded theory of vision which takes the
sensible qualities of objects to be properties of the object in themselves, rather than subjective
effects of the physical relationship between objects and perceiving subjects. Whitehead traces
this manner of thinking about perception to Descartes, whose “unquestioned acceptance of the
subject-predicate dogma forced him into a representative theory of perception.”60 For Whitehead,
this erroneous subject-predicate theory of perception wreaks havoc throughout modern
philosophy: “All modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms
of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. The result always does
violence to that immediate experience which we express in our actions, our hopes, our
sympathies, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal
analysis.”61 In other words, the subject-predicate model of perceptual experience inadequately
explains the actual nature of perceptual events, in a manner that unduly isolates, objectifies, and
indeed fetishizes objects of perception. In actuality, for Whitehead, “We find ourselves in a
buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other,
orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances…”62 Whitehead echoes Marx
in asserting the definitively social nature of perceptual relation, and in ways that produce a
metaphysical resonance between the two: Marx’s transubstantiation of qualitative social relations
into abstract, material quanta, and Whitehead’s intensively materialist theory of the ‘society’ as a
‘nexus’ of actual entities affectively ‘prehending’ each other.63 Through this juxtaposition,
Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism comes close to the form of argument Whitehead uses to
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critique the subject-predicate model of experience, and hence to enact the latter’s aesthetic
reversal of Kant’s metaphysics. What Marx, no less than Whitehead, endeavors to explain is the
manner in which economic relations of exchange are always imbued with relations of processual
sociality and aesthetic judgment ‘without criteria,’ relations which, through the process of
exchange, become abstracted into discrete, quantitative relations between subjects and objects,
perceivers and objects of property, that is, “forms of appearance” in precisely Kant’s own
technical usage of the term as “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in
certain relations.”64
By making affective experience primary, Shaviro suggests, Whitehead comes to
anticipate Deleuze as a philosopher of becoming.65 Consequently, Whitehead also becomes a
predecessor of Rancière, whose concept of the distribution of the sensible—“the system of selfevident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in
common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it”—can be
appreciated fully in its aesthetic implications.66 Rancière is correct to point out that “there is an
aesthetics at the core of politics,” and that the political nature of experience is fundamentally
inseparable from its aesthetic nature. But if “politics revolves around what is seen and what can
be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties
of space and the possibilities of time,” then the metastasis of conspiracy’s aesthetic form into an
ontologically generative mode of epistemology entails a raising of the stakes, since we are no
longer talking simply about the partition between the visible and the invisible, but about a more
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profoundly ontological partition between what is authorized or permitted to exist and what is
not.67 To the extent that the phantasmagorias of financial value and speculation are relevant
epistemic formations then, they are also constitutive forms, facilitating and enacting the
distribution of the sensible as ontogenic aesthetic forces. This is, of course, already implicit in
Rancière’s characterization of aesthetics, which itself echoes Shaviro. Rancière states that
“aesthetics can be understood in a Kantian sense—re-examined perhaps by Foucault—as the
system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience. It is a delimitation
of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously
determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience.”68 Thus, Whitehead helps
us understand mapping precisely in its processual aspect, as an ‘-ing’; an aesthetic process of
schematic and material formation, in which the schematic and material dimensions are mutually
immanent to each other.
1.5

The Schema, Diagram, The Abstract Machine
This immanence of schematicity and materiality is taken up most fully and explicitly by

Deleuze, in his concept of the diagram. We have already encountered one variation on Deleuze’s
concept of the diagram, in the form of his distinguishing, in The Archaeology of Knowledge,
between statements and propositions. At its most basic, Deleuze uses the concept of the diagram,
which appears throughout his oeuvre in many guises and through many diverse examples, as a
means of revising and reorganizing the relationship between what Kant called schemata and
images of objects, or forms of appearance in empirical sense perception. As Melissa McMahon
explains, both Deleuze’s and Kant’s philosophical projects share an investment in
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problematizing the concept of difference in terms of the difference between the conceptual and
the non-conceptual rather than between concepts themselves, between the intelligible and the
sensible, and between the logical and the aesthetic.69 In Kant, this difference is negotiated by the
notion of synthetic a priori concepts of the understanding which, like problems in geometry,
“[require] a material process of construction or transformation, in the course of which properties
of a figure come to light which cannot be deduced from its concept.”70 McMahon argues that
“Deleuze is clearly inspired by the geometrical or ‘schematic’ understanding of a concept as a
diagrammatic mode of occupying space and time: the idea that a thing’s concept or essence is a
set of distinctive points or movements that mark out a territory, instead of being a purely
intelligible identity.”71 Deleuze’s innovation, however, is to follow Whitehead in insisting on the
primacy of aesthetic experience, as a material movement in space-time that conjoins bodies and
produces images, which precedes and informs the other cognitive faculties.72 In doing so, as
Shaviro claims, he transforms Kant’s notion of the regulative idea into the concept of the virtual:
A regulative idea does not determine any particular solution in advance. But
operating as a guideline, or frame of reference, the regulative idea works
problematically, to establish the conditions out of which solutions, or “decisions,”
can emerge. In positing a process of this sort, Kant invents the notion of the
transcendental realm, or of what Deleuze will call the virtual….Deleuze himself
does what he credits Nietzsche with doing: he “stands [Kantian] critique on its
feet, just as Marx does with the [Hegelian] dialectic.73
Hence, the diagram, in Deleuze’s thought, performs a function that is analogous to the Kantian
schema, but differs fundamentally in that its trajectory moves from unconditioned apperception
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to conditioned reason, rather than the reverse, and in its mediation between virtual and actual,
rather than the possible and the real. Shaviro explains this inversion by claiming that “To convert
Kant from transcendental idealism to transcendental empiricism, and from a juridico-legislative
project to a constructivist one, is to move from the possible to the virtual, and from merely
formal conditions of possibility to concrete conditions of actualization.”74 This in turn entails a
different function for the schematic diagram, which for Deleuze operates as a self-organizing,
doubly articulated hinge between pure matter, movement, and sensation on the one hand, and
form and intelligibility on the other.
For Deleuze, the diagram, or figural, explains how molar structures can form out of
molecular assemblages. As I have already suggested, this ‘problem of difference,’ as McMahon
calls it, is found across Deleuze’s thought, and in many guises. It is present in The Logic of
Sense, where Deleuze claims that “Sense is both the expressible and the expressed of the
proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side toward things and one side
toward propositions….It is exactly the boundary between propositions and things….It is in this
sense that it is an ‘event’: on the condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal
realization in a state of affairs.”75 Later in The Logic of Sense Deleuze reiterates this problem in
terms of representation, stating that “Representation must encompass an expression which it does
not represent, but without which it itself would not be “comprehensive,” and would have truth
only by chance or from outside.”76 In this passage, Deleuze frames the Kantian problem of the
schema, or the figure that contains its own regulative but non-deducible properties, as a problem
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of representational signification: what immanent logic distinguishes sense from nonsense? Here,
Deleuze’s conception of the diagram, though he does not use that terminology, comes close both
to Lyotard’s theorization of the figural, and to Auerbach’s historically-oriented account of the
figura, which will be discussed at greater length below.
The problem of difference is also phrased, by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Pleateaus,
along explicitly linguistic lines, in their discussion of the double articulation and its relationship
to Hjelmslev’s model of the sign. Here, the concept of the double articulation is leveraged to
explain how the divide between matter and intelligibility is traversed:
The first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable
molecular or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a
statistical order of connections and succession (forms). The second articulation
establishes functional, compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar
compounds in which these structures are simultaneously actualized.77
Deleuze and Guattari go on to explain how Hjelmslev’s sign model, which decomposes the sign
not only into signifier and signified, but into forms and substances of content and expression,
thereby producing an account of processes of stratification that transcend the narrow confines of
linguistics to isomorphically encompass all manner of modes of material organization and
formation, as what they term an abstract machine. Discussing regimes of signs, they write:
We must therefore arrive at something in the assemblage itself that is still more
profound than these sides [of the assemblage, content and expression] and can
account for both the forms in presupposition, forms of expression or regimes of
signs (semiotic systems) and forms of content or regimes of bodies (physical
systems). This is what we call the abstract machine, which constitutes and
conjugates all of the assemblage’s cutting edges of deterritorialization. An
abstract machine in itself is not physical or corporeal, any more than it is
semiotic: it is diagrammatic….The abstract machine is pure Matter-Function—a
diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will
distribute.78
77

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Brian Massumi (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013 [1980]), 47.
78
Ibid., 163-4.

46

Thus, the diagram is an abstract machine, but it is not, or not simply, material or physical in
nature. Rather, it is a schematic mechanism that regulates the boundary between sensation and
intelligibility—conjugating an assemblage’s deterritorializations—that is virtually immanent to
material process of formation. It is not a figure, but rather figural, in its regulation of the
differences and contiguities constitutive of intelligible forms. Like the Foucauldian statement, it
functionally organizes and distributes forms, substances, expressions and contents, generating
and delimiting the actual articulable propositions.
The implications of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, and its diagrammatic
schematism, for visual culture and moving image studies are most clearly expressed through his
interpretive readings of Foucault and Francis Bacon. Deleuze identifies, in Discipline and
Punish, a shift in Foucault’s thinking from the earlier period of The Archaeology of Knowledge
and prior, in which Foucault posited both discursive statements as well as non-discursive
environmental structures and institutions, to a conception in which even putatively nondiscursive, purely visual structures are capable of producing effects analogous yet irreducible, to
discourse: “What The Archaeology recognized but still only designated negatively, as nondiscursive environments, is given its positive form in Discipline and Punish, a form that haunted
the whole of Foucault’s work: the form of the visible, as opposed to the form of whatever can be
articulated.”79 Deleuze argues that the major significance of Discipline and Punish, and
especially of its keystone example of the panopticon, lies in the realization that power operates
through non-discursive formations like architectural structures and organizations of visibility and
invisibility just as much as it does through discursive statements, decrees, and other linguistic
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utterances. In this sense, Foucault follows Lyotard in emphasizing the chiasmus between images
and discourse, albeit as a site of the exercise of power, as much as of desire. Deleuze notes that
Foucault terms this capacity for figural formation a diagram, explaining that
The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography
that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is
defined by its informal functions and matter and in terms of form makes no
distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a nondiscursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though
it makes others see and speak.80
For Deleuze, the Foucauldian diagram does not merely describe the means through which power
finds its expression, but is also, perhaps more fundamentally, the mechanism through which
material and social realities, as stable if contingent forms or structures, are immanently
constituted through ongoing processes of formation:
It never functions in order to represent a persisting world but produces a new
kind of reality, a new model of truth. It is neither the subject of history, nor does
it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and
significations, constituting hundreds of points of emergence or creativity,
unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a
sense of continual evolution.81
Power, for Deleuze, both constitutes and produces a diagram immanent to the material field upon
which it exerts epistemic and historical force, a figure cohering into stable diagrammatic forms
of multiple forces in mutual tension, thereby producing the conditions under which truth can be
thought by sculpting relations between the visible and the articulable, the sensible and the
sayable. Thus, the diagram provides a conceptual means for understanding not only how forces
can congeal into more or less stable forms, but also how historical strata are thereby formed, and
how knowledge/power relations come to be stabilized in a particular historical configuration.
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If Deleuze deploys the notion of the diagrammatic figure as a political and historical
concept, it is also no less importantly an aesthetic concept in his thought. In The Logic of
Sensation, Deleuze applies the concept of the figural to the painting of Francis Bacon, using
Bacon’s triptych designs and application of “free marks” to show how the body, as a temporarily
stable form, even if subject to distorting forces and modulations, can emerge out of pure
aesthetic force. As Deleuze explains,
“The diagram is thus the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines
and zones, line-strokes and color-patches….They mark out possibilities of fact,
but do not yet constitute a fact (the pictorial fact). In order to be converted into a
fact, in order to evolve into a Figure, they must be reinjected into the visual
whole; but it is precisely through the action of these marks that the visual whole
will cease to be an optical organization; it will give the eye another power, as
well as an object that will no longer be figurative.”82
In reviewing the trajectory of Deleuze’s accounts of the diagram, we can see that it is always
both aesthetic, insofar as it consists in aesthetic forces that cohere into forms, and political,
insofar as those forms are also distributions of visibility, and by extension of power. It is, as
Deleuze claims, “the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular
formation; it is the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be affected; it is the
mixing of non-formalized pure functions and unformed pure matter.”83 In other words, the
diagram designates the aesthetico-political zone where force and form, affects and passions,
function and matter coincide.
1.6

Figural Constellations
In order to assess this aesthetic production of the real in and through processes of

financialization, and in order to locate its expression in both practices of everyday life and in
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aesthetic texts that figure it, we need a theoretical concept that can account for ontological
production in both its aesthetic and historical dimensions. As I have already suggested in the
discussion of Blow Up above, the concept we need and which I shall argue unites these two
features, is the figural. The key significance of the concept of the figural is its ability to articulate
the schematic aspect of the Deleuzian diagram with the actualized aesthetic forms to which it is
immanent. In doing so, it also provides a crucial fulcrum between the thought of Deleuze and
that of the Frankfurt School and its fellow-travelers, particularly Auerbach, Kracauer, and
Benjamin. In this section, I provide an account of the figural from the perspective of these
thinkers that works to connect their understanding of the relationship between aesthetic form and
history to Deleuze’s diagrammatic schematism.
There are many important differences between Deleuze on the one hand and Auerbach,
Kracauer, and Benjamin on the other, perhaps most importantly their markedly different views
on the centrality of the human subject in relation to social structures of knowledge production. In
bringing the concepts of the figural and the diagram together, however, I attempt to highlight the
continuities between these two distinct historical eras and intellectual contexts for thinking the
relationship between individuals, knowledge, aesthetics, and power, and the particular utility
these continuities possess for grasping the representational, cultural, and diagrammatic
implications of financialization. It is worth recalling here Foucault’s comment that “If I had
known about the Frankfurt School in time, I would have been saved a great deal of work. I would
not have said a certain amount of nonsense and would not have taken so many false trails trying
not to get lost, when the Frankfurt School had already cleared the way.”84 It is also worth
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emphasizing the similarities between the intellectual projects of social theory and
poststructuralist critique: in profound ways, both projects stand as challenges to Kant, who
stands as a central philosophical interlocutor for both the Frankfurt-affiliated thinkers and the
poststructuralists. This is why the Whiteheadean inversion of Kant’s critiques, which places
aesthetics at the center of the critique of the relationship between the subject (or Whitehead’s
‘superject’) and knowledge, stands as a key metaphysical and ideological intervention, and why
the figure and the diagram are themselves central to the (itself likewise aestheticized)
relationship between capital and contemporary culture. In this sense, Whitehead’s revision of
Kant, taken up by Deleuze, offers a dialectical fulfillment of the promise of Kant’s metaphysics
that parallels the Marxian inversion of Hegel. It provides what Adorno, Horkheimer, and the
other thinkers associated with the Institute for Social Research strove to theorize: the ground for
a thoroughly materialist theory of society that would account for the ways in which social
structures come into being and become determinate epistemological and ideological structures
shaping the behavior of individuals. It also explains why the aesthetic is so central, not only to
Benjamin and Adorno, in their belief in the power of fragmentary, mass cultural commodities to
disclose aspects of the larger social structure in which they were produced, but also to Lyotard
and Deleuze, in their respective intellectual valorizations of the differend and the diagram.
As Adrian Martin points out, the figural analyses of historical time and perceptual
bricolage, as practiced by Kracauer and Benjamin, owe a substantial conceptual debt to the
influence of Erich Auerbach.85 Auerbach’s work on biblical figural interpretation, immortalized
in Mimesis but articulated most explicitly in his essay “Figura” from 1938, traces the
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development of the concept of the figura from Ancient Latin rhetoric to medieval Christian
interpretation of the bible. On Auerbach’s account, the Latin figura first described a rhetorical
device in which a word or phrase with one meaning insinuated another, but without negating the
first, explicit meaning of the phrase: “The aim of a figure is not, unlike in all tropes, to substitute
words for other words; figures can be formed from words used in their proper meaning and
order.”86 Over time, this figural relationship of a term to its implication transformed from a
purely rhetorical device into a metaphysical attitude towards historical time. Writing about
medieval biblical interpretation, Auerbach notes that “The fulfillment is often designated as
veritas...and the figure correspondingly as umbra or imago; but both shadow and truth are
abstract only in reference to the meaning first concealed, then revealed; they are concrete in
reference to the things or persons which appear as vehicles of meaning.”87 He explains that
“Moses is no less historical and real because he is an umbra or figura of Christ, and Christ, the
fulfillment, is no abstract idea, but also a historical reality. Real historical figures are to be
interpreted spiritually (spiritaliter interpretari), but the interpretation points to a carnal, hence
historical fulfillment (carnitaliter adimpleri: De resurrectione, 20)—for the truth has become
history or flesh.”88 As Auerbach defines it, then,
Figural prophecy implies the interpretation of one worldly event through another;
the first signifies the second, and the second fulfills the first. Both remain
historical events; yet both, looked at in this way, have something provisional and
incomplete about them; they point to one another and both point to something in
the future, something still to come, which will be the actual, real, and definitive
event.89
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On Auerbach’s account, for the practitioner of figural interpretation history “remains forever a
figure, cloaked and needful of interpretation.”90 One consequence of this philosophy of history is
that it comprehends historical time as essentially conspiratorial in nature. Auerbach distinguishes
between figural interpretation and the “modern view,” in which the latter is distinguished in
terms of the self-sufficiency of historical events in a linear causal process, as opposed to figural
interpretation, in which both historical phenomena and their interpretation are structured by an a
priori theological given, a conceptual diagram into which historical phenomena can be slotted.91
What Kracauer and Benjamin add to Auerbach’s account of the figural is firstly, the
notion that figural interpretation can coincide with a view of history as a contingent, materialist
process. Secondly, they reimagine the raw material of interpretation, which for Auerbach’s own
medieval interpreters remains history as revealed by scripture, positing a mode of figural
interpretation that can deal directly and literally with spatialized images, rather than Auerbach’s
imagos. Taken together, the Frankfurt School thinkers modernize Auerbach’s medieval scholars,
showing how the concept of figural interpretation can articulate spatial relations that are
essentially aesthetic to temporal relations that are essentially historical, producing a matrix of
historical consciousness and facilitating cognitive mapping. More than this, however, the
redemptive, messianic potential of photography and cinema described by Kracauer, and
Benjamin’s concept of “collective bodily innervation” as a biomechanical mechanism through
which adaptations in the human sensorium are possible on a social scale, suggest that the stakes
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of the figural are more than merely representational, and that figuration stages itself as a ground
for collective social transformation.92
In his essay on photography, Kracauer distinguishes photography from natural memory
and from traditional art forms by claiming that memory images distill the data of sense
perception into a representation of one’s “personal history”:
This history omits all characteristics and determinations that do not relate in a
significant sense to truth intended by a liberated consciousness. How a person
represents this history does not depend purely on his or her natural constitution or
on the pseudo-coherence of his or her individuality; thus, only fragments of these
assets are included in his or her history. This history is like a monogram
[emphasis in original] that condenses the name into a single graphic figure which
is meaningful as an ornament.93
For Kracauer, these memory images, which omit insignificant information and reduce relevant
fragments into a single coherent, unified, ornamental figure, are distinguished from photography,
which he sees as refusing to do the work of reducing perceptive elements into a single image,
and instead “stockpiling the elements,” and capturing “only the residuum that history has
discharged.”94 Unlike the memory image, photographic images, Kracauer asserts, are
“unredeemed” images of nature, collections of all the residual fragments that do not congeal into
an image of subjectivity.95
Yet photography, precisely because of its ability to render the negative space to the
memory image, or handcrafted image’s positive image of distilled experience, thereby becomes
charged with a powerful dialectical potential. Since photography is ‘unredeemed’ and does not
automatically perform the task of transforming sense data into a signifying figure, it opens up a
92

Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and
Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 132-8.
93
Siegfried Kracauer, “Photography,” in The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans. and ed.
Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 51.
94
Ibid., 52, 55.
95
Ibid., 56.

54

possibility to reveal physical reality to the observer, but a physical reality unmediated by the
condensing function of memory or aesthetic labor. Its ability to, as Kracauer puts it, “disclose
this previously unexamined foundation of nature,” [emphasis in original] thereby “promotes a
conflict of consciousness with nature...the reflection of the reality that has slipped away from
it.”96 For Kracauer then, photography’s unique ability, and its political task, is to disclose
unredeemed reality, to force a conflict between consciousness and natural sensory information,
and in doing so to reveal the historical process by which monogrammatic figures are produced in
the first place, and to demonstrate the “provisional status of all given configurations.”97 As
Miriam Hansen explains,
Understood as a general warehousing of nature, photography provides an archive
that makes visible, in a sensually and bodily experienced way, both the fallout of
modernity and the possibility of doing it over, of organizing things differently.
This archive, though, is anything but easy to access and navigate, it is rather an
an-archive—a heap of broken images—that lends itself to the task precisely
because it lacks any obvious and coherent organizational system.98
If memory performs the work of figuration, collecting, organizing, and amalgamating
fragmentary perceptions and thoughts into memory images, photography’s refusal to perform
this task—and both its ability to show it up as a historical process and its ability to solicit a selfconscious act of historical assemblage on the part of the observer—indicates the centrality of
figuration as a simultaneously aesthetic and historical process. Through the self-conscious labor
of figural assemblage, the contingent and unredeemed reality of technologized perception can be
reconfigured, redeemed differently, and perhaps even progressively improved.
Kracauer’s vision of the potential of photography, to pull a historicizing, materialist
consciousness out of the detritus of the mundane collection of insignificant fragments is echoed,
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in a more general way, in Benjamin’s philosophy of history. Perhaps most famously, Benjamin’s
own figure of Klee’s angel as an angel of history, wreckage of time piling up at its feet, evokes
both the apocalyptic deluge of commodities under technologized capitalism, as well as the
messianic hope for future redemption. Whereas Kracauer is more cautious in his estimation of
photography in 1929, by the time of the Theses on the Philosophy of History in 1940, a sense of
desperate urgency pervades Benjamin’s writing: “The true picture of the past flits by. The past
can be seized only as an image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability, and is never
seen again….For it is an irretrievable image of the past which threatens to disappear in any
present that does not recognize itself as intended in that image.”99 If Kracauer coined the turn of
phrase designating photography as the “go-for-broke game of history,” Benjamin’s writing
cashes it in for the greatest affective impact. His notion of jetztzeit, the “presence of the now”
which must be forcibly extracted, even “blasted out” from images of the past, gives poetic
philosophical expression to Kracauer’s possibility of photographic redemption, and reimagines it
as a shocking, violent moment of annihilative redemption, rather than as a careful process of
curative collection.
Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History present the dramatic fulfillment of his
theorizing about historical figuration, but it also gestures backwards to prior, more fragmentary
figures of and in Benjamin’s thought. While the breadth of Benjamin’s thought on the nature of
history is far beyond the scope of this analysis, one key concept—the constellation—can help
illuminate not only Benjamin’s investment in the figural, but his parallels with Deleuze as a
reinterpreter of Kant. The concept of the constellation runs through Benjamin’s writing, from his
early study of the Trauerspiel to the late Theses mentioned above. Benjamin begins On the
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Origins of German Tragic Drama, famously, with an “Epistemo-Critical Introduction” that
frames, in a distinctly post-Kantian manner, the possibility and limits of knowledge about the
book’s historical and textual subject matter. In particular, he frames his introduction in terms of
the relationship between ideas, concepts, and empirical reality: “Through their mediating role
concepts enable phenomena to participate in the existence of ideas….As the salvation of
phenomena by means of ideas takes place, so too does the representation of ideas through the
medium of empirical reality. For ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and
exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in their concept: as the configuration of these
elements.”100 Benjamin explicitly follows Kant in claiming not only that concepts mediate the
experience of empirical reality or sensible apperception, but that ideas themselves, like Kant’s
categories of pure understanding, cannot be represented in themselves, but are only indirectly
accessible to thought insofar as they are present in particular, actualized empirical apperceptions.
Benjamin goes onto elaborate on this point: “The set of concepts which assist in the
representation of an idea lend it actuality as such a configuration. For phenomena are not
incorporated in ideas. They are not contained in them. Ideas are, rather, their objective, virtual
arrangement, their objective interpretation.”101 Importantly, the idea itself is instantiated at the
level of the arrangement of phenomena, as a schematic regulating principle governing the
legibility of empirical forms. Thus, Benjamin’s well-known dictum that “Ideas are to objects as
constellations are to stars” analogizes the idea to the formal configuration and imagistic legibility
of a given set of objectively existing data.102 As Graeme Gilloch explains, “The idea is neither a
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pile of instances nor a mere complex of precepts. Rather, it is a pattern of finely crafted, carefully
positioned fragments composed by concepts: a mosaic….The idea is constituted in the particular
formation or pattern adopted by a set of fragments, and manifests itself only within them.”103
The concept of the constellation, as a schematic principle of formation, answers
Benjamin’s even earlier call “to create on the basis of the Kantian system a concept of
knowledge to which a concept of experience corresponds, of which the knowledge is the
teachings.”104 Its general form, as Samuel Weber claims, is reflected in Benjamin’s idiosyncratic
usage of the German -barkeit suffix in his most pivotal conceptual coinages, and anticipates
Deleuze’s concept of the virtual:
If Deleuze, as we have seen, describes “structure as the reality of the virtual,” one
could say that Benjamin construes the virtual as the reality of structure—here, the
concept. The mark of this virtualization of the concept is Benjamin’s distinctive
use of the German suffix -bar, which in English would have to be translated either
as -able (or -ible)….To recapitulate, what results is a series of concepts that are all
constructed around this suffix: “Criticizability,” “Translatability,” “Citability,”
“Reproducibility,” and “Recognizability” in the Arcades Project; and “impartability” in the essay on language. These are Benjamin’s -barkeiten, his “abilities,” which define his major concepts in terms of what Derrida has called
structural possibility rather than in view of their actual realization. The
philosophical predecessor of this unusual move is probably to be found in Kant’s
use of the suffix -mäβigkeit in the Critique of the Power to Judge. It is no accident
that this formulation is invented by Kant in order to articulate a type of judgment
that provides no actual knowledge, determines nothing, and is therefore not
cognitive, precisely to the extent that it remains tied to a certain singularity.105
Weber explicitly links Benjamin’s terminological emphasis on the structural possibility inherent
in the process of conceptual formation both to Kant’s earlier concept of the faculty, and to
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Deleuze’s later concept of the virtual as the field of structuration immanent to the actual. In other
words, Benjamin’s “abilities,” of which the legibility of the constellation is a self-reflexively
(doubly articulated) example par excellence, are schematic in the same way that the Deleuzian
diagram is schematic; the constellation is the diagram, and both are actualized in and through
particular historical figures.
The diagrammatic and historically mediated nature of Benjamin’s concept of the
constellation is clarified in his short essay “Doctrine of the Similar” from 1933, in which he links
the legibility of astrological constellations to the mimetic faculty. Not only does Benjamin claim
that the mimetic faculty has a history, “in both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic sense,” and that
“play is to a great extent its school,” but crucially that “As researchers into old traditions, we
must take account of the possibility that sensuous shape-giving took place—meaning that objects
had a mimetic character—where today we are no longer capable even of suspecting it. For
example in the constellations of the stars.”106 Here, the concept of the constellation
metaphorically yokes “sensuous shape-giving” to meaning, and ultimately to specific courses of
historical action and behavior. Benjamin terms this relationship between the human and celestial
realms a “nonsensuous similarity,” a relationship which also obtains, for Benjamin, in writing
between “what is said and what is meant, but also between what is written and what is meant,
and equally between the spoken and the written.”107 Here, Benjamin comes tantalizingly close to
anticipating not only the notion of the diagram, but the Foucauldian concepts of discourse,
genealogy, and power:
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The most important of these ties may, however, be the one mentioned last—that
between what is written and what is said. For the similarity which reigns here is
comparatively the most nonsensuous. It is also the one which takes the longest to
be reached. And the attempt to represent the actual history of this similarity can
hardly be undertaken without a glance into the history of its birth, however
impenetrable the darkness that is still spread over it today. The most recent
graphology has taught us to recognize, in handwriting, images—or, more
precisely, picture puzzles—that the unconscious of the writer conceals in his
writing….Script has become, like language, an archive of nonsensuous
similarities, of nonsensuous correspondences.108
Thus, Benjamin’s figural notion of nonsensuous similarity, the principle operating between the
perceiving subject and the legible constellation, functions discursively, articulating what is
written to what is meant in a historically mutable manner, one that can be interpreted to excavate
the unconscious processes at work in the formation, and all in a way that is, as Benjamin makes
clear, immanent to the semiotic function of language as communication: “Thus, the literal text of
the script is the sole basis on which the picture puzzle can form itself. Thus, the nexus of
meaning which resides in the sounds of the sentence is the basis from which something similar
can become apparent out of a sound, flashing up in an instant.”109
If the Benjaminian constellation shares with the Deleuzian diagram its schematic aspect,
it differs in its historicity. Although historical duration and change is implicit in Deleuze’s
reading of Foucault, Benjamin makes it a central facet of the function of the constellation as a
philosophical concept. “Doctrine of the Similar” ends with Benjamin stating that “…the
astrologer reads the constellation from the stars in the sky; simultaneously, he reads the future or
fate from it.”110 To read a constellation, then, is to engage in a kind of speculative divination that
figurally produces a sense of historical determinacy that is immanent to the image itself.
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Elsewhere, Benjamin clarifies that such images, which he terms dialectical images, bear a figural
relationship to historical time:
It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its
light on what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has been comes
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is
dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely
temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in
nature but figural. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical…111
For Benjamin, the formation of constellations is dialectical, in the sense that is conjoins
opposites or extremes together, figural in the sense that what is produced is a relationship
between two points in historical time, and historical in the sense that the relationship between the
historical elements in the image is a juxtapositional and qualitative, rather than strictly linearquantitative one. This fragment in turn gestures toward Benjamin’s ultimate stance in the
historical Theses, in which
Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well.
Where thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with
tensions, its gives that constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a
monad. The historical materialist approaches a historical object only where it
confronts him as a monad….He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific
era out of the homogenous course of history; thus, he blasts a specific life out of
the era, a specific work out of the lifework.112
Ultimately, Benjamin advances a program of constructivist historical materialism that, like
Kracauer’s cautiously utopian view of the potential of photography, calls for the violent,
shocking reorganization of schematic constellations into new and explicitly revolutionary forms.
It is extremely ironic then, or perhaps only extremely dialectical, that the apotheosis of
Benjamin’s philosophy of history, along with Kracauer’s and Auerbach’s, lies precisely at the
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center of contemporary capitalism as such, in the go-for-broke game of speculative risk
quantification, where configurations of economic and social risk can be reconfigured into
profitable, and putatively risk-dispersing global constellations. In this sense, financial derivatives
offer a paradigmatic example of the Benjaminian dialectical image, insofar as they figurally
articulate, in a kind of nonsensuous similarity, the figural strivings of 20th century Weimar
materialist critique and the materially ontogenic figuring operations of 21st century finance
capital. Indeed, A Beautiful Mind’s dramatization of the taming of (schizophrenic) risk, through
the realization of its lucrative productivity, testifies to this figural relation between the
Benjaminian constellation and the financial derivative. This tragic sublation of Auerbach,
Kracauer, Deleuze, and most of all Benjamin into the uppermost echelons of capital, is however
not without its own dialectical reversal, in which the materialist figural constellation moves into
the heart of capital, ready to split open in a flash. In the chapters that follow, I rely on the
conceptual groundwork laid by these thinkers of the figural as diagrammatic schemata for
constructing and interpreting my own constellation of historical objects.
1.7

Chapter Summaries
This project asserts that speculation designates both the diagrammatic process through

which the historical strata of contemporary financialized capitalism are formed, and that the
functional mechanism of speculation is essentially figural. While, as this introduction claims,
elements of this diagrammatic process dates back at least to the mid-1960s, the chapters below
focus on the first decade and a half of the 21st century as the aesthetic epicenter of conspiratorial
figuration, leading up to and in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Although it focuses
primarily on American commercial cinema, it also looks at related television and new media
texts as well, arguing for a broad-based cultural shift, which is strategically supported by
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analyses of texts in a variety of genres, from medical melodrama, to independent drama, to
science-fiction and horror. The objects under discussion here are not presented as being an
exhaustive compendium of conspiracy walls, a project that would be all but impossible given the
figure’s ubiquity. Rather, the objects stand as evidence for that claim that the conspiracy wall
and its figural logic is embedded in several of what I take to be the most pressing and interrelated
questions in contemporary theory and aesthetics, namely the production and circulation of digital
images, logics of preemption, and the vexing question of post-digital materiality. This is to say
that the conspiracy wall is locatable nearly everywhere in contemporary visual media, from
commercial films to gallery art and amateur media, but its governing figural logic is, like Kant’s
pure notions of understanding, only effectively comprehended when it is ‘empirically’ entangled
in other discourses, and helps to shape them.113 Hence, it is through case studies in which the
figural logic of the conspiracy diagram is immanent to the aesthetic form of the object itself that
I seek to extract a sense of the abstract schematic operation of the diagram itself.
The first chapter of the dissertation looks more closely at the core theoretical concepts of
conspiracy, the figural, and the diagram, as they function in the contemporary context. By
reading Erich Auerbach’s theory of figural interpretation as a kind of prefiguration of conspiracy
theory, the chapter considers how medieval Christian figural prophecy forms a hermeneutic basis
for the contemporary visual aesthetics of conspiracy. This theoretical analysis is developed
through interpretive readings of Auerbach’s Mimesis, amateur online conspiracy charts, and the
murals of Julie Mehretu. These disparate objects present a shared articulation of the visual
grammar of conspiracy media, while also rendering the historical and aesthetic contours of how
the diagram operates within and through specific representational contexts: Auerbach’s
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theorization of paratactic fragmentation as an historical form of realism articulates a conspiracy
theory of historical reconfiguration, while the amateur conspiracy charts, termed “Chart Brut” by
Gawker, use the visual form of the conspiracy wall to articulate epistemic relations regarding
historical events. Lastly, the chapter explains how Julie Mehretu’s massive murals, and in
particular her Mural (2009) located in the New York headquarters of Goldman Sachs,
appropriate the aesthetics of the conspiracy wall to present a self-reflexive critique of the history
of capitalism as a temporally and spatially figural enterprise. In this respect, Mehretu’s work
functions as a kind of metapictorial theoretical discourse, while simultaneously participating in
precisely this same speculative financialized economy in virtue of its spatial location and
Goldman patronage.
Chapter two deals centrally with the relationship between preemption and the figural,
explaining how the temporal logic of preemption, vital to the conduct of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, is also a figural logic of prefiguration and redemption. This chapter seeks to
bridge the gap between two historical strata of the Bush Administration’s prosecution of the
wars, and of the financial crisis and its attendant shift in concern from foreign violence to
domestic value. It argues that financialization and preemptive warfare are closely related,
through a reading of the network television series House (2004-2012). As Pasi Väliaho cogently
argues, the shift toward financialization is intimately connected to a shift in the nature of
subjectivity, from the optical subject of the eye and the gaze to the neural subject of the
networked brain. I shall argue that this transformation has its immediate roots not only in the
financial crisis as such, but also in profound changes in imaging technology, which find their
fullest expression in MRI. As an imaging technology, MRI mediates the temporal and the visual
dimensions of the figural, producing spatialized images out of temporal differences in nuclear
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intensity. MRI technology is therefore fundamentally and ontologically distinct from both
traditional photography and X-ray, since unlike the latter, MRI produces an image by measuring
changes in the vibration of hydrogen atoms over time, literally rendering space out of time.
Medical imaging technology central to the show’s preemptive diagnostic puzzle-solving, which
treats the human body as a conspiracy, and given Dr. House’s motto that “everybody lies,” also
authorizes the invasive and often ethically compromised penetrative surveillance of the body. Dr.
House’s belief that “everybody lies” fuels rampant and expensive speculation about the patient’s
body, and early in the show’s broadcast run, also often about the patient’s home. The chapter
places House’s investment in the production of evidentiary images into dialogue with cocontemporary advertising images, showing how the show’s anxiety around the relationship
between images and evidence is symptomatic of a broader structure of feeling within American
culture between 2003 and 2008.
Chapter three addresses how the found-footage horror film Sinister (dir. Scott
Derrickson, 2013) figures financialization as a phantasmagoric threat to both home and personal
property. In the film the protagonist, a financially overextended nonfiction writer, must perform
the surveillance of digitized super-8 home movies as a form of labor and as a form of
spectatorship, in order to produce a true crime narrative that will allow him to afford an
expensive house purchased before the economic downturn. This chapter reads the film as a
meditation on the hauntological specter of property value in the wake of the Great Recession,
and the ways in which the ephemerality of digital circulation, both as digital money and digital
media, provokes an epistemic crisis of value. In the film, the locus of such a crisis is in digital
surveillance technology’s ability or inability to register salient information and preserve it
through the process of digitization. Sinister complicates the subject-object relations of the gaze
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by allowing the object to return the gaze, and to do so in ways that extends the power relation
beyond architectural knowledge relations, and into the register of affective embodiment.
Chapter four considers the role of conspiracy, figuration, and aesthetics with respect to
the relationship between race and value. Through an examination of Nightcrawler (dir. Dan
Gilroy, 2014), this chapter shows how mediation and figuration operate in tandem to produce
racialized events through the production of figural constellations. In Nightcrawler, the
protagonist exchanges commodities for technologies, and eventually exchanges images of
racialized violence for money. The film’s special attention to the aesthetic composition of racial
violence and death into television news packages figures the problem of reality’s aesthetic, rather
than rational origin, thereby interrogating what constitutes ‘real’ news. The chapter reads the
film as developing a formal critique of contemporary capitalism’s structuring elements of
exchange, valorization, and financialization. The film thereby makes a case for racialization as
the schematic grounding upon which these economic and social structures are erected and
maintained. It then turns to consider the relationship between the production of racialized
precarity and the form of financial derivatives, which likewise require situations of risk in order
to generate financial liquidity that is abstracted and extracted from racialized bodies.
What connects each of these chapters together is that they all attempt to articulate the
dialectical tension between abstraction and concretion that is structurally inherent to both
representation and economic financialization. If the dissertation as a whole seeks to understand
how financialization intensifies the dialectical contradiction between the abstract and the
concrete, which manifests at the cultural locus of visual representation, then the body chapters
pursue the implications of this representational quandary, if not indeed a crisis, across a series of
exemplary case studies. Each chapter focuses, therefore, on one or more media objects in which
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visual representation is thrown into crisis by the competing and contradictory demands of
materiality and abstraction. These objects express the ramifications of this economically
exacerbated visual regime not only for the stakes of representation but, in chapter order, for
historical causality, neoliberal subjecthood, precarious labor, and racialized embodiment
respectively. All of these key concepts are in play across each of the chapters, but each chapter
focuses more centrally on one than the others.
The structure of this project is intended to assemble a constellation of interrelated and
interlocking analyses. In short, these individual case studies attempt something like their own
figural assembly: a collage of fragmentary images from contemporary moving-image culture,
which collectively gesture toward broader economic and aesthetic modalities of the
epistemology of mass culture. Hence, a brief conclusion discusses Arrival (dir, Denis Villeneuve,
2016) as a kind of metatheoretical constellation that articulates various formal and conceptual
threads from each of the preceding chapters. As such, the conclusion also turns to reflect upon
the methodological implications entailed by the usage of the concept of the figural as an analytic
for conducting formal analysis.
The necessarily piecemeal nature of the project’s approach reflects a broader
neoliberalization of epistemology itself. If culture now infamously takes itself to be ‘post-truth,’
this indicates a transition from some imaginary antediluvian epistemic structure of shared, public
‘truth,’ to a privatization of epistemology in which each individual consumer is entitled to his or
her own private ‘truth,’ hermetically sealed off from intervening appeals to shared experience or
common rhetorical grounding. Likewise, this privatization of truth is accompanied by a
privatization of knowledge production, which foists the responsibility for generating
knowledge(s) onto the citizen-consumer. Yet if this is the case, then it is also the case that
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academic assemblages of evidentiary figurae are in no way exempt from such economic and
epistemic processes. The objective-aesthetic and the subjective-epistemological cannot be
conceived of as distinct realms, or in terms of a one-way flow of schematic organization from a
synthetic a priori concepts to the empirical realm. This immanent entanglement of the
transcendental concept or figure within the empirical matter of its expression also motivates the
methodological approach that the analyses in the body chapters take. Each of the chapters below
is itself structurally organized in a manner that reflects the formal structures of the media objects
they analyze. Hence, rather than assuming a fully transcendental theoretical position from which
to observe and comment upon the dissertation’s objects, or a fully immanent mode of
theoretically charged description, this project situates itself in the midst of things, between the
transcendental and the immanent, but with arms reaching in both directions. The stakes of this
methodological decision are, on the one hand, to refuse an ahistorical, transcendental subject
position from which to gaze upon a manicured landscape of curated evidence. To do so would be
to fall into the trap of presuming unmediated access to a conceptual totality that is determinative
with respect to the interpretation of aesthetic forms. On the other hand, to refuse a
methodological position of total immanence is to assert that there are still subject-positions,
however compromised, from which we necessarily make conceptual claims and empirical
observations. In doing so, I hope to expressively reflect at an analytic level how the conspiracy
diagram functions at a formal level, or at least to avoid turning a deaf ear to the objects
themselves, and to the historicity of this project itself.
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2
2.1

HISTORICITY, FIGURALITY, CONSPIRACY

Introduction
In the Introduction the conspiracy wall was briefly sketched, as a figure expressing the

schematic relations between the aesthetic and the epistemic, and as a diagram mediating
speculative subject/object relations within financialized capitalism. If the form of this
diagrammatic figure was nascent in Blow Up and the classic conspiracy thrillers of the 1970s, I
argued that it reaches a kind of transformative apotheosis in A Beautiful Mind, where all of the
formal elements—the collage of images affixed to a wall, and connected, both materially and
conceptually, together by lengths of string—are co-present, and where the articulation of
conspiratorial speculation to financial speculation is perhaps most explicitly manifested. From
here, the aesthetic form of the conspiracy wall becomes increasingly ubiquitous across visual
media forms, from film and television to social media. While the near contemporaneous film
Minority Report (2002) also presents a parallel analogue of the conspiracy wall in the preemptive
investigation of ‘PreCrime,’ in which the detection of crime is visually figured as a technological
hybrid of desktop computer use and analog VCR jogging (fig. 2.1), it is A Beautiful Mind that
furnishes the dominant model for representing investigative speculation in 21st century visual
media, at least in terms of the proliferation and circulation of the formal tropes it codifies.114
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Figure 2.1 Minority Report
As the introduction also noted, the visual form of the conspiracy wall is virtually
ubiquitous across contemporary media, with far too many specific instantiations to list.
Therefore, rather than attempting to track down each individual example, or even to identify and
canonize the most important or influential conspiracy walls in contemporary media, this chapter
aims at a more narrow and focused analysis of the expressive logic of the conspiracy wall as
such, considered as an abstract schematic form of organization. It seeks to unpack the epistemic
and aesthetic logic of the conspiracy diagram, and to consider the relationship between the
figural speculation inhering in it to the speculative logic of financialization. Thus, this chapter
argues that the representational logic of the conspiracy wall both formally and figurally
expresses the representational logic of financialization. This claim in and of itself is not new, but
what is different about the contemporary conspiracy wall is its ontogenically productive
capacity.115 That is, the formal figuration of the conspiracy wall also operates as a kind of
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Deleuzian diagram that models subject-object relations under the epistemic and aesthetic regime
of finance capital, a regime that is constitutively defined by the ontogenic productivity of the
aesthetic, which functions in a generative manner, producing truth and value through the
mechanism of speculation.
As the introduction also explained, finance capital presents itself not only as a regime of
capital circulation, but as a distinct representational problem. The “problem” of finance capital,
as Jameson understands it, is that it short-circuits Marx’s general formula for capital, M-C-M,
allowing money to exchange for money without passing through the commodity form, in an
abbreviated M-M’ form. This is the same circumstance identified by Marx and elaborated on by
David Harvey as “fictitious capital,” in which the problem of money’s having to be invested in
material goods or labor in order to produce interest, a process which reduces the flexibility and
general exchangeability of money, is solved by the lending and exchange of advances on that
expected and hypothetical interest as capital; or in other words, credit.116 Paradoxically, the
existence of credit allows the transactional process of commodity exchange to reverse its
conventional temporal order. In a typical cycle of profit accumulation, money (M) is exchanged
for, or invested in, a commodity (C), which after a certain amount of time is itself sold for a
profit (M’). Credit reverses this sequence, allowing a capitalist to begin with a credit loan (M’),
exchange or invest that money in a commodity (C), and then exchange that commodity for a
profit, after paying back the loan (M). In a way, the existence of credit therefore enables a kind
of time travel, in which the outcome of a sequence of commodity exchanges is peremptorily
anticipated. As Cédric Durand explains, “fictitious capital represents claims over wealth that is
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yet to be produced. Its expansion implies a growing pre-emption of future production.”117 The
temporal paradox of finance capital is, as Durand also explains, that while future returns are
preempted by present exchanges, suggesting increased flexibility and freedom today, the
valorization of the present is increasingly dependent on the anticipation of a stable futurity that
forecloses alternatives, producing an economic and temporal determinism with no alternative.118
At the same time that future time is preempted or foreclosed by the anticipatory operations of
credit and finance, a novel futurity is also, paradoxically, necessary for the expansion and
continued growth of capital. In order for capital to expand there must be a mechanism for the
production of temporal or historical difference, rather than simply the return of the same. This is
a fundamental problem of contemporary capitalism, one with sweeping social and ecological
ramifications, but it is also a problem that serves as an interpretive key to the inner schematic
logic of conspiracy as a mode of representation in relation to the structure of capitalism.119
For Jameson, the peculiar temporal arrangement organized by finance capital is
intimately tied to a paradigm of spatial organization, namely a postmodern aesthetic of
fragmentation and renarrativization. In his essay “Culture and Finance Capital,” Jameson argues
that the fragment plays a central role in negotiating the relationship between culture and finance
capital. Jameson argues that whereas in aesthetic modernism the fragment is “empty,”
“meaningless,” and “autonomized,” the postmodern fragment is capable of seamlessly
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renarrativizing and producing meaning.120 Thus, for Jameson the changing function of
fragmentation plays at once an aesthetic role and a historically periodizing one, insofar as
changes in its aesthetic function also index the shift from modernism to postmodernism, and this
both in aesthetic terms and in terms of the attendant cultural logic, which is itself informed by
underlying changes in the structure of the global economy. As Jameson explains, “Modernist
abstraction, I believe, is less a function of capital accumulation as such than of money itself in a
situation of capital accumulation. Money is here both abstract (making everything equivalent)
and empty and uninteresting, since its interest lies outside itself. It is thus incomplete… it directs
attention elsewhere, beyond itself.” By contrast, Jameson explains that finance capital introduces
“a play of monetary entities that need neither production (as capital does) nor consumption (as
money does), which supremely, like cyberspace, can live on their own internal metabolisms and
circulate without any reference to an older type of content.”121 Therefore, for Jameson
postmodern fragmentation indexes the self-sustaining flow of abstracted and financialized capital
through the global circuits of the economy, continually producing recombinations of the same as
the form of the new, which must dialectically be understood also as the new as the form of the
same. Hence, the aesthetic fragment functions in the context of Jameson’s analysis, as well as
this one, as what Deleuze and Guattari designate as a double articulation: a hinge between the
aesthetic and economic dimensions of representation (a term which must now be articulated only
under erasure), which itself articulates distinct historical periods and is situated as a hinge
between them.122 Crucially, aesthetic fragmentation operates across both temporal and spatial

120

Fredric Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1997):
264-5.
121
Ibid.
122
See p. 45.

73

dimensions, and it is the fragment’s ability to traverse these dimensions that gives it the ability to
articulate history and aesthetics in such a powerful way. The question of fragmentation, then, is
central to the representational logic of conspiracy because it articulates a network of conceptual
and discursive threads pertaining to the representational objects of finance capital and of
aesthetics, the most salient of which are the concepts of representational self-sufficiency,
circulability, and historicity.
Following Jameson, this chapter assumes a parallelism between structures of
fragmentation and renarrativization in the postmodern regime of aesthetic representation and in
the logic of post-Bretton Woods financialized markets. The peculiar temporal structure of credit,
in which a diachronic process of exchange is transmuted into a synchronic sum of money capital,
albeit an extremely abstract one that may not have any material referent beyond a computational
signifier, has already been mentioned. Also, as the introduction explained, we can readily see
both the temporal and spatial dimensions of the logic of financialization at work in what is
termed ‘slow market’ or latency arbitrage, in which high frequency trading algorithms, executing
trades in the scale of microseconds, are able to exploit such microsecond differences in the
transmission of pricing information across globally networked stock exchanges to buy the same
stock lower in one location, then immediately sell those shares in another location, where the
price is still temporarily higher.123 In a more general way, the capacity to quantitatively price
volatility and risk, a necessary precursor to contemporary financial derivatives, also entails the
concretization of fundamentally indeterminate and qualitative temporal relations between states
of affairs.124 All of these examples therefore point to the ways in which the contemporary global
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stock market is, in this sense, like the photos in Blow Up—what appears as a coherent and
unified representational form becomes, when expanded to view its smallest components, a
spatiotemporal multiplicity, and a series of disjunctions that belies any sense of self-identical
objects, that nevertheless, and necessarily, operates as though it is a temporally and spatially
self-consistent construct.
Thus, the economic and cultural logic of financialization can be characterized, in part, by
a spatiotemporal logic of fragmentation and reconfiguration. The key claim of this chapter is that
this logic is essentially figural, in the ways that Auerbach and Deleuze deploy this term. Despite
their clear differences, Auerbach and Deleuze share an investment in understanding how
aesthetic forms cohere, which is in itself a question about the unifying capacity of aesthetic
fragments. By placing them together, this chapter explores how not only their deterritorializing
similarities but also their territorializing differences, namely Auerbach’s distinctive investment
in history and representation, in contrast to Deleuze’s investment in asignifying affective force,
might speak to each other as two sides of an expressive and epistemological dialectic. In short,
this synthesis of their theories of the figural provides, I am suggesting, a solution to the particular
‘form-problem,’ as Jameson would say, of the ‘post-truth’ characteristic of speculative thinking,
in both its conspiratorial and financial modes, under contemporary capitalism.
2.2

Erich Auerbach’s Conspiracy Theory
Émigré German philologist Erich Auerbach admittedly makes for an unlikely theoretical

antecedent to the conspiracy diagram, given both his disciplinary and historical distance from
contemporary visual culture, and his characteristically placid, ‘serene’ mode of humanist inquiry,
even in the face of exile in Turkey during World War II. Auerbach, whose monumental Mimesis:
The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, published in German in 1946 and English in
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1953, helped to set the agenda for the emerging field of Comparative Literature, and holds a
privileged position as one of the great, if also one of the last, advocates for enlightened
humanism as a posture toward the scholarly interpretation of culture. Paul Bové goes so far as to
claim that the primary function of Mimesis, and therefore also of Auerbach himself,
is not as a philological model but as a sign that in an antihistorical, antihumanistic
age of relativism, mass-cultural leveling, and the increasing irrelevance of writers
and critics, it is not only possible for critics to perform opportune and important
acts, to construct monumental synthetic texts in the face of massive specialization,
to invent new techniques for dealing with changed cultural conditions, and to do
all this out of the unique intellectual and existential experience of the individual
scholar, but also, in so doing, to relegitimate culturally a certain image of the
responsible authoritative critical voice.125
For Bové, Auerbach represents the limit point of humanistic scholarship, insofar as the
philologist’s historicism leads him ultimately to historicize his own position as an intellectual
commentator and literary critic, a self-reflexive move that Auerbach himself cannot transcend,
but which opens out onto the anti-humanist scholarship of Said, and especially Foucault.126
Thus it would seem that Auerbach makes an odd fit as an intellectual progenitor of
conspiracy theory, given the latter’s predilection, as Jameson has explained, for totalizing
apparatuses of social domination in which the individual has no real chance of withstanding the
deterministically totalizing power of the conspiratorial whole (viz. The Parallax View), let alone
attempting any kind of effective synthesis of its disparate parts into a conceptual unity, which
remains only a utopian horizon toward which the individual can be oriented, but can never reach
(viz. All The President’s Men). Yet as this chapter argues, Auerbach’s theoretical synthesis, in his
concept of the figura, between historical causality and aesthetic-spatial parataxis theoretically
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anticipates the relationship between aesthetics and historical truth claims that is characteristic of
the conspiracy diagram. This in turn entails an articulation in the conspiracy diagram between
history and power that opens onto a novel consideration of the role of speculation in constructing
historical time. If Auerbach’s limits are transcended by Foucault, as Bové suggests, those
limitations also prefigure many of Foucault’s important concerns vis-à-vis the relationship
between discourse and authority, as well as between the individual and the incapacity to
speculate beyond the limits of a particular regime of power/knowledge.
Indeed, despite the superficial oppositions between self-assured humanistic inquiry and
paranoid, anti-humanist apophenia, a closer look at Auerbach’s intellectual trajectory reveals a
series of tantalizing connections to conspiracy’s aesthetic and epistemic problems. To begin
with, while it is well-known that Auerbach’s habilitationsschrift on Dante inaugurated his
celebrated philological career and formed the basis for his later thinking on realism and
representations of everyday life, it is less well-known and scarcely remarked upon in Englishlanguage Auerbach scholarship that prior to the Dante habilitation, Auerbach pursued and in
1913 earned a doctoral degree in Law, writing a dissertation on the topic of the problem of
criminal “coperpetration,” that is to say criminal conspiracy. “Combining a component of guilt
with a component of innocence, the role of the coperpetrator contains in its very structure a
potential for tragedy,” writes Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, for whom Auerbach’s early work
anticipates his later concern with the tragic dimension of the mundane, everyday dimension of
daily life.127 This synthesis of guilt and innocence is characteristic of criminal conspiracy within
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the frameworks of both historical and contemporary legal statutes.128 It also indicates, at a very
early stage in Auerbach’s thinking, the significance of a discontinuous mode of causality in
which the actions of one individual can causally and legally implicate another individual, who
may not have been present or directly involved in the perpetration of a criminal act. This logic of
discontinuity anticipates Auerbach’s later discovery of the discontinuous nature of Hebraic style
in the Old Testament, as opposed to the smooth, Hellenistic continuity of Homer’s Odyssey in
the famed opening chapter of Mimesis. It also anticipates the way, as Auerbach explains, Joshua
becomes retroactively complicit in the redemptive sacrifice of Christ, as a prefiguration of the
latter.129 Read backwards through Auerbach’s later theorizing on the discontinuous temporality
of figural relations, it is clear that conspiracy represents an early example of a figural relation in
Auerbach’s thought. Although Auerbach never again explicitly explores the topic of conspiracy,
its implication in the mode of relationality designated by the figura allows it to hover as an
immanent presence in Auerbach’s oeuvre.130
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The immanence of conspiracy to Auerbach’s work is also locatable in his intellectual and
personal relationship with another German émigré intellectual, Walter Benjamin. The friendship
between Auerbach and Benjamin is widely remarked upon in Auerbach scholarship, as both men
were born in 1892 and grew up in the same Berlin neighborhood, a fact which Auerbach
references in his written correspondence with Benjamin in the 1930s.131 While these letters
suggest a cordial, yet rather formal relationship between scholars of a shared generation enduring
the rise of the Third Reich, Kader Konuk speculates, in a remarkable and generically
conspiratorial turn, that Auerbach and Benjamin probably met for the first time at the Prussian
State Library sometime in 1923 or 1924, during which time Benjamin was conducting his
research on the origins of the Trauerspiel, and Erich Auerbach was working as a librarian while
composing his own thesis on Dante. Konuk suggests that it was probably Auerbach who helped
Benjamin conduct his research, and whom the latter praised in a contemporaneous letter to
Gershom Scholem.132
The possible meeting between Auerbach and Benjamin at such crucially formative
moments for each scholar adds an element of bibliographic intrigue to the account of their
relationship, but whether or not this meeting took place, I read their intertwined intellectual
development as a case of theoretical coperpetration, in the sense that despite their terminological
denials—for reasons we shall see, Auerbach adamantly rejects the notion of allegory, Benjamin’s
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favored term—they are closely united in their theoretical commitments, particularly with respect
to their theorizations of history and its interpretation. This theoretical similitude hinges, as I have
already indicated, on the question of allegory, and on the question of history. Michael McGillen
explains that despite their superficial terminological differences, “Auerbach’s theory of figural
interpretation and Benjamin’s theory of allegorical citation have a strong structural affinity.”133
For McGillen, this affinity involves a shared emphasis on aesthetic and anti-historicist historical
fragmentation, rather than on representational unity: “Both figural interpretation and allegorical
reading engage in a historical reading that activates a historical figure for a remote present. This
amounts to a practice of literary criticism that considers the literary text a historical object that
entertains relations not with its historical context but with the present in which it is read.”134
Although for McGillen Auerbach and Benjamin share an approach to historical reading, he
understands this fragmentation to have opposite historical implications for each thinker: for
Auerbach fragmentation entails a future moment of salvation, whereas any such redemption is
foreclosed within Benjamin’s theory of history.135
Auerbach’s theory of figural interpretation is incipient in his habilitationsschrift on
Dante, but its most explicit articulation occurs in the essay “Figura,” begun in 1935 and
published in 1938. In this essay, Auerbach traces the origin and development of the concept of
the figura, or figure, from its origins in Latin rhetoric to its central role in the figural
interpretation of biblical scripture in medieval Christian scholasticism. For Latin rhetoricians and
poets, the term figura was initially used as variously synonymous with shape, appearance,
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outline, semblance, and a host of other terms designating plastic form. In the first century A.D.,
however, the term took on a new meaning on the concept of the rhetorical figure. As Auerbach
writes of Quintilian’s understanding of the term, the rhetorical figure “is a form of discourse
which deviates from the normal and most obvious usage. The aim of a figure is not, as in all
tropes, to substitute words for other words; figures can be formed from words used in their
proper meaning and order.”136 Unlike tropes, which employ words in a nonliteral sense, as in
metaphor for example, the figura maintains the literal meaning of the individual words, even as
the meaning of the whole assemblage of words becomes transformed into something other than
what the individual words would literally suggest. Hence, a figure of speech involves a formation
of words into a grouping that establishes a distinctive relation between literal words, as formal
elements of the figure, and the figure itself as a whole or unity. Auerbach explains that “The art
of hinting, insinuating, obscuring circumlocution, calculated to ornament a statement or to make
it more forceful or mordant, has achieved a versatility and perfection [in Antiquity] that strike us
as strange if not absurd. These turns of speech were called figurae.”137 Again, unlike
metaphorical speech, which may be rhetorically effective but which uses words in a nonliteral
sense, the rhetorical efficacy of a figure, especially when used to hint or suggest a meaning
without explicitly claiming it outright, lies precisely in the fact that the literal meaning of each
individual word is maintained, while the meaning of the whole is transformed.
While the figura functions as a rhetorical device in Latin oratory, Auerbach traces its
transformation, in medieval biblical hermeneutics, into a complex theory of both textual and
historical interpretation, in which the concept of the figure is used to reframe the Old Testament
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as an anticipatory prefiguration of events in the New Testament and the End of Days.
Conceptually, the rhetorical figura gives way to the hermeneutic model of figural interpretation,
which Auerbach defines thusly:
Figural Interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the
first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second
encompasses or fulfills the first. The two poles of the figure are separate in time,
but both, being real events or figures, are within time, within the stream of
historical life.138
As with the classical figure, the relationship between first and second-order meanings is
significant, and in this respect figural interpretation demonstrates continuity with the rhetorical
figure. As Auerbach notes, it is the notion that the figure conceals or hides something other, be it
an insinuated meaning, a theological truth, or a prediction about the future, that carries over from
antiquity into the medieval concept of the figure.139 The crucial difference, however, is that
whereas classical oratory took the figure merely as a means of persuasion, medieval scholars
understood it as applying to historical reality itself, in a real and literal sense. Thus, Auerbach
claims that the nature of figural interpretation is such that
Figural prophecy implies the interpretation of one worldly event through another;
the first signifies the second, the second fulfills the first. Both remain historical
events; yet both, looked at in this way, have something provisional and
incomplete about them….Thus history, with all its concrete force, remains forever
a figure, cloaked and needful of interpretation.140
This, for Auerbach, is also what distinguishes figural from allegorical interpretation,
which views the formal content of the figure as historical but its meaning as abstract or symbolic
(e.g. as representing a virtue such as justice or wisdom).141 In a later essay from 1952, Auerbach
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clarifies this position, explaining that in the case of allegory or symbolism, “at least one of the
two elements combined is a pure sign, but in a figural relation both the signifying and the
signified facts are real and concrete historical events. In an allegory of love or in a religious
symbol at least one of the terms does not belong to human history; it is an abstraction or a
sign.”142 Hence, Auerbach’s resistance to the term ‘allegory,’ motivated by a desire to clarify the
explicitly historical nature of both interpretive poles in a figure, in no way contradicts
Benjamin’s theory of allegory, which is similarly invested in the historical dimension of
representation. Though they may draw differing conclusions about the redemptive potential of
history itself, both Auerbach and Benjamin emphasize the historicity of both the ‘signified’ and
the ‘signifier’ of the figure or allegory, and do so in opposition to the deficient idealism of
symbolism.143 Moreover, they both understand the logic of the figural or allegorical as
fundamentally one of fragmentation and reconfiguration. As Benjamin describes the baroque
era’s valorization of the “highly significant fragment”: “It is common practice in the literature of
the baroque to pile up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal, and, in the
unremitting expectation of a miracle, to take the repetition of stereotypes for a process of
intensification.”144 Benjamin’s theory of allegory, however, at least as outlined in the Trauerspiel
monograph, understands allegory in terms of its production via the accumulation of fragments in
fiction—in literature and theater—whereas Auerbach is quite explicit about figural prophecy’s
use of past historical events in order to anticipate future historical ones. For Auerbach, figural
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prophecy is more than an interpretative tool or a hermeneutic strategy, it is an epistemic regime,
what Benjamin will only later famously term a ‘philosophy of history.’
The historicity of the figure is what makes figural interpretation not merely a hermeneutic
strategy, but also a theory of history, insofar as figural interpretation comprehends the flow of
historical time and causality in fundamentally distinct terms, as opposed to “modern”
historiography:
In the modern view, the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbroken
horizontal process; in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from
above; events are considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but
torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other than is promised and
not yet present.145
In assuming that historical events of the past, such as those recorded in the Old Testament,
prefigure events in the New Testament and beyond, figural interpretation is forced to take a view
of temporality that is not linear, causal, and sequential, but rather one in which events that are
chronologically disparate and causally unrelated are immanent with respect to each other, and
immanent to what Auerbach later terms “the plane of providential design.”146 As Hayden White
has noted, Auerbach’s notion of the figure-fulfillment dyad allows him to construct a theory of
history, and of historical redemption, endowed with “a modern equivalent of classical “telos”
and a secular equivalent of Christian “apocalypse.” It allows him to endow history with the
meaning of a progressus towards a goal that is never ultimately realizable or even fully
specifiable.”147
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Auerbach provides us with a theory of temporal figuration, in which historical events
themselves, rather than being self-contained and self-identical, are temporally dispersed,
multiple, and always in need of an interpretive and aesthetically constructive act that will unite
them. In the same way that figural interpretation produces historical truth claims through a
process of creative, interpretive recombination, financialization operates by preemptively
producing real value in the present by using the past to anticipate the future, and in the case of
latency arbitrage, by profitably trading on the temporal difference. As Alison Shonkwiler
explains, “Finance continuously seeks the path of the shortest, fastest, and highest return. It
works by running the possibilities, comparing hypotheticals and actuals, and trading on the
difference, thereby realizing that which had been hypothetical or unreal.”148 Likewise, figural
prophecy seeks to realize the truth of what Auerbach calls “a definite event in its full historicity,”
a fully material, ‘actual’ historical occasion.
If Auerbach’s theory of figural interpretation is a theory of history oriented on a temporal
axis, it is also, no less significantly, a theory of aesthetic expression oriented on a spatial one.
Fredric Jameson has argued that the historical periodization of realism, modernism, and
postmodernism generates a kind of “technical problem” that demands a function that would
mediate between the historiographical and the formal or aesthetic.149 The Auerbachian figura, in
fact, serves precisely such a mediating function, insofar as it frames the historiographical as
inescapably aesthetic and needful of interpretation, while it also historicizes the very act of
interpretation itself, thus casting the aesthetic and the historiographical into a dialectical bi-
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polarity (though Auerbach does not use this dialectical language). This is nowhere more evident
than in Auerbach’s magnum opus, Mimesis, in which the formal analysis of the syntax of
realism, and the serial organization of such analyses into a work aspiring to represent the totality
of the western literary canon, is in turn reframed by Auerbach’s gesture of including himself in
the historical lineage of modernist authors in his analysis of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse.
In Mimesis Auerbach identifies parataxis—the spatial arrangement of clauses in a
sentence in a manner that ambiguates the relation between the clauses—as the dominant
principle governing the development of representations of realism from Homer onward. The
ellipses engendered by paratactic construction is what distinguishes Genesis from The Odyssey in
aesthetic terms, which for Auerbach entails an entirely different conception of history. Auerbach
also identifies parataxis as the principle of realistic representation in Augustine, and Gregory of
Tours, though Dante apparently transcends paratactic construction to produce a novel form of
unity between irruptive clauses.150 These stylistic trends anticipate, and even prefigure, the
emergence of turn of the century aesthetic modernism in the work of Proust, Joyce, Woolf, and
others, in their emphasis on aesthetic fragmentation, spatial and temporal ambiguity, and random
occurrences, even to the point of a disintegration of the causal-historical movement of narrative
temporality. Crucially, for Auerbach the historical temporalities engendered by literary
representation are necessarily spatial in terms of their syntactic construction, a point that is not
lost on the author of Mimesis as he constructs his own survey of western literary history. The
organization of Mimesis into twenty fragmentary (Auerbach even, somewhat apologetically, calls
them “arbitrary”) case studies, seemingly disconnected from a comprehensive historical causality
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(perhaps because of Auerbach’s notorious lack of access to bibliographic sources in Istanbul),
indicates the influence of Auerbach’s subject matter on his own principles of formal
construction, as well as the distinctively modernist sensibility that governs Mimesis.151 In writing
his history of aesthetic realism, Auerbach dialectically historicizes aesthetics, while also
aestheticizing historical representation, which leads inexorably to the synthesizing conclusion
that Mimesis itself must be historicized—a point Auerbach acknowledges by indicating that
Mimesis stems from the same modernist literary tradition that informs Woolf.152
Auerbach thus provides an answer to the Jameson’s problem of periodization, insofar as
the method of figural analysis in Mimesis mediates between the concept of history and the
concept of the aesthetic, demonstrating how aesthetics and history are always immanent to each
other, and demanding both the historicizing of the aesthetic and the recognition that historical
narratives, as narratives, are ineluctably aesthetic, which in turn demands a new act of
historicizing. Furthermore, Mimesis momentarily crystallizes the dialectical tensions between
realism, modernism, and postmodernism through the way in which it, rather like the ‘actantial
positions’ Jameson ascribes to the conspiracy film, rotates through each of the positions in turn,
blurring the clear distinctions between them.153 On its face, Mimesis makes a claim for realism,
that is, a positive epistemic claim about the nature of literary history, but its Viconian historicism
necessarily entails the historicizing of each paratactic moment of realism relative to the others.
Auerbach’s recognition that not even Mimesis is exempt from the imperative to historicize
entails a distinctly postmodern act of historicizing the historicizing gesture itself, in a kind of
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meta-historicist rupture that unleashes a mise-en-abyme of reproductive serial figurations
without any ultimate fulfillment.154
A central question in this scheme, therefore, is that of the event as such, since the
aesthetic-historical hermeneutic circularity worked over in, and by, Mimesis threatens to beg the
question of how historical change as such is possible at all, and whether or not the periodizing
positions of realism, modernism, and postmodernism might not become, through a dialectical
reversal, no longer periodizing functions at all, but only aspects or moments of a profoundly
ahistorical and conservative stasis. One answer is to reverse this reversal by noting how the
inability to historicize is precisely symptomatic of the postmodern as such, as an historical era
that is inaugurated perhaps by Auerbach himself and the periodizing problem his work poses.
The other, I think more productive answer, and the one I have emphasized in the introduction, is
to foreground the event in precisely this problematic way by pointing to the ways in which
aesthetic experience might, at least minimally, evade the legislating functions of schemata
insofar as it occurs, as Shaviro claims, “without criteria.” Whitehead’s reversal of the Kantian
system, and Deleuze’s and Benjamin’s parallel investments in the processual nature of sensory
experience in the respective figures of the diagram and the constellation, point to the ways in
which aesthetic experience might function, if not as a ground, then as a kind of immanent
exteriority in relation to history and historical categories.
Another temptation here is to align Auerbach’s method of paratactically organizing
extremely close readings of specific textual fragments into a unifying figure of history with the
aesthetic logic of the conspiracy diagram as such, insofar as the latter likewise involves the
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aestheticizing organization of historical fragments into a potentially totalizing narrative
explanation.155 Against this oversimplification, I would suggest that the value of this comparison
lies precisely in a figural relation between Auerbach’s method and the conspiracy wall:
Auerbach’s deployment of aesthetic modernism as a means of coming to grips with the
impossibility of representing the totality of western literature, along with the disappearance of
the mode of humanist scholarship for which Auerbach advocates, prefigures the conspiracy
wall’s use of post-modern aesthetic fragmentation, which in turn provides a potential solution to
the problem of modernist disintegration, in an act of renarrativization that reconfigures the
relationship between the (formerly humanist) subject and the object of investigation.
2.3

Chart Brut: Conspiracy Theory in Practice
Given the parallels between Auerbach’s theory and practice of figural interpretation, I

now want to turn to a specific example of the kind of figural, paratactic organization that is
characteristic of not only of Auerbach’s textual examples, but of Auerbach himself and of the
contemporary conspiracy diagram As I work to show, the hermeneutic desire for, and potential
for textual and historical reconfiguration plays a central role in the aesthetic organization, and
epistemological structure, of the conspiracy diagram. As with Mimesis, the question of
renarrativization, what in Benjaminian parlance might be termed narratability, lies at the core of
the aesthetic and epistemic stakes of the conspiracy diagram.
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In December of 2014, online blog Gawker published an article recounting the rise of “a
new style of folk art booming on the internet,” what its author sarcastically termed “Chart
Brut.”156 Taking cues from visual representations of investigation in detective and conspiracy
media, and most obviously from the manic, paranoid conspiracy walls of A Beautiful Mind, the
aesthetic depicts relations between agents in perceived conspiracies, using Microsoft Paint or
other consumer-grade image editing software and a proliferation of hand (or mouse) drawn lines,
typically red, to visually articulate the causal relations among actors and objects presented as
evidence with respect to some particular event. This collage style of visual rhetoric, which
manifests itself as an assemblage of image fragments, copied and pasted into one larger image,
has become an intuitive mode of online visual communication, and has figured prominently in
the occurrence or representation of a number of significant events in internet culture in recent
years.
As the Gawker piece explains, the first, and perhaps still most prominent use of this style
occurred during the manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects in April 2013, during
which it served as a means to posit amateur theories regarding the identities of the bombers on
the basis of security camera images released to the public by authorities. The images published
by Gawker, which originally appeared on the popular social networking website Reddit,
demonstrate attempts to identify the bombers based on crude eyeline matching and the
identification of individuals wearing backpacks similar to one found shredded at the scene.
While the amateur detective producing and debating these images ultimately did not identify the
Tsarnaev brothers, they did entertain the (false) speculation that a missing 22 year-old Brown
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University student, Sunil Tripathi, was one of the bombers.157 The evidentiary basis of this
speculation was an image collage, placed left to right across a white background: first a blurry,
low-resolution image of one of the bombers, with a circle around the individual’s face lightened
by image editing software, then an image of Tripathi posing for a portrait near some campus
buildings, and lastly a third image featuring these two images superimposed (fig. 2.2).158

Figure 2.2 Chart Brut Featuring Sunil Tripathi
This Galtonesque triptych, which also bears a striking aesthetic resemblance to the overlapping
digital superimpositions of Minority Report, was evidently sufficient to fuel rampant speculation
that the missing student was missing because he was a terrorist, either in hiding or preparing to
strike again. Tripathi was subsequently found dead in the Providence River, his death reported as
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a suicide, and apparently caused in part because of the weight of the accusations hurled at
himself and his family during the veritably ecstatic online investigation.159
The Boston Bomber investigation and the death of Sunil Tripathi may be the most
obvious example where collages in the ‘Chart Brut’ style facilitated online speculation, and in
this case led to distinctly tragic material consequence, but it is far from the only notable event to
be pervaded by these kinds of images. The GamerGate movement, as Gawker also reports, made
extensive use of the style in attempts to trace connections of alleged collusion and sexual quid
pro quo between videogame developers and members of the games media (fig. 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Chart Brut Featuring GamerGate
It also played a role in the 2014 celebrity iCloud hacking scandal, as a means of speculating
about the sources, authenticity, and provenance of photographs of nude celebrities under what
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participants euphemistically framed as a process of ‘investigation.’ More recently, the Chart Brut
style has also been deployed to present conspiracy theories regarding the 2017 mass shooting in
Las Vegas (fig. 2.4).

Figure 2.4 Chart Brut Featuring the Mandalay Bay Mass Shooting
If the Gawker essay that coined the term ‘Chart Brut’ functions as an effective snapshot
of a cultural form of representation, it is also largely sarcastic and dismissive in tone, suggesting
that these images can serve no cultural purpose beyond their ability to gesture towards the
paranoid and conspiratorial nature of the internet itself. Rather than dismissing it (Gawker’s
pithy conceptual designation may as well stand), taking Chart Brut seriously can provide insight
into the particularly aesthetic nature of conspiracy as a significant and demonstratively impactful
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mode of popular epistemology and vernacular realism. In other words, although the Chart Brut
style of organizing and presenting information may not always (or often) be rhetorically
effective, in terms of persuading a putative audience, the case of Sunil Tripathi and others who
have been slandered indicated that at the very least, the style does produce effects of real
consequence. Thus, if Chart Brut’s objects are speculative, then they are speculations that can
find, and have found, fulfillment in reality, along the lines of Auerbach’s theory of figural
interpretation. This capacity to actualize or fulfill the content of speculative aesthetic forms is
deeply connected to the logic of financialization, precisely because of their shared formal logic
of fragmentation and renarrativization. Moreover, this process of de- and reterritorialization
reconfigures both temporal-historical and spatial-aesthetic relations. Hence, to unpack and
explain this it is necessary to chart the ways in which the schematic form of the conspiracy
diagram articulates both a figural spatial and a figural temporal logic. Here, Auerbach’s
theorization of the spatial and temporal logics of figurality provides a theoretical model for
approaching the precise ways in which Chart Brut and the abstract schema of the conspiracy wall
articulate a distinct spatial aesthetic to a temporal logic of historical time.
As the previous section explained, Auerbach’s theory of the figura articulates a temporal
logic, in which two events that are chronologically disparate are nevertheless connected together
as elements in a figural pair (and later, in the “Typological Symbolism in Medieval Literature”
essay of 1953, an open-ended figural series). The first prefigures the second, and the second
fulfills the first, while gesturing beyond the pair to an ultimately transcendent and eschatological
unity. Thus, each individual figure in a figure-fulfillment dyad stands in a particular evidentiary
relationship to some ultimate truth that cannot itself be disclosed, but only rhetorically evinced
through acts of local interpretation. In practice, both as a rhetorical construction and as a
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hermeneutic theory of history, the figure relies essentially on the spatial reconfiguration of
syntactic elements across scale, from the individual turn of phrase to the structure of Mimesis to
the vision of history as a series of figures in succession. Crucially, although the temporal and
spatial dimensions of the figural can be disarticulated conceptually, they move together in
practice as a spatiotemporal structure.
Thus, the concept of the figure, as I wish to import it from Auerbach, has two primary
and interconnected aspects: a formal, rhetorical, and aesthetic one, which aligns with the
classical meaning of the term, and which finds itself instantiated in the production of Chart
Brut’s image collages, and an interpretive, prophetic, and historical one, which is located at the
site of consumption of these images, and is identified with their intended effects. Both of these
aspects are illustrated, for example, in the images produced in the wake of the Boston Marathon
bombing investigation, as evident in figs. 5160 and 6.161
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Figure 2.5 Chart Brut Featuring the Boston Marathon Bombing
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Figure 2.6 Chart Brut Featuring the Boston Marathon Bombing
These two figures attempt to demonstrate, in the Chart Brut style, that the Boston Bombing was
not, as widely reported, an act of terrorism carried out by the Tsarnaev brothers but was, in fact,
a ‘false flag’ operation conducted by military contractors under the auspices of the U.S. federal
government. These images attempt to show that the two men in question, in the upper right of
fig. 2.5 and the upper left of fig. 2.6, are covert operators responsible for the lethal blast. As fig.
2.2 attempts to make clear, the backpack apparently shouldered by one of the men is the same
type of pack that the FBI claims contained one of the deadly explosives.
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These are conspiratorial images insofar as they attempt to articulate lines of power and
agency through nodes of evidence.162 In this particular instance, the nodes of evidence are
surveillance and media images of the scene of the bombing, and the lines of agency are quite
literally actualized in the images as brightly colored lines connecting the images to each other,
identifying both relevant actors and suggesting relations between actors, which in this relatively
limited case amounts to the attempted identification of several seemingly innocuous individuals
as suspicious, and indeed as military contractors, and further that the backpack worn by one of
them contained one of the bombs, making these contractors the bombers, and not the Tsarnaev
brothers, who are presumably only patsies in this inside operation. These are also figural images,
insofar as they take individual elements (which would stand by themselves as merely signifying
the presence of certain individuals at certain places at some point in time, or the design and style
of an exploded backpack) and recontextualize them in the formation of an aesthetic-rhetorical
assemblage that transforms them from first-order signifiers into components of a (putatively)
persuasive apparatus. Moreover, although these collages are presented as self-evident, they both
demonstrate a figural interpretation on the part of their authors, as well as require one on the part
of the collage’s observer. These images seek not only to explain an historical event, but to
establish a relationship of figuration and fulfillment between the historical event and its aesthetic
rendering, in which the latter is capable of laying bare and unconcealing the mysterious truth of
the conspiracy’s design, which in this case makes the U.S. federal government analogous to the
God of Christian figural prophecy.
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The aesthetic form of these images, which emphasizes fragmentation and reconfiguration,
echoes Auerbach’s distinction between the temporality of figural interpretation and that of
modern history:
In the modern view, the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbroken
horizontal process; in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from
above; events are considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but
torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other than is promised and
not yet present.163
In assuming that historical events of the past, such as those recorded in the Old Testament,
prefigure events in the New Testament and beyond, figural interpretation is forced to take a view
of temporality that is not linear, causal, and sequential, but rather one in which events that are
chronologically disparate and causally unconnected are immanent with respect to each other, in
virtue of their mutual immanence to the ‘plane of providential design.’ Figural temporality is
reflected in the formal aesthetics of Chart Brut, which render not only the fragmentation, but the
collapse of chronology and linear causality through its flattening approach to visual composition.
As in Mimesis, figural time is rendered through a spatial organization of paratactic fragments,
which strive toward a unity of both aesthetic and historical expression. This figural approach to
aesthetics and temporality is not limited only to the kinds of images produced in the wake of the
Boston Marathon bombing, but are characteristic across its variations. In general, the Chart Brut
image understands the historical fragments it collects as prefiguring a revelation of truth, but a
revelation that can only be understood through the interpretive practice of assembling the
fragments properly. Like the Boston conspiracy images, Chart Brut in particular, and conspiracy
theory in general, prefigures and anticipates a moment of revelation that would fulfill it, allowing
its virtual speculation to become actualized as reality and truth. Siegfried Kracauer’s early book
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on the detective novel explains this redemptive process of fulfillment, which for Kracauer is
essential to the activity of detection and mystery solving, as follows: “the self will be in relation
with the supreme mystery that will carry it to its fullest point of existence….what is experienced
will become real; won knowledge will attain absolute human value.”164 Adrian Martin, in whose
short book on figural thinking this quotation appears, explains that for Kracauer, the hero of
detective fiction functions as a figure of tension, situated liminally between the two spheres of
the human and the divine, between the evidentiary and the mysterious, and ultimately between
the living and the dead.165 The eschatological liminality that Kracauer finds in detective fiction is
also essential to the figural logic of Chart Brut, which like all conspiracy theory is always
oriented towards the Messianic moment of future revelation that would fulfill its fragmentary
contents and render speculation into absolute truth.
That Chart Brut images do not conform to the Enlightenment tradition of linear-causal
empiricism (that is, they appear to most observers as recklessly implausible) is not only not a
deficiency, but is indeed necessary for the logic of figural thinking to operate properly. Since, as
Auerbach claims, figural interpretation necessarily voids linear temporal and causal relations, the
meaningful relations between the disparate fragments brought together in the images of Chart
Brut do not simply stand in self-evidently meaningful relation to each other. They must be made
to signify, and despite these images’ presentation as simply self-evident, more than mere spatial
proximity is required in order for this process to operate effectively. In Chart Brut, meaningful
connections are typically rendered through the editorializing lines that connect fragments within
the collage form. In addition to the figural organization of fragments, this line-connection stands
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as the other key aesthetic feature of Chart Brut. As a feature, the use of lines to connect
fragments follows very much in the aesthetic tradition of the conspiracy wall. Indeed, the
Gawker piece on Chart Brut cites several contemporary examples, including True Detective
(2014-) and The Wire (2002-2008), to which I would add Homeland (2011-2019) as another
notable, and especially colorful, recent example (fig. 2.7).166

Figure 2.7 Homeland
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In the conspiratorial images of Chart Brut, the lines connecting fragments into
meaningful relationship function as if attempting to render visible and explicit the lines, not only
of causal force, but aesthetic force that allow the collages to congeal into unified aesthetic, as
well as rhetorical forms. It is though the lack of self-evidently meaningful relation between the
fragments is rendered over and sutured together by these lines of force, which seek to bring
about the historical fulfillment of these figures by aesthetic, rather than historical means. Hence,
the potential for renarrativization, so important to Jameson’s account of the relationship between
financialization and postmodern aesthetics, is in Chart Brut a wholly metaphysical question of
the capacity of an aesthetic assemblage to express a certain facticity. The facticity of Chart
Brut’s figures is sought in the play of obscure lines of force rendered visible, a notion that can be
traced back at least to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where Kant claims that the essence of
aesthetic judgment is a free play of cognitive powers that mediates between the presentational
powers of sensation and cognition, one that produces a sense of aesthetic pleasure as a
consequence of the harmony between these two faculties of sensation and cognition. For Kant,
the effect of this harmonious relation is the facilitated play of imagination and understanding,
and the universal communicability of such a sensation of aesthetic pleasure is the basis that
underwrites aesthetic judgment.167 On this model of aesthetic experience, the harmonious
sensation produced by the indeterminate “free play” of the faculties of imagination and
understanding constitutes the subjective experience of aesthetic beauty.
Contrary to this view, Christophe Menke notes that the domain of aesthetics has, since
Leibniz, been divided between two “irreconcilable” aspects of aesthetic theory, namely an
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understanding of the principle of sensible activity as a faculty in the Kantian sense, versus an
understanding of it as a force: “The force propelling an ongoing transformation of the
unconscious ideas that constitute us.”168 This latter view, put forth by Johann Gottfried von
Herder and in anticipation of Whitehead and Deleuze, asserts that the aesthetic force (as opposed
to faculty) is the force of the imagination, which as Menke explains means the formation of a
unity, but not a unity generated through a conjunction of impressions, but rather “the generation
of images by their conjunction with other images. The imagination creates images by creating
the unity of these images.”169 Herder’s concept of force, as Menke explains, “designates a form
of apperception” that observes and orders into relation. The nature of this relation, for Herder, is
the “operation of one thing into another,” which Menke explains, stating “the other is that which
is effected and engendered by the one, such that the one is transformed or continuously formed
into the other….‘Force’ means that the one and the other exist only in operation, in the transition
of the one into the other, in the emergence of the other out of the one.”170 Herder’s aesthetic
theory privileges force over faculty, with the crucial consequence that rather than supposing a
universalized, transcendental subject position through which aesthetic judgment transpires, it
seeks to explain how aesthetic force functions as a support undergirding the constitution of the
subject as such.
Hence Herder prefigures Deleuze who, as the introduction explained, takes up the
position of aesthetic experience as a material movement that produces images, in a manner that
precedes and informs the other faculties. For Deleuze, the diagrammatic figure is a kind of
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constructivist schema, functioning to organize the virtual dimension of “possibilities of fact,”
which when actualized aesthetically will produce a concrete and perceptible form.171 This
articulation of the aesthetic to the factual is most prominently expressed in The Logic of
Sensation, in which Deleuze approaches the question of how Francis Bacon’s painting articulates
a figural logic of sensory experience. Here, Deleuze famously distinguishes between the
figurative, or representational aspect of painting, and a figural aspect, which he provocatively
aligns with “the fact.”172 Indeed, Deleuze identifies the relationships between coupled figures,
though in explicitly nonnarrative terms, as “matters of fact” [emphasis in original].173 As the
introduction explains, such “matters of fact” eventually become, later in The Logic of Sensation,
identified as diagrammatic forms, but Deleuze’s early provocation to consider nonnarrative
relations between figural elements as possessing facticity, and as, quite literally, materially
expressive of facts, reverberates with Auerbach’s parallel concern with how figural elements in a
hermeneutic apparatus can likewise constitute an historical fact of the matter for the interpreter.
For Deleuze, the answer to this question involves an appeal to the concept of force, as a
“condition of sensation.” Yet, as he argues, “it is nonetheless not the force that is sensed, since
the sensation “gives” something completely different from the forces that condition it.”174 In
other words, aesthetic force serves as a preconditional ground upon which both figural and
eventually figurative effects rely, though this force is not itself typically sensible to the observer,
who experiences it only in more ‘molar’ terms of figuration. For Deleuze then, the central
problematic of painting is how to render these invisible forces visible, which is closely aligned
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with the related problem of “the decomposition and recomposition of effects” [emphasis in
original].175 In The Logic of Sensation Francis Bacon’s painting, with its emphasis on the figural
rather than the figurative, provides the solution to this form-problem, which must now also be
considered as a force-problem. In Chart Brut, as with conspiracy theory in general, the sensible
expression of lines of articulation, which is to say the articulation of matters of fact, is an equally
pressing concern. Chart Brut’s literal lines of connection strive to render these epistemic forces
visible and to self-reflexively present decomposition and recomposition, which in this context
should be understood in narrative terms, as putatively self-evident and self-sufficient narrative
articulations.
Thus, in Chart Brut the lines that trace conspiratorial connections seek to establish the
ordering and relational operation of aesthetic force. These lines of force gather disparate
fragments into what is presented as a coherent and sensible unity, and the ability to be
understood as a coherent explanation of some event or state of affairs. Through this operation of
force, Chart Brut strives toward the transformation of its figures into factual representations
about what is—a fully articulated diagram. The nature of figural thinking is such, however, that
this process of ‘ongoing formation’ is never complete, leaving facticity as the absolute limit
toward which the figure moves, but into which it can never successfully resolve. That the nature
of figurality is such that the fulfillment of figures always exists in the future and yet to occur, and
consequently insofar as Chart Brut, as embodying the schematic diagram of conspiracy thinking,
also employs figural thinking, the consummation of integral fulfillment is always beyond reach,
a kind of conspiratorial sublimity that is only ever gestured towards.
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Hence, the articulating lines of force of Chart Brut, as Deleuzian “matters of fact,” do not
so much succeed in articulating facts of the matter, so much as they figure them as an expression
of aesthetic and hermeneutic desire. In so doing, Chart Brut provides a sublating solution to the
problem of finance capital’s simultaneous need to produce a novel futurity on the one hand, and
incessant reconfiguration of the same on the other. Insofar as the process of renarrativization can
be said to occur in Chart Brut, it holds out the utopian promise of figural redemption, that is, a
future that is meaningfully, perhaps even progressively, different from the present. Presumably
the sublime revelation of the Grand Conspiracy has the potential to effectuate meaningful social
change. Yet, the very structure of figurality as such ensures that this reconfiguration cannot but
resemble the past that schematically conditions, which is to say prefigures, its aesthetic
appearance and hermeneutic recognizability, ensuring a perpetuation of the same as the guise of
the new. In Chart Brut, Benjamin’s Angel of History reappears as an Angel of Conspiracy.
2.4

Conclusion: Julie Mehretu’s Speculative Gaze
If this problematic of renarrativization and its discontents is implied in Auerbach and

Chart Brut, it is taken up in a far more explicit and politically incisive way in the work of
contemporary visual artist Julie Mehretu, whose abstract work not only evokes the spatial form
of the conspiracy diagram, but also functions to critique it. Moreover, whereas financialization
remains schematically immanent in the figural form of the conspiracy diagram, Mehretu’s work,
and especially her 2009 Mural, commissioned by Goldman Sachs and located in the lobby of the
financial firm’s global headquarters in New York, self-consciously theorizes finance capital as a
unification of figural temporality with figural spatiality.
The mural spans a massive 80 feet wide by 23 feet tall and is composed of six
overlapping layers of abstract line, shape, and color embedded in sanded acrylic spray (fig. 2.8).
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Figure 2.8 Mural
Thematically, the work’s formal elements express a sense of historical time: while the abstract
lines and shapes evoke the history of abstract modernist painting, the incorporation of
architectural plans signifies various aspects of the history of capitalism: there are fragments of
architectural plans, including Greek and Roman markets and modern high-rise buildings, maps
of trade routes including New Orleans cotton exchange routes, as well as the façade of the New
York Stock Exchange, all embedded and palimpsestically layered within the mural. In addition
to the work’s gestures toward its own art-historical and economic contexts, the mural is also
annotated by abstract marks of color that traverse the sprawling canvas, indicating a sense of
affectivity, animacy, and spatio-temporal movement that reverberates with Deleuze’s account of
Bacon’s affectively intensive “free marks.”176 In its formal investment in orchestrating a
discontinuous mode of historical time by means of a collage of fragments, therefore, the mural
resonates strongly both with the literary form of Mimesis, as well as with the visual style of Chart
Brut.
Yet what sets Mehretu’s work apart from these others, and what gives it a distinctively
polemical critical edge, is the way in which its thematic expression of historical temporality,
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which is legible through close scrutiny of the surface of the work, is differently experienced by
observers inside and outside of the building that houses the work. As Calvin Tompkins of The
New Yorker has observed, Mehretu’s layering practice produces a sense of spatial depth in the
work that itself evokes a sense of temporality.177 The way in which this temporality is rendered
spatially, through the collapse of historical strata into a single visual plane, not only echoes
Auerbach’s explanation of figural interpretation as implicating a series of incomplete, non-linear,
fragmentary historical events that mutually redeem each other, but also the movement from force
to form that characterizes the diagram in Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation. In Mehretu’s Mural, as in
Mimesis and Chart Brut, figural space becomes a way of rendering figural time, and the
interaction of these two systems, architectural and historical, reproduces the operational logic of
finance capital for the mural’s observer: from afar (i.e. from the public space on the sidewalk
outside the Goldman lobby) the mural appears as a molar, unified whole (fig. 2.9), while up close
(i.e. inside the lobby), the work is composed of spatially minute representational, and historical,
disjunctions, rather than a self-identical relation between the mural’s layers (fig. 2.10).
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Figure 2.9 Mural (Exterior)

Figure 2.10 Mural (Detail)
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In doing so, it incorporates relations of power, in the form of visual and epistemological access
to the work and its fine details, into the observer’s very experience of it. While it is visible
through a window from the street, only Goldman Sachs employees and guests who pass through
lobby security may assess the work up close, in a way that would reveal the actual fragmentary
details of which the work as a whole is comprised.
Moreover, not only does the mural’s spatial location produce a series of disjunctions
between inside and outside, insider and outsider, and private and public that self-reflexively
enacts the privatization of public art and public space, but it does so in a way that constructs
these distinct subject positions as markedly different modes of apprehension of the work and
whatever representational content it may disclose. Counterintuitively, it is the public outsider
whose view of the work is as a representational unity, whereas it is the Goldman insider alone
who can appreciate the fragmented, non-self-identical form of the work, along with its intricate
and historically specific detail. Thus, Mehretu’s mural aesthetically and architecturally
reproduces the division between insider and outsider views of the market itself, which becomes
the genuine content of the work as an installation piece: the public view of the market is the
illusion of a stable and coherent system, guided by the providence of the ‘invisible hand,’
whereas the privileged inside view of the mechanisms of the marketplace reveals a disjunctive,
incoherent system of intense financialization, in which privileged access to market data, such as
the microsecond price fluctuations that enable latency arbitrage, allows institutions like Goldman
to extract profit seemingly out of thin air. The bodily movement from inside the Goldman
building to its outside would, then, figure the ontologically generative movement of speculation
itself, from value as an imaginary representational fiction, to value as a ‘real’ and productive
force, value as self-sufficient face-value.
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Thus, Mehretu’s Mural provides not only a sort of cartographic map, but also an
epistemic and affective diagram of finance capital and neoliberal privatization, one that hinges
on the privileged ability to interpret the figural object, and hence also on the very question of the
narratability of aesthetic form. The question of renarrativization is answered differently
depending on the observer’s location in space relative to the painting, such that the general
public sees a work in its holistic formal unity, but without access to the narrative elements of the
work while the privileged insider sees the work in its fragmentation, but with the ability to
articulate this incomplete striving toward formal unity to the historical signifiers of the history of
capitalism and mercantile exchange. Mehretu’s mural thereby renders the problem of
renarrativization in all its dialectical complexity, by presenting oppositional perspectives on the
narratability of the work that depend on the observer’s subject-position relative to the institutions
of finance capital. Mehretu’s own commentary on her work is instructive here. She describes
how, in her work, the tension between the incorporation of architectural plans and abstract marks
and characters functions to both produce the sense of space the work affords, as well as to
undermine and dismantle any sense of coherence or self-identical form.178 Mehretu explicitly
affirms this dioptic focus as the stated goal of the Mural, explaining that her “aim is to have
pictures that appear one way from a distance, almost like looking at a cosmology, city, or
universe from afar—but when you approach the work, the overall image shatters into numerous
other pictures, stories and events.”179
What Mehretu’s remarkable work ultimately produces is an experiential, embodied
reminder that the abstractions of finance capital, as much as those of conspiracy theory, are
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inseparable from the question of the specific bodies interpellated by these speculative systems of
world-making and representation. It is precisely the question of the location of the body that
ultimately matters in relation to the Goldman mural, which is why critiques of the work on the
grounds that its commission by an investment bank only serves to supplicate the 1% are doomed
to miss the point. The mural takes the presumption that it is itself a speculative commodity, in
the form of an interest-bearing work of fine art installed in an obviously commercial location,
and reconfigures the conventional subject-object relation between the viewing subject and the art
object. The mural effectively shows up the public observer with a speculative interest in the work
as, from the perspective of Goldman Sachs itself, an objectified commodity whose social value
and capacity for exploitation by the financial system is determined by its epistemic and spatial
relationship to the fixed and centered speculative object. In other words, one’s distance from the
locus of financial speculation directly correlates to one’s susceptibility to the exploitative
mystifications of the financial system, particularly those that require naïve investors to view the
market as a stable and coherent system that functions smoothly and instantaneously, which the
market is not and does not. The mural’s modality of spatial critique also, therefore, extends to an
immanent critique of the racialized, geospatial structure of global finance, in which developing
economies in African and Latin American nations, not to mention American subprime mortgage
loans, are exploited by financial systems that capitalize on the social risk inherent in credit-debt
relations at the same time as ideological presumptions create the ground for those very same risk
assessments.180
Thus, Mehretu’s work raises the question of embodiment in relation to speculation, a
question that is articulated in differing ways, with differing stakes and differing outcomes, in
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each of the chapters that follow. In the following chapter, the naïve medical patient’s body on
House M.D. also becomes a site for speculative exploitation, albeit without a conscious concern
for financialization or critique as such. In the following chapter on House, as well as in the
chapters on Sinister and Nightcrawler, financial speculation becomes submerged as an immanent
diagrammatic form that while not explicitly articulated, is detectable through its indexical effects
on the bodies it interpellates.
3

SCANNING THE NEOLIBERAL BRAIN: HOUSE M.D. AND THE
BIOPOLITICAL T.V. SCREEN

3.1

Introduction: The Biopolitical T.V. Screen
The December 5, 2005 issue of TIME Magazine features a cover story on “The Year in

Medicine from A to Z,” a brisk recap of breakthroughs in medical science over the previous 11
months. On the magazine’s cover this headline is accompanied by a graphic cover image
featuring an illustration of a male human figure, viewed from slightly above, whose glowing and
radiant purple skin-surface reveals beneath it the body’s vascular system of heart and red-blue
arteries and veins, all of which is visually encapsulated by a large red and yellow pill (fig. 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 TIME
Obliquely, this cover image evokes the body as seen by medical imaging technology—an MRI
(Magnetic Resonance Imaging) or CT (Computed Tomography) scan—and this not only through
the transparency of the body, but also through the angle of the (hypothetical) camera and the pill
background, which work to suggest the supine orientation of the body in relation to the
visualizing scanners of medical imaging technology.181
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To seek to understand the state of medicine and culture through “The Year in Medicine
from A to Z” is, however, only to see a symptomatic surface phenomenon belying a deeper
condition. The article itself addresses 26 distinct medical news items from the preceding year,
one for each letter of the alphabet, with a short, three or four sentence blurb-like summary: a dog
was cloned. The controversy over Terry Schiavo’s life and death erupted. Fish oil supplements
looked promising for combating heart disease. But these fragmentary, sound-bite accounts are
less revealing as historical documents than the interstitial advertisements that separate and
conjoin them. One such ad promotes GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), a pharmaceutical giant, and one
of several that advertises heavily in magazines like TIME that appeal to a middle-aged, middleclass readership.182 The ad features an off-white background, onto which is laid a vertical
rectangle of brown textile fabric, and over that another rectangle forming a weathered, browned
page (fig. 3.2).
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Figure 3.2 TIME
Over the top of this page are snapshot photos of a doctor and some kind of microscopic image,
although it is unclear exactly what is supposed to be visible in it. On the page, text reads, on
separate lines: “WE’RE FIGHTING AN ENEMY WE CAN’T SEE / IN A WAR THAT
NEVER ENDS / AND WE’RE ACTUALLY WINNING.” More text goes on to explain that
developing drugs to fight disease is expensive and time consuming, that bacteria develop
resistance and force drug companies to start over, that the ‘war’ on disease has no end, and (yet)
must be won, or at least continued, since “losing is not an option.”183
183
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As this ad makes abundantly and explicitly clear, the fight against disease being waged
by pharmaceutical companies is thought, by the company and presumably by TIME’s readership,
to be analogous to the War on Terror then being waged by the U.S. and its allies in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The interminable nature of warfare, which has come to define the still-ongoing
global conflict, is leveraged by the ad to explain drug development as a kind of necessary,
indefinite war on the ever-present threat of potentially lethal disease. As with the War on Terror,
the “enemy” is invisible, prone to “resistance,” and expensive to eradicate. Also like that War on
Terror, GSK can project the image that it is “winning” the war, at the same time that it
acknowledges that the war is impossible to win, and must continue forever, both because bacteria
resist and because a successful resolution to the war on disease would eliminate the need for
GSK and other pharmaceutical conglomerates to continue to exist. As Brian Massumi explains,
in the similar context of the subsumption of both viral pandemics and warfare under the rubric of
future threat, “There is always a remainder of uncertainty, an unconsummated surplus of
danger….Self-renewing menace is the future reality of threat.”184
This was also not the first time that global terrorism and disease had been productively
compared. Among many examples, George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, perhaps
more well-known for the coinage of the term “Axis of Evil,” uses a similar medical metaphor to
analogize the War on Terror. In his speech, Bush refers to “the terrorist parasites who threaten
their countries and our own,” while also noting that Hussein’s Iraq “is a regime that has
something to hide from the civilized world.” Here, the logic of terrorism as a disease, one that is
all the more dangerous for its ability to ‘hide’ and evade visible detection, is leveraged in the
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service of drumming up support for the then-imminent war against Iraq. According to this
metaphorical logic of terrorism-as-disease, the war to be fought is as much one of images and
visibility as it is of boots on the ground, or compounds developed in a laboratory. For Bush,
GSK, and TIME’s December 2005 cover story, to succeed requires the ability to visualize the
invisible enemy, to make the diseased body, whether literal or the body politic, open to visual
inspection and preemptive, prophylactic intervention.
The GSK ad, despite its assertion that disease is invisible, illustrates a snapshot photo of
what is presumably bacteria, twice framed with an iris-like mask (to denote the microscope that
would make the bacteria visible to the naked eye) and with a white border (to denote the image
as an image, as something transportable, showable, and shareable). The ‘mise-en-scène’ of the ad
suggests that the war against disease (as well as, perhaps, the War on Terror that is evoked by the
ad, but which remains invisible and implicit within it) can be fought through the production of
images and their placement into literal imbrication. The image of the disease, set against the
image of the GSK researcher who would cure it, encourages TIME readers to think of both wars
as wars of invisibility, organized according to a logic whereby the ability to see and frame
images accords with the ability to control and manage biological and geopolitical resistance to
the dominant order of neoliberal capitalism. Moreover, the capacity for biological threat control
and management is articulated simultaneously to both the ability to produce images that visualize
invisible threats, as well as the ability to arrange images spatially in a manner that effectively
produces a sense that the biological threat, and its image, is itself under expert control.
À propos of this relationship between virality, visibility, images and power, Pasi Väliaho
asks: “If images are quasi-corporeal and even, to quote W.J.T. Mitchell, ‘parasitical’ passengers
that travel across time and space in their human mediators, where can we locate them
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conceptually?” He goes on to propose the concept of biopolitical visual economy, a field of
power relations that is established at and through the intersection of the visibility of images in the
realm of screens and pictures, and the beliefs and affects that are evoked by those images and the
visual logic that constitutes them.185 For Väliaho, biopolitical visual economy names a kind of
Rancièrean partage du sensible, articulating relations between what is sayable and what is
visually sensible: “The image can be visual or verbal, aural or tactile, or any combination of
these, the main point being that it works, if not always subserviently, within networks of power
and constitutes ‘the sensible system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously
discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective
parts and positions within it.’”186 Although Väliaho uses Rancière’s language to describe
biopolitical visual economy, his emphasis on the articulation of the sayable and the visible
implicitly evokes Deleuze’s parallel problematic of the differentiation of the sensible and the
intelligible, as discussed in the introduction. Indeed, the Rancière quotation Väliaho appeals to
here itself indicates, in so many words, a schematic or diagrammatic functioning of visibility
itself, insofar as it is both self-evident to sense perception, and capable of disclosing the
commonalities and regulative functions immanent to the empirical field it produces.
According to Väliaho, the contemporary apparatus of biopolitics is distinguished by a
shift from subjectivity as the dominant mode of thinking the individual in relation to
sociopolitical authority to brainhood, in which biopolitical control is exercised not only on the
body, but on the brain that is taken to be the seat of the biologized self.187 Images, as Väliaho’s
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reference to Rancière suggests, are the principal means through which the neurobiological self is
managed and controlled under neoliberal capitalism, and particularly through the ability of
images to circulate between brains and screens. For Väliaho, therefore, visualizations of the brain
therefore hold a privileged position in the visual economy of neoliberal brainhood, since they
effectively constitute the discourse that contemporary capitalism has about itself with itself, as
both contain and propagate the logic of neoliberal brainhood in and through their circulation.
Väliaho’s primary interest is in examining the ways in which screen images “administer
our temporal realities” and orient us temporally through mediating image technologies: “Images
incorporate the future in the present; they make the future a fact lived here and now in our
bodies. In doing so, they reiterate the key logics of biopolitics today, logics based on the
management of future possibilities, on the ontogenetic effectiveness of appearances to conjure up
what has not yet happened but will happen.” As Väliaho makes clear, the preemptive ontogenesis
entailed by neoliberal biopolitics operates across a vast field of action, from the preemptive wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan to the speculative securitization of high finance.188 As Randy Martin
likewise observes, “While not reducible to the interests of finance capital, war today takes on a
financial logic in the way it is organized and prosecuted. War is a means of destruction, but also
the occasion for reconstructing a region along specific lines for particular ends. War destroys, but
it also bears forms of life that render perceptible capital’s inner machinations.”189 What both
Martin and Väliaho bring into focus is the ways in which both finance and contemporary warfare
are regulated, not only by “capital’s inner machinations,” but by a distinctively figural,
speculative logic through which the image, construed broadly as a general form of sensible
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representation, is imbued with a temporally and spatially productive capacity: to produce the
future in the present, as well as to organize the respective parts and positions that constitute the
visual field into a cohesive figure.
This chapter seeks to understand more precisely how the biopolitical regime of neoliberal
brainhood emerged during its particular historical moment, as well as to explain how this regime
articulates processes of visual and securitizing speculation. In this respect, the GSK
advertisement that opened this chapter should be understood as symptomatic of the solidification
of a larger cultural epistemology of the image, one that comes about precisely at an historical
moment of intense and pervasive anxiety regarding the ability of visualization technologies to
effectively produce a satisfactory image of biological, political, and existential threats. In this
moment, medical and military visualities enter into a relation of mutual transference and
exchange, each trading epistemic and affective properties with the other, and producing a kind of
composite: a figural biomilitary visuality. This chapter’s goal is, by collating disparate elements,
to render an image of neoliberal brainhood at this point in its development—between the
beginning of U.S. military engagement in Iraq in 2003 and the 2008 financial crisis—which in
turn has a transformative effect on how speculation is itself figured culturally. In doing so, this
chapter works not only to show how the biomilitary visuality of the War on Terror anticipates
and feeds into the crisis of speculation that is so acutely exacerbated by the financial crisis, but
also to explore how digital images, as articulations of the dialectical tension between materiality
and abstraction that grounds both aesthetic and financial speculation, function as loci for
expressing the ramifications of the longer durée of financialization.
If the GSK ad is particularly striking, it is, however, only a narrow example of one image
that circulated briefly during late 2005. In order to produce a more adequate image of neoliberal
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brainhood, a more powerful and expansive imaging and imagining technology is required. This
chapter therefore turns to television as a medium for the circulation of images that visualize the
brain and its functions. In particular, I look to the first three seasons of the network television
program House M.D. (2004-2012), which aired from fall 2004 to spring 2007, as an especially
well-positioned synaptic junction in Väliaho’s map of contemporary visual culture. In the show,
Dr. Gregory House and his diagnostic team of doctors solve medical mysteries that consistently
hinge on the illegibility of ambiguous symptoms that must be rendered both visible and
intelligible by House and his team during the course of the investigation. As Dr. House’s nearnamesake Holmes would indicate, the show centers on processes of investigation and detection,
in which the patient, in both body and mind, is treated with suspicion. While the program itself
provides a rich textual mediation of the brain, the body, and the cultural visuality of disease, I am
seeking here to contextualize the show within the broader situation of American culture between
2003 and 2007 by theorizing it as an image of the neoliberal brain. This chapter therefore also
considers, alongside House M.D., TIME magazine as a primary historical archive, along with
other relevant archival sources of information.
2003 marked a banner year in the emergence of neoliberal visuality, for at least three
reasons. Firstly, it was the year in which the Second Iraq War commenced, following closely on
the heels of the “Axis of Evil” State of the Union speech, in which Bush outlined his eponymous
doctrine by vowing to preemptively strike enemies of the USA, claiming that “We are protected
from attack only by vigorous action abroad and increased vigilance at home.” Secondly, 2003
was the year in which the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Paul C.
Lauterbur and Sir Peter Mansfield, “for their discoveries concerning magnetic resonance
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imaging.”190 Although MRI technology has existed since the 1970s, and was increasingly
widespread beginning in the 1990s, it was only formally acknowledged at this prestigious level
in 2003, effectively marking its arrival in the public consciousness as a vitally important medical
technology. Lastly, although perhaps no less significantly, 2003 was also the year in which
General Electric overhauled its corporate brand image for the first time since 1979, replacing its
brand slogan of “We bring good things to life” with “Imagination at Work.” This overhaul was
accompanied by an aggressive marketing campaign that cost in excess of 100 million dollars,
and indicated G.E.’s shift away from associations with lighting and consumer appliances, and
towards a more expansive and diversified brand identity.191 “Imagination,” to the extent that it
replaces “good things,” indexes the cultural shift away from the Fordist regime of manufacturing
and towards the Post-Fordist regime of immaterial goods and cognitive labor, and especially
towards images as the products of an ‘imagination’ figured as work.192 In this context, it is

190

“The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2003,” Nobelprize.org,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2003/.
191
This marketing campaign included a series of four television commercials, each of which
illustrates the ways in which G.E.’s products and services either have, or will, transform the
world of technology. Three of the ads invite viewers to hypothetically reimagine America’s
technological and cultural history through the lens of contemporary technology, with spots
featuring a jet-propelled Wright Brothers’ Kitty Hawk flight, an episode of Lassie in which the
faithful collie uses kung-fu inspired by The Matrix to protect Jeff (or is it Timmy?) from a
mountain lion, and a scenario in which a sublime trove of medical documents, clearly modeled
on Citizen Kane and Raiders of the Lost Ark, is easily accessible thanks to digital information
technology. A fourth ad however looks to the future, imaging a world in which the automobilepainting robots that have replaced human labor are themselves obsolesced by an even more
advanced plastics technology that obviates the need for paint at all. The humanoid robots are
shown playing cards and reading magazines at work before they are disconcertingly reassigned
to become crash test dummies, in an oddly bleak repetition of the deleterious effects of
automation on human labor. See examples at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPqn5p-8Vdg,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4XMfj2zbI0, and
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kk3A2BGqerI.
192
Stuart Elliott, “The Media Business: Advertising; G.E. to Spend $100 Million Promoting
Itself as Innovative,” The New York Times, January 16, 2003.

123

crucial to note G.E.’s position as one of the most prominent manufacturers of medical imaging
technology, especially MRI machines, which serve as the means of production of such images.193
As Väliaho suggests, visualizations of the brain maintain a privileged status within the
regime of neoliberal brainhood, as they function to both bear and propagate the logic of
contemporary biopolitical power. Moreover as scientific images they contain, embedded within
them, traces of what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison refer to as the “epistemic virtues” that
guide their construction and use. For Daston and Galison, scientific images index the ways in
which subject/object relations are understood by the individuals who produce and consume
them.194 In the 19th century, photographic objectivity entailed a professional ethics of restraint
and elimination of will, and in the 20th century, the necessity of interpreting abstract images
(such as of bubble chambers and the brain) entailed an ethics of trained interpretation of images.
I would suggest that these kinds of processual relations, which shape how interactions between
subjects, or brains, and images are supposed to take place in terms of epistemology, ethics, and
affect, are a useful means of approaching visualizations of the brain in neoliberal brainhood
precisely on account of the ways in which they allow both subject-positions and object-positions
to emerge as discrete, yet articulated forms out of the inescapably aesthetic process of
interpretation that unfolds between them. As bearers of “epistemic virtues,” or in other words a
particular distribution of the sensible or Deleuzian diagram, scientific images can be subjected to
a transcendental deduction that reveals the forces of subjective and objective construction at play
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in a particular case. Moreover, although Daston and Galison restrict their study to medical
images produced by and for professional scientists, I would also suggest that their model for
analysis, which takes scientific images as always freighted with various assumptions about the
nature of visualization, may be usefully extended beyond technical images, and into the realm of
images that signify scientificity and that circulate culturally. The “Year in Medicine from A to
Z” cover image, for example, weaves together epistemic, ethical, and affective engagements by
rendering the body as permeable and readily available to inspection, albeit an inspection that is
able to restrict itself to only specific systems of the body (i.e. the vascular system, and not organ
tissue, or bone) and elides sexual organs. The body here is rendered as a glowing, purple entity,
radiating its own energy and projecting power, even as the image penetrates its surface. This
image, like many others, makes legible and indeed is only legible through the way it articulates
assumptions about the capacities of medical imaging technology, and the form of visuality
produced through the use of such technology.
As I have suggested, the first three season of House are situated at the intersection of
neoliberal discourses regarding medicine, visuality, and the War on Terror. As a (partly) episodic
medical mystery program (especially during its first three seasons, which iterate relatively
narrow variations on its basic narrative format), House features a number of consistent formal
and stylistic characteristics that establish its unique identity as a television program through
weekly and seasonal episodic iteration. In this respect, House shares in common with MRI
technology the concept of a ‘common brain space.’ Since no two individual brains are precisely
identical, either in terms of anatomy or in terms of patterns of neurobiological activation, the
concept of common brain space was developed in order to construct a normalized, ‘average’
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brain that could serve as a reference for comparisons. As one introductory MRI textbook
explains,
The concept behind this development [of common brain space] was to develop a
common coordinate framework for expressing relative neuroanatomical positions
in any brain….In order to represent individually variable brain shapes in a
standard coordinate framework computational methods for ‘warping’ one brain
geometry into that of another have been developed….Such methods fit one brain
shape to another by optimizing the alignment of neuroanatomically similar
features of the two brains.195
This technique functions through the accumulation of a substantial number of individual brain
scans, which are them ‘warped’ together computationally in order to produce a mathematical and
visual composite. The unified visual form of the average brain is created through the ‘warping’
of differential fragments into a holistic whole. The notion of a common brain space, then, is
something like the MRI equivalent of Francis Galton’s 19th century composite portraiture, except
that whereas Galton superimposed images onto each other to generate a composite image, brain
atlases are oriented according to shared ‘landmark’ structures of the brain, which are used to
produce a normalized average image. In both cases, the scientific goal is a kind of deduction of
common properties, structures, or qualities on the basis of an inductive accumulation of
individual examples, but in the case of common brain space the composite whole remains an
hypothetical form that is produced by forcibly ‘warping’ a plurality of concrete, but fragmentary
images together into a single unified, but abstracted visual figure.
House, through its episodic iteration of narrative, thematic and stylistic features, produces
a kind of televisual brain space that renders itself visible for analysis as a composite image; an
ur-text that is not identical to any particular episode of the show, but offers a map of landmarks
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to which any individual episode can be normalized or distinguished and which demonstrates, like
the brain itself, structural plasticity. Unlike Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance,
however, in which a group can be defined according to a set of overlapping, shared features, but
where no single feature is necessarily common to all members of the group, the concept of a
common brain space emphasizes the mapping of partially overlapping relations between
structures over the definition and categorization of the features subject to such a mapping
operation.196 Also unlike Walter Benjamin’s ‘photographic’ notion of history, in which “The past
can be seized only as an image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability, and is never
seen again,” the notion of brain space suggests a less instantaneous and more iterative, if not
compulsive, approach to the imagination of history and to Väliaho’s “administration of temporal
realities.”197 In order to perceive House as an historico-cultural image, it must be observed not at
the level of singular episodes or plot lines, but as an aggregate, and as a kind of archive. For this
reason, this chapter elevates the mundane and typical aspects of the show over distinctive
episodes, even those which engage more explicitly with themes of conspiracy and geopolitics.
For a procedural like House, these minute similarities and differences from episode to
episode are at least as useful for approaching the show as a kind of cultural index. This in turn
reflects the way in which MRI operates at a technical level. Unlike x-ray images, which similarly
expose the inside of the body but which traditionally work by means of the registration of a
visible trace on a photochemical surface, MRI operates by producing, detecting, recording, and
visually rendering changes in the magnetic polarity of hydrogen nuclei within the human
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body.198 Thus, as Kelly Joyce explains, “The body is transformed into an array of numerical
measurements that are then coded into images,” and indeed typically as a set of multiple images,
each of which offers a slightly different visual perspective on the object in question.199 Hence,
MRI is technologically and conceptually situated at the thresholds of material embodiment and
abstract, speculative representation, between quantitative measurement and qualitative
imagination. Moreover, whereas x-ray technology is predicated on photochemical absorption and
analog indexicality, MR is a thoroughly digital technology that produces visual models of tissue
based on recorded data recording changes in nuclei polarity over time. Consequently, as opposed
to the spontaneous and unpredictable flash of Benjaminian history, MR offers us, as a guiding
metaphor, something much closer to the accumulation of wreckage at the feet of Klee’s angel.200
Instead of a photographic explosion to blow open the historical continuum in a moment of
danger, we may look to the steady accumulation of episodic slices that, with the right kind of
map of common landmarks, can begin to form meaningful relation.
The analytical purchase of the concept of a common brain space for House is not, or not
only, that it indicates a degree of isomorphism between the episodic, iterative structure of the
medical mystery series and the similarly iterative process of constructing brain atlases. Rather,
what the concept indicates is that the logic of speculative finance is immanent to both of these
hermeneutic operations, insofar as both finance and brain space are definable in terms of a
capacity to actualize what the hypothetical or only latently virtual, as in the instrumental
objectification and rendering-fungible of conditions of social risk in the process of calculating
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prices for derivative products. In both instances preemptive ontogenesis, as a strategy of risk
management, becomes incorporated into a cybernetic feedback loop of what Ivan Ascher calls
“the mode of capitalist prediction,” predicated less on commodification than on securitization, in
both its financial and military registers.201 Thus, House, MRI, and the logic of financial
speculation themselves form a kind of Benjaminian constellation producing an image of
neoliberal visuality, the schematic function of which can also be turned on House itself as an
immanent example.
The textual structures of House’s brain space under consideration here, which function as
organizing characteristics of neoliberal brainhood in the early to mid-2000s, fall into two broad
categories, each of which can be parceled into two sub-categories or branches. The first category
deals with the show’s visualization of images, and can be subdivided into the stylistic use of the
“CSI shot” to visualize the medical symptom as image, and the production of a decisive, ‘telltale’ image that secures knowledge of the disease etiology and coincides with a successful
resolution of the mystery, the illness, and the episode. The second category concerns the show’s
rendering of action and can likewise be split into the figuration of diagnosis as cybernetic puzzlesolving and game play, as well as a pharmacological emphasis on the logic of preemptive action.
These four markers constitute key structures in the image of neoliberal brainhood that is
produced by House, and as such also constitute an emergent self-theorization of neoliberalism by
itself—the imagination of the neoliberal brain at work. In this respect, the show echoes Väliaho’s
assertion that the brain appears, within neoliberalism, as a “dynamic and self-organizing system”
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that is both “plastic and self-modifying.”202 The show’s ability to ‘bootstrap’ itself into a
theoretical cogito is, therefore, perhaps as much a sign of the times as it is a hermeneutic conceit.
3.2

Medical Imaging
The typical, ‘normalized’ episode of House begins with a pre-credits opening scene that

establishes the medical emergency to be solved during the course of the episode. These scenes
begin as innocuous vignettes, in which House’s future patients are seen going about their daily
lives, until those lives are traumatically disrupted by the sudden onset of symptoms that will
inevitably lead to death unless their underlying cause can be discerned and treated effectively. In
the show’s pilot episode, “Everybody Lies” (S1:E01, original airdate: November 16, 2004), a
kindergarten teacher, exuberant after a weekend of implied sex with a new partner, loses the
ability to speak before collapsing into a grand mal seizure in front of her class. Immediately after
the credits, an opening dialogue between Dr. House and his friend (and the Watson to his
Holmes) Dr. Wilson, establishes that the patient’s seizures have been getting progressively
worse, and that death as a result of brain tumor or another equally serious affliction is likely.
As the series continues and the audience becomes familiar with this basic pattern, the
show modifies and elaborates on it, no longer necessarily focusing solely on the victim-to-be, but
allowing medical trauma to emerge from unexpected places in the mise-en-scène. In “Spin”
(S2:E06, original airdate November 15, 2005), the pre-credits sequence follows two young boys
spectating a bicycle race, as they run to secure a vantage point before the racers pass by.
Although one of the boys begins to breathe sharply, indicating an asthma attack, it is not the boy
but one of the cyclists who is felled by sudden illness, crashing dramatically on the course. In
this instance, the show demonstrates a plasticity of the sudden onset structure in order to trick its
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audience into thinking the asthmatic child would be the episode’s victim, producing more shock
and surprise when it is revealed to be an athlete in peak physical condition who is afflicted. This
trope amplifies the show’s suggestion that violent medical trauma can affect anyone at any time,
even those considered least susceptible, and that death may be imminent for anyone, anywhere.
The opening hook, which functions as an entrée to a large majority of all House episodes,
visualizes and narrativizes the bodily risk created by the potential imminence and
unpredictability of life-destroying trauma in post-9/11 America. It articulates a set of cultural
anxieties regarding the possibility of terrorizing attacks, displacing concerns about national
security onto the medicalized body, effecting a chiasmatic reversal of the logic of Bush’s “Axis
of Evil” speech, and echoing the logic of GSK’s print advertisement in TIME. Another
advertisement in that same GSK campaign, a television spot about developing drugs to fight
pandemic bird flu, echoes these same anxieties. It features a GSK spokeswoman and scientist
asking the viewer to consider how the time-consuming challenges involved in finding treatments
for diseases like heart disease Alzheimer’s disease also apply to bird flu, and suggests that a bird
flu pandemic would be devastating. Unlike heart disease, diabetes, or Alzheimer’s, the ad tells
us, a bird flu pandemic would transpire much faster, nearly instantaneously by comparison,
hence the need for preventative vaccine research.203 This ad, like House’s opening sequences,
presents a view of life-threatening disease as spontaneous and sudden. Like Bush’s speech, it
also highlights an affinity between disease and biological warfare in terms of unpredictability,
immediacy, and the need for both preemptive action. In the case of the GSK ad, this preemptive
action takes the form of preemptive financial investment, which in turn generates new lucrative
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products designed to manage and mitigate potential risks, or on other words, a preemptive form
of financial and national securitization.
The logic of spontaneous, immediate danger in the show’s opening sequences and
throughout the program, are frequently punctuated by what Shannon M. Kahle, borrowing a
concept from Karen Lury, identifies as the “CSI shot”: a CGI visualization of the interior of the
body that was pioneered by CSI (2000-2015), though its aesthetic roots are traceable at least to
the visual rendering of bullet wounds and sepsis in David O. Russell’s Gulf War I heist film
Three Kings (1999). Kahle describes the CSI shot as follows:
This technique is a computer generated image that makes it appear as if the
camera is entering the body, giving viewers a tour through the inside of the
body….The CSI shot is used on House to confirm a diagnosis, demonstrate the
effects of treatment, and sometimes to demonstrate the bodily events that lead to
the onset of the patient’s symptoms.204
For Kahle, House’s appropriation of the CSI shot is a function of its Foucauldian view of the
relationship between knowledge and the body, in which any notion of subjective interiority is
obviated in favor of a notion of the subject as a set of legible bodily inscriptions, facilitated by
various medical as well as televisual visualization technologies (fig. 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 House M.D.
Kahle argues that the show therefore proposes surveillance as the most effective and reasonable
means of social interaction.205 Kahle’s argument is persuasive, and the Foucauldian double
confluence she identifies of surveillance and medical practice, which on House is figured in both
medical and mediatic terms, gestures toward a broader sense of the perceived functions and
cultural value of visualization technologies. Indeed, surveillance as a medical and televisual
technology of power is already inscribed in the ‘red herring’ variant of the House cold opening,
in which the obvious target of the show’s narrative interest is not always clear, which in turn
demands that the spectator carefully scrutinize the entirety of the mise-en-scène as potentially
suspicious and potentially dangerous. This in turn articulates, in a more generalized and visual
manner, the show’s central, categorical conceit that “everybody lies” and should be treated
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accordingly through a preemptive assumption of guilt. Building on Kahle’s insight, but moving
away from House’s own textual logic, I would suggest that the show’s use of the CSI shot is
symptomatic of a deeper play of cultural values surrounding the (in)ability to produce an
adequate image of that which is killing the body, which again must be understood in both local,
individual terms as well as in national, collective terms.
Such a cultural concern regarding the capacities and limits of visualization is already
apparent in the GSK ad that opened this chapter, but it extends far beyond this individual
example. For example, in Fall 2006, G.E. began producing and distributing Signa PULSE: the
Magazine of MR, an advertainment periodical that features articles on MR applications,
interspersed with ads for G.E. itself. Although the circulation of this periodical is unclear, its
target readership is evidently medical professionals working with MR equipment. One of the five
articles in the inaugural issue, titled “Producing High-Resolution MR Images Despite Patient
Movement,” informs readers about “PROPELLER HD,” a motion-reduction technology
designed to overcome visual artifacts caused by body motion in order to produce clearer, more
easily legible images. Echoing these concerns over visibility and legibility, the center pages of
this issue of Signa PULSE feature an ad for G.E.’s ‘Signa’ line of MRI machines. The first page
of the ad (fig. 3.4) features an image of a hummingbird at a flower, its wings only a blur of rapid
motion, with the caption “How do you capture difficult images?” On the following page, large
text reads: “Start by capturing the imagination,” and in smaller print: “There have always been
patients who have been difficult to image. But through the eyes of GE’s Signa® High Definition
MR, you get a new view of your patients, Clearer and more accurate, So you can diagnose
quickly and with more certainty.”
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The third page in the ongoing advertisement then features an image of the same hummingbird,
only here its wings are sharply visible.206 This ad, in keeping with G.E.’s then-novel
“Imagination at Work” brand identity, invites readers to appreciate G.E.’s advanced imaging
technology, which eliminates unwanted artifacts and renders a clear, intuitively understandable
and legible image, one that would allow doctors to secure effective knowledge regarding the
body of a potential patient. As with GSK’s bird flu advertisement, it emphasizes time as a crucial
factor in making a diagnosis and thereby preventing harm. Its suggestion that time can be
parceled out in miniscule increments (small enough to catch a hummingbird’s wings in flight)
suggests that control over temporality is necessary to effectively visualize space, and its
anthropomorphizing of imaging technology suggests that such control is only possible through
the “eyes” and “imagination” of an MRI machine.207 Indeed, it is the ability to engage in literal
speculation, the use of the eyes and the imagination to create an immaterial image that can then,
in turn, be used to manage future risk, that is what is at the core of what is being advertised here.
In the popular imagination, MRI and other medical imaging technologies are often
understood to be transparent, unmediated, objective pictures of the real human body, rather than
as complex, highly mediated representations requiring training, judgment, and interpretation in
order to become legible.208 Kelly Joyce argues on this basis that MRI technology is understood
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within an ideological framework that equates the picture with the real.209 The ability of images of
the body to enter into fungible relations with the body itself presents as both a crisis of the real,
and as the paradoxical solution to that same crisis. On House, the CSI shot’s kinetic and
spectacular power is often used to give the audience information about a patient’s illness that is
literally invisible to either the patient or the doctors. In this respect, the use of CGI animations to
render the inside of the body marks the limit of natural human vision, which must be
supplemented by technologized vision—both extradiegetically through the aesthetic rupture
between photorealistic live action and computer animation, and intradiegetically through the
diegetic medical imaging technologies themselves. The CSI shot therefore takes on the epistemic
mantle of the real, but in a way that only a computer-animated rendering is capable of. Like
G.E.’s medical imaging technologies, the CSI shot is presented as itself possessing not only a
certain kind of animacy, but also the imaginative, speculative capacity to render visible the
invisible, and accessible the inaccessible.
House’s narrative structure, which frequently collapses narrative resolution into the
production of a ‘tell-tale’ image affirming the certainty of a diagnosis, echoes this problem and
resolution model of image production. Although this definitive image is frequently produced by
medical imaging technology, it is often produced as a direct material inscription, on the body or
elsewhere. In “Occam’s Razor” (S1:E3, original airdate November 30, 2004), the episode’s
mystery is conclusively solved when Dr. House produces a pill inscribed with the letter ‘L,’ thus
proving that the patient’s symptoms were caused by a pharmacist’s nearly fatal error. In “TB or
not TB” (S2:E4, original airdate November 1, 2005), the hypothesis that the patient has an
insulin-producing tumor is confirmed when the team intentionally provokes a stroke in the
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patient. This diagnosis is visually corroborated for the viewer by a CSI shot of the patient’s
bloodstream, as insulin is seem being released and interacting with other chemicals (fig. 3.3). A
similar CGI corroboration of the conclusive diagnosis appears in “Deception” (S2:E9, original
airdate December 13, 2005), in which the grape aroma of the patient’s bruise indicates an
infection, House’s explanation of which is synesthetically accompanied by a CSI shot of the
wound that shows what the doctor smells. As with MRI technology in the popular imagination,
House’s emphasis on the production of an image, especially a computer-generated image in the
form of a CSI shot, presents such technologically enhanced vision as coterminous with the real
and as essentially both reliable and definitive. Whereas the use of computer animated images of
the body functions in the early and middle parts of an episode to indicate that something is
wrong with the body, without clearly explaining what the cause of the illness is, in the final
analysis visualization technologies are presented as essentially sound.
The notion that digital imaging technology as the ‘imaginative’ capacity to reliably
enhance human vision is also evident in the ad discourse surrounding personal digital cameras
during this time. The October 2006 issue of Popular Science indexes this idea well.210 Pages two
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and three of this issue feature a two-page spread ad for the Sony ‘alpha 100’ DSLR camera (fig.
3.5).

Figure 3.5 Popular Science
The first page of the ad features an image of kinetic cresting waves, overlaid with the text “The
New Sony α with built-in Image Stabilization.” The opposite page features a calm sea and sky,
divided in half by the horizon, with the alpha 100 camera in profile, overlaid with the caption:
“Steady your world.” Visually, the two pages of the ad juxtapose a turbulent, blurry sea with the
calm clarity of still water, an obvious visual signifier for the kind of image stability offered by
the camera.211 The ideological subtext, however, is as clear as the image: consumer-grade
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visualization technology can bring order, security, and tranquility to a violent, turbulent,
unpredictable world. Just as with G.E.’s Signa MRI machine, commodified technologies of
visibility are correlated with safety, transparency, and ease of use. What’s more, the
ideologically constructed transparency and epistemic efficacy of MRI is, in these ads, transferred
from multi-million dollar professional-grade medical technologies to affordable consumer-grade
cameras: you too can wield the power of the digital to securitize your world.
These same themes are evident throughout ads and reviews for consumer electronics,
especially digital cameras, in Popular Science during this time period. In the following
November issue, a photography tech roundup article titled “The Camera Sees All,” promoting an
$1,800 Fuji Finepix S3 Pro Uvir DSLR camera, notes that the camera enhances the consumer’s
ability to take photos at night, since “now the same technology that helps crime-scene
investigators uncover invisible evidence like gunpowder residue is available to you.”212 An ad in
the September 2005 issue promoting a Nokia camera phone with removable memory storage
encourages the reader to “Reload on the Go,” thereby suggesting a congruence between the
phone’s memory card and an ammunition clip, along the lines of ease of use and preparedness
for action (fig. 3.6).213
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Figure 3.6 Popular Science
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This issue also features a cover story about scientific advancements in healthcare entitled “Will
you be Able to Predict—and Prevent—Your Demise?” The story covers ways in which medical
imaging technologies, including genome mapping and CT scanning, are helping to personalize
and improve the capacities of predictive medicine.214
Such stories and advertisements indicate the ways in which visual media, rehearse, and in
doing so seek to ameliorate, a cluster of cultural anxieties surrounding the reliability and efficacy
of technologically mediated vision within the sociohistorical context of the War on Terror. As
the November 25, 2002 cover of TIME pointedly asserts, Osama bin Laden has not yet been
caught (fig. 3.7).
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Figure 3.7 TIME
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This cover image, which features a white background, filled mostly with empty space, presents a
washed out, monochrome photographic portrait of bin Laden in its center. Bin Laden’s faint
features seem to blend into the background, effectively staging his disappearance from the (miseen-)scene, and rendering his elusiveness not only from capture, but from the image as well. The
fraught relationship between bin Laden’s presence and absence is further emphasized on TIME’s
March 29, 2004 cover illustration, which depicts a series of matches, each with bin Laden’s face
(the same, exact image, in fact, as the 2002 cover) on the head, accompanied by the caption “AlQaeda: The Next Generation” (fig. 3.8).
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This cover, like its 2002 predecessor, renders anxiety regarding bin Laden’s visibility and
disappearance, this time suggesting that his image could burn up and vanish in the ignition of a
fire, an apparent visual metaphor for further volatile terrorist activity not involving, but perhaps
inspired by bin Laden himself. One wonders, and rhetorically speaking it would seem one is
indeed meant to wonder, whether this chemical transformation would leave a trace that
forensically indexes bin Laden’s former presence, or whether he would disappear completely?
The same, evidently ontological concerns about the presence and absence of bin Laden
also haunt both medical imaging equipment and consumer-grade digital cameras as technologies
of image production. They stage, through expressive form, the same kinds of ambiguities and
anxieties that surround contemporaneous academic discourse on the nature of digital
photography, which similarly places the questions of the index and the trace at the forefront of
attempts to come to grips with the ontology of digital images.215 But if the present absences of
bin Laden, not to mention Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction or the World Trade
Center buildings, haunt popular representations of technologies of vision, then these
representations work to assuage and mollify these anxieties as much as they compulsively figure
them. This is reflected in the way House consistently figures the physiological symptom as an
image, as well as the production of images as symptomatic of an epistemic regime in which to
prevent disaster requires the elicitation of the proper, and properly indexical, image.
3.3

Differential Diagnosis as Risk Management
If as the previous section argued, both House and the popular print media that emerged

along with it present biopolitical control and avoidance of future catastrophe as hinging on the
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production both of actual images and the sense of digitally enhanced visibility entailed by them,
then the ways in which those images are produced are also a necessary component of the brain
space illustrated by these mediated images. On House, the tell-tale image that secures the safety
of the body against death is only produced (and is only producible) after the diagnostic process
of hypothesizing and ruling out various causative illnesses before arriving at the correct
conclusion.
On the show, this iterative process typically involves team meetings during which
symptoms and possible illnesses are charted on a dry erase board, in between which medical tests
of blood, tissue, or imaging scans are performed, and the results of which are then reported and
further diagnostic possibilities are articulated or ruled out (fig. 3.9).

Figure 3.9 House M.D.
The dry erase board is an essential component in House’s neoliberal brain space, as it appears in
nearly all the show’s episodes, and even when it is not literally present its diagnostic function is
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figured through substitute surfaces, including an airplane movie screen and the bottom of a bunk
bed in a prison cell. The white board provides a pliable system of visual organization that strives,
like the show’s medical imaging technology, to produce an image that will solve the mystery and
conclude the investigation. In the context of the show’s rendering of the process of differential
diagnosis, however, the board functions as an analog of the conspiracy wall in A Beautiful Mind,
as a figure that mediates the subject-object relations constructed through the act of speculation.
Indeed, although House does not frame its own discourse vis-à-vis the body in the explicit terms
of conspiracy, Dr. House’s (and the narrative discourse’s) constant refrain that “everybody lies”
produces a speculative relation between the doctors and their patients, as well as between the
doctors and each other in the show’s interpersonal melodrama, that threatens to surpass cynical
skepticism and move into misanthropic paranoia. The white board stands as the locus of such
speculations, not only as a figure for epistemic closure but as a figure for the iterative, and in
aggregate over the show’s eight seasons, Sisyphean, processual temporality of compulsive
speculative investigation.
The show explicitly describes this diagnostic process as puzzle solving on a number of
occasions, notably in “The Socratic Method” (S1:E6, original airdate December 21, 2004), in
which House’s view of patients as puzzles is explained during a conversation between Dr.
Foreman and Dr. Wilson:
Foreman: I thought he liked rationality.
Wilson: He likes puzzles.
Foreman: Patients are puzzles?
Wilson: You don’t think so?
Foreman: I think they’re people.
Wilson: Yeah, well, he hates them. And he’s fascinated by them.
The theme of diagnosis as puzzle-solving is reiterated again in “DNR” (S1:E8, original airdate
February 1, 2005), in which Dr. Wilson criticizes Dr. House’s obsessive need to solve medical
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mysteries by telling House that while “some doctors have the Messiah complex, they need to
save the world. You’ve got the Rubik’s complex. You need to solve the puzzle.” Although these
examples come from the show’s first season, and exist in part to establish preliminary
characterizations, the ludic attitude toward medical diagnosis demonstrated both by House, and
the program itself, is consistent across the show’s broadcast run.216 The show regularly presents
the activity of diagnostic medicine, replete with liberal use of medical imaging technologies, as a
gamelike activity. Indeed, this playful attitude is reinforced by the sly, mischievous, and flippant
character of House himself.
The gamelike nature of medical practice, as articulated by House, is also illustrated in an
article in the October 2004 issue of Popular Science, which contains an article entitled “Why
Give a Dead Man a Body Scan?” The article explains how CT and MRI machines are beginning
to be used in Switzerland to conduct “virtual autopsies,” which can take image slices of the body
non-invasively, and can allow a corpse to be virtually dissected at any time, anywhere, and as
many times as is necessary or desired.217 The article describes this process in videogame-like
terms:
As intent as schoolboys with a new videogame, the two men take turns clicking
and dragging screen controls to manipulate the image on the monitor. Vock
defines and deletes the CT scanner’s bed to leave the woman’s body suspended in
midscreen. Slowly he melts away silvers layers of skin, muscle and connective
tissue to reveal bare white skeleton. He rotates the image, head over
heels….Then, layer by later, he reassembles the body. When he reaches the level
of fascia…he stops again, intrigued by the abnormally high position of the
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woman’s stomach and the telltale indentation, like and overly tightened belt,
around the organ’s midsection.218
Like House, this passage compares the diagnostic aspect of forensic medicine, especially where
it involves medical imaging technology, to a game, in this instance evoking the physics and
camera perspectives (not to mention the gender dynamics) of third-person digital games, as well
as the rotational analysis and configuration involved in solving a Rubik’s Cube or other similar
three-dimensional puzzle. It suggests an affinity between imaging, diagnosis, and play that is
also very much at the heart of House’s depiction of diagnostic medicine.
Moreover, the article also goes on to explain, in an astonishing passage, how the U.S.
Department of Defense is “extremely interested” in establishing virtual autopsy facilities at its
morgue at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. William Rodriguez, the deputy chief medical
examiner for special investigations at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, is quoted stating
that “As the technology becomes more efficient, this becomes a way to scan many more bodies
in a shorter amount of time with fewer pathologists.”219 While one wonders about what kinds of
catastrophic emergency events would necessitate the ability to “scan many more bodies in a
shorter amount of time,” perhaps the key insight regarding this militarization of virtual autopsy
technology was reported in a New York Times article in 2009 explaining how the military, with
finding through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), uses information
collected from virtual autopsies of soldiers to learn about enemy weapons, as well as to make
iterative adjustments and improvements to battlefield medical gear.220 The Department of
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Defense’s collection of virtual autopsies effectively functions as an archive of bodily trauma, one
that can be used to render the maimed corpse first into an abstracted and malleable virtual 3D
model, and then into an even more abstract form of pure logistical information. In doing so, the
plastic and plasmatic archive of virtual autopsies articulates the speculative dimension of medical
visualization technologies to the informatic logic of contemporary warfare.
This reactive-anticipatory approach to warfare relies fundamentally on the insights of
cybernetics, a theory and method of systems regulation developed by Norbert Wiener during
World War II to produce more effective artillery performance by statistically modelling probable
enemy behavior and incorporating these calculations into an automated targeting and firing
process.221 Both the Department of Defense virtual autopsy program and the way House presents
the diagnostic process share the same undergirding cybernetic logic. In the former instance, CT
scans are used to gain feedback from the battlefield, and to make the dead body both legible and
intelligible as an information asset, that is to recover value from the loss of life in military risk.
The information gained is then fed back into military planning and logistics operations, in order
to produce more effective results in the future. The use of virtual body scans for this purpose by
DARPA represents only one more recent application of cybernetic simulation to anticipatory war
planning. As Crogan also explains, another DARPA program, SIMNET, a simulation training
technology project active in the 1980s and 1990s, was used to produce anticipatory models of
Operation Desert Storm. The actual battle plans for the entire war were based on information
gleaned from these wargaming simulations, and the same technology was used to record the
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actual eventuality of the war, information from which was then used to re-stage and review the
effectiveness of battle tactics.222
The principles of network control pioneered by Weiner during World War II, as Randy
Martin notes, have been profitably applied to economic market forecasting. Both warfare and
market speculation rely on the anticipatory risk-management strategies of cybernetics, to such a
strong degree that for Martin, it is now true that “Warfare has been packaged and produced along
the lines of financial instruments,” namely derivatives and securities.223 Martin cites the U.S.
military’s employment of professional economists during the Vietnam War to apply
mathematical market modelling strategies to the war, but also the use of the same cybernetic
modelling strategies to both combat severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Asia in 2002
and to manage the military’s massive retirement and healthcare investment portfolios.224 The
anticipatory risk-management protocols of cybernetics thus provide a strong link between the
speculative conduct of the War on Terror, and the similarly speculative management of
epidemiological crises like SARS, the unarticulated fear at the center of the GSK ad at the
beginning of this chapter, and more explicitly elsewhere.
On House, diagnostics is presented as precisely such a cybernetic process of gleaning
information from medical records, performing tests on the body or administering treatment, then
using that information to further refine the diagnosis, most typically through the visual mediation
of the dry erase board. As with the virtual autopsy program, the victimized body becomes a kind
of informatic toy to be modulated until actionable information emerges, and ultimately the
puzzle is solved and victory in the game is declared. Also like the virtual autopsy program, the
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cybernetic diagnostics of House rely necessarily on the dying body as an essential element in the
informatic feedback loop. In both cases it is the body’s illness unto death that yields usable
information. A crucial distinction, however, is that whereas the Department of Defense virtual
autopsy program only receives dead bodies and plays no explicit role in their production, on
House the patient is typically deliberately exposed to danger in order to accelerate the diagnostic
process. House and his team regularly ‘confirm’ a diagnosis by exposing the patient to a
treatment that will visibly harm them if they have the disease in question, thereby creating new
risk and provoking crisis, in order to produce results and ultimately save the patient.
In this sense, House presents a pharmacological model of diagnostic medicine, in which
treatment often involves inducing sickness, rendering the two indistinguishable from each other
and reinforcing the financial logic of risk as not only a necessary, but a beneficial and lucrative
feature of markets: the securitization of risk as a form of security.225 Derrida, reading Plato’s
Phaedrus, describes how the concept of a drug, or pharmakon, entails a fundamental ambiguity:
“This pharmakon, this “medicine,” this philter, which acts as both remedy and poison, already
introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all its ambivalence. This charm, this
spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination can be—alternatively or simultaneously, beneficent
or maleficent.”226 For Derrida, writing itself is, inside the Phaedrus and outside it, a kind of
pharmakon in the sense that it operates as an ambiguous medium through which the
differentiation of différance is produced through play.227 In other words, the pharmakon
functions, for Derrida, as a figure for deconstruction as such and in a general way. For Bernard
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Stiegler, however, it also maintains a special relation to the widespread cultural dissemination of
extremely sophisticated technological knowledge in the 21st century: insofar as “technical
knowledge is pharmacological, that is, it has the ambivalent structure of a pharmakon: it is
always at once potentially beneficial and potentially harmful.”228 For Stiegler, complex
technologies like genetic engineering and nanotechnology, in conjunction with the global
financial crisis, have produced a kind of technophobic ambiguity around the
beneficent/malevolent potentials of technological innovation that stands as an epistemic crisis to
be overcome.229
House consistently stages the amelioration of this anxiety by rehearsing the successful
resolution of medical mysteries, in which the ambiguously pharmacological element of both Dr.
House’s treatment of patients (as well as the team’s use of precisely the kinds of technical
knowledge Stiegler discusses) is shown to be if not wholly beneficent, then at least necessary.
For example, in “Maternity,” (S1:E4, original airdate December 7, 2004), during an outbreak of
a mysterious disease among newborn babies in the hospital, different treatments are administered
to two babies suffering from the same illness, with full knowledge that one infant is likely to die
while the other is likely to be saved. In part, the drama of the episode revolves around the ethical
dilemma posed by the decision to kill one infant so as to save many more. In “DNR,” the
patient’s mysterious illness is improved through an aggressive treatment involving the
administration of many drugs simultaneously. In order to discern which of the treatments is
actually causally effective, the drugs are withheld, one at a time, until the patient’s health
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plummets, with House and the other doctors relying on their ability to save the patient faster than
their course of treatment kills him.
Through this veritably accelerationist paradigm of diagnosis and treatment, House
demonstrates the logic of pharmacological preemption at work. In the same way that, as Bush
asserted in 2002, the U.S. can only be protected from attack by “vigorous action abroad,” House
figures proactive and preemptive action as the optimal strategy for fighting disease. The
geopolitical notion that war is the most expedient path to peace is reflected in the diagnostic,
prescriptive, and indeed the televisual narrative logic of House. In this sense, House both
narrativizes, and affectively administers to its viewing audience the logic of what Väliaho
describes as the “preemptive brain.” As he explains:
Neoliberal brainhood thus organized itself specifically around the felt reality of
threats, risks, and insecurities, which are the key values that constrain how we
simulate and act on the world. The neoliberal brain, to use Richard Grusin’s term,
“premediates”—affectively forefeels—future possibilities in the present with an
eye toward anticipatory responses, especially when fear or anxiety about future
threats or danger is involved.230
House rehearses precisely this bundle of concerns regarding security, risk, and threat through its
depictions of diagnostic daring in the face of imminent bodily disaster and death. The show
functions to demonstrate, at least during its first three seasons in which the formulaic narrative
structure of the show is most strongly evident, the successful outcomes of preemptive brainhood
at work. This preemptive logic also parallels the logic of the pre-crisis financial markets as an
‘eat your cake and have it too’ activity of increasing exposure to risk and increasing profit,
without the specter of collapse.
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The logic of preemption evident in House also operates through medical advertising
discourse in both TIME and Popular Science, most typically through the ubiquitous presence of
ads for Viagra and other erectile dysfunction medications in the mid-2000s, especially after
Viagra’s two chief competitors in the marketplace, Levitra and Cialis, were approved by the
FDA in August and November of 2003, respectively.231 These ads emphasize the need to ‘be
ready when the moment is right,’ and to encourage potential customers to preemptively
anticipate and act on the future possibility of gratifying sexual activity through a quite literal act
of libidinal investment, by buying and consuming pharmaceuticals. A similar rhetoric is also
used to advertise cholesterol medication, which is framed as preempting heat attacks, and asthma
medication, which likewise can prevent sudden and life-threatening asthma attacks. Taken
together, the trinity of preemptive advertisements for erectile dysfunction, cholesterol, and
asthma medications are very strongly represented in TIME and Popular Science between 2004
and 2006. Like the diagnostic approach of House and the foreign policy of the Bush
administration, these advertisements exhort the reader to affectively forefeel the future
moment—of sex, or of death—in the present, and to invest, in the present, to either enhance or
mitigate the possibility of future events.
3.4

Conclusion
If House operates successfully as an expression of neoliberal brainhood during its first

three seasons, it is equally indicative of shifts in American culture during its latter five seasons.
At the end of the show’s third season (“Human Error,” S3:E24, original airdate May 29, 2007)
House fires one member of his diagnostic team and the other two quit, ending the season on a
cliffhanger and indicating change on the horizon for the show. Season four marks a sea change in
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the show’s narrative structure, which is marked by an increased emphasis on its serial aspects,
and in particular the relationship dynamics between the show’s principal characters. Season four
follows House’s attempt to hire a new team by running a Survivor-esque contest in which
(mostly) young doctors compete for a limited number of employment opportunities. Although
each episode still features a medical mystery, the solving of the mystery begins to take a
backseat to the interpersonal dynamics of the doctor candidates and the hospital more generally,
which in the fourth season emphasizes the internecine struggle for job security between potential
diagnostic team members. As the first rumblings of what would become the global financial
crisis began to be heard, for example, in Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s
declaration on the PBS NewsHour that there had been a “bubble in housing,” House began to
turn inward toward the sufferings and tribulations of its own doctors, as much as it still focused
on the suffering of the patient’s body. In doing so, the show suggested that there was no longer
such a large gap between those patients who were at risk, and the diagnostic professionals who
enjoyed the capacity to take risks and reap the professional benefits. This shift from medical
mystery to medical melodrama solidified somewhat at the end of the fourth season, which
concluded with a two-part story (“House’s Head,” S4:E15, original airdate May 12, 2008, and
“Wilson’s Heart,” S4E16, original airdate May 19, 2008) in which one of House’s former
prospective employees, Amber, who has become involved in a serious romantic relationship with
House’s best friend and colleague Dr. Wilson, is grievously injured in a bus accident (for which
House’s bad behavior may be responsible) and becomes the patient whose medical mystery
House needs to solve. Amber’s death at the end of “Wilson’s Heart” marks a significant turn in
House, and a pivot from ludic medical mystery to, as one contemporaneous reviewer called it, “a
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complex meditation on misery,” in which addiction, pain, and suffering increasingly
overshadowed the practice of diagnostics, which itself became increasingly fatigued and trite.232
The slow demise of House, embodied in the demise of Dr. House himself, as he
increasingly falls victim to his own abuse of the painkiller Vicodin, reflects, notwithstanding the
destructive external effects of neoliberal preemptive visuality in the form of preemptive warfare,
the increasingly internal immiseration that occurs when the logic of preemption fails to
successfully anticipate and preempt a crisis, as was the case during and after the 2007-2008
financial crisis. “Wilson’s Heart” aired less than two months after Bear Stearns was acquired for
pennies on the dollar by J.P. Morgan Chase, affectively premediates the crisis, “forefeeling” the
suffering to come, and eerily and ironically locating the site of that suffering as the House. Over
the final four seasons, House observed the breakdown of relationships between principal
characters, while Dr. House himself grappled with addiction, withdrawal, and was
institutionalized, imprisoned, and dealt with Dr. Wilson’s terminal cancer diagnosis at the series
finale. But for a contemplation of the vicissitudes of the recession itself, in a way that achieves
more than the purely negative image of it that House provides (that is, the recession as a negation
of the positive logic of pre-crisis speculation), the next chapter turns to a film that comes to grips
more directly with the consequences of failed speculation.
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4

“YOU CAN NEVER EXPLAIN SOMETHING LIKE THIS”: NARRATIVE AND
ECONOMIC SPECULATION IN SINISTER

4.1

Introduction
In a dimly lit home office, a writer gets to work: taking notes while screening home

movies and hoping (needing desperately, in fact) to make sense of the footage somehow, to
scrutinize the screen until it yields a meaningful, self-evident explanation of its visual contents.
The writer is Ellison Oswalt, protagonist of Sinister (dir. Scott Derrickson, 2012), but this
description, with slight modifications, could just as easily fit the (post-)cinematic spectator of
Paranormal Activity (dir. Oren Peli, 2007), who examines that film’s home movies with the
same level of investigatory intensity, and with similar outcomes: both will be fascinated and
frightened by the images they see, and also be made palpably anxious by the evidentiary truths
those images do and do not disclose. Shifting and expanding frames again, the description could
apply as well to the spectator of Sinister (academic or otherwise), engaging in processes of
narrative hypothesis-testing and thematic construction: a forensic construction of narrative that
pieces together coherent meaning from a flow of audiovisual data in time.
Indeed, as we shall see, there is in Sinister a distinctive immanence between the
‘techniques of the observer’ employed within the film and those of the observer of the film, and
that the film’s textual dynamism derives precisely from the tension created by this relation. In the
film, down-on-his-luck true crime writer Ellison Oswalt moves his family into a home where the
previous owners were gruesomely murdered. By moving into the murder house (one might, in
the parlance of high-frequency trading, call this an example of co-location), Oswalt hopes to
glean the gritty details that will catapult him back into the limelight and put an end to his own
family’s money troubles. As it turns out, Oswalt gets more than he bargained for as his
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investigation uncovers evidence, in the form of amateur found-footage film reels recording a
series of murders, that a demonic power might be responsible for killing the previous owners.
Only Oswalt’s ability to reconstruct the narrative of what happened to the previous residents of
the house can save his own family from the same fate, but by the time the plot is uncovered it is
too late, and the family is doomed to become the most recent addition to the collection of ghostly
reels.
This chapter explores how Sinister, in its incorporation of processes of forensic
spectatorship within the film’s narrative diegesis, stages the dialectical interdependence of a pair
of cultural and technological oppositions. The first of these oppositions is structured as a tension
between labor and surveillance. The film constructs Ellison’s professional labor of narrative
construction and meaning-making as a form of precarious labor that is necessary for him to
support his family in a time of economic hardship, coming as it does on the heels of the 2008
financial crisis and subsequent recession. The film renders this labor of narrative content
creation, however, as a form of fraught surveillance, the ethical and existential anxiety of which
is produced through the haunted media(ting) object’s capacity to reverse the flow of surveilling
control from subjective domination of the object, to the object’s overturning of the perceiving
and putatively centered subject-position. Thus, the film creates a dialectical image of speculation
that partakes of both its spectatorial and economic valences. In contradistinction to the previous
chapter, in which processes of speculation and image-making were, at least in the first three
seasons of House M.D., presented as being capable of producing epistemically satisfactory and
medically effective, Sinister explores what happens when speculation fails and is thrown into
crisis.
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The film’s dialectical opposition between surveillance and labor, however, is crucially
filtered or compounded through a second opposition, which is structured as a tension between
media ontologies. The film crucially stages this dialectical opposition through its diegetic
interrogation of the status of audiovisual media in moments of technological transition from
celluloid film to digital video. Unlike in House, where digitality is necessary to visualize the
interior of the body, here it is rendered problematic, and even threatening to the body. This
emphasis on digitization, however, in turn provides something like a unifying sublation between
the two forms of visual and economic speculation in Sinister, providing a new conceptual ground
upon which to speculate about the state of speculation itself that extends beyond the diegetic
narrative of the film to bodily implicate the film’s spectator.
In the years following the remarkable and unlikely financial and popular success of
Paranormal Activity, which was produced in 2007 but did not see wide theatrical release until
2009, the American horror film genre has undergone a significant shift towards films that
resemble the surprise hit both in terms of style and content. Most pointedly, the influence of
Paranormal Activity has been felt through both the use of found footage aesthetics as an
organizing stylistic and narrational feature, and through a renewed emphasis on narratives of
supernatural possession. In particular, in addition to the six films in the Paranormal Activity
franchise (2007-2015), REC (dir. Jaume Balagueró and Paco Plaza, 2007), Cloverfield (dir. Matt
Reeves, 2008), Diary of the Dead (dir. George Romero, 2008), the anthology V/H/S trilogy
(2012, 2013, 2014), and Europa Report (dir. Sebastián Cordero, 2013) represent only a small
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sample of the horror and science fiction films that have appropriated the aesthetics of found
footage video, and have done so across the generic contexts of horror and science-fiction.233
Critical scholarship on this cycle of films has emphasized two significant features: on the
one hand scholars have examined the appropriation of documentary aesthetics as a both
compelling and problematic aspect of the cycle, insofar as the films seem to appeal to the
credible veracity of documentary in order to depict incredible, supernatural occurrences. On the
other hand, scholarship has also emphasized the cultural anxieties embedded in this very tension
between documentary style and fantastic, supernatural content, particularly as it relates to the
processes of mediation involved in producing such images. As the introduction to a recent edited
collection of essays on horror cinema in the digital age attests, “digital horror is a cinema of
anxiety embodying, in its ‘shaky-cam’ cinematography, verisimilitudinous mise-en-scène,
paranoid narrative propensities and often startling visual imagery, a range of concerns regarding
the technologically-mediated and globally capitalized subjectivity of the present.”234 Both of
these analytical prongs are present in Barry Keith Grant’s article on what he terms “verité horror
and sf film,” which he defines as a cycle in which “the camera exists within the diegesis, often
with much of the story unfolding in real time, as if it were there recording actual not fictional
events, as in the documentary tradition of cinema verité.” Grant further contends that “the realist
aesthetic of these films, in combination with their fantastic and frightening elements, reveal a
postmodern anxiety about the indexical truthfulness of the image that has been exacerbated by
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the ubiquity of digital technology.” He identifies the core anxiety in the cycle as a tension
between the digital image and its ability (or lack thereof) to indexically affirm evidentiary
reality, a worry which is articulated in the context of the emergence of reality television in the
years after 9/11’s traumatic televised documentation.235
Caetlin Benson-Allott similarly argues, regarding what she terms as “faux footage
horror,” that these films “dramatize the risks of finding media files in the twenty-first century.”
She links the ‘seemingly found’ aspect of the cycle to an ethical dilemma regarding the status of
pirated media images in the contemporary digital era of easy and immediate access. The
documentary aesthetics of such films suggest that they have been “unethically obtained, that we
are not supposed to be watching these images [emphasis in original].” Reading these films as
contemporary media industry morality tales, Benson-Allott claims that the ethical crisis of
spectatorship precipitated in this cycle gestures towards a cultural and industrial fear regarding
media piracy and the unauthorized dissemination of digital images beyond the control and
economic exploitation of the media industries.236
I want both to press these arguments further and, at the same time, bring their central
claims closer together by suggesting that the ruinous consequences of the unauthorized
circulation of images allegorize the unauthorized, unethical circulation of wholly digitized
finance capital through global markets, before finally coming home to roost in the traumatized
body itself. If Grant’s concern is about the inability of the verité image to secure the indexical
real, and Benson-Allott’s is a social anxiety about unauthorized circulation, then the site where
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both of these concerns meet is the image as a form of financialized monetary abstraction,
securely tied neither to the (commodity) body nor to appropriate regulatory oversight. As Fredric
Jameson has pointed out, the global flow of capital has undergone a second process of
abstraction beyond the initial abstraction necessary to produce the money-form of capital. The
digitization of finance capital through globally interconnected markets enables these abstractions
of the money form, as complex financial instruments, to exchange for each other without ever
passing through the commodity form of Marx’s general formula for capital.237 Along somewhat
similar lines, W.J.T. Mitchell has argued that the ‘reproduction’ in Walter Benjamin’s ‘age of
mechanical reproduction’ has now taken on a biological meaning, in which “Reproduction and
reproducibility mean something quite different now when the central issues of technology are no
longer ‘mass production’ of commodities or ‘mass reproduction’ of identical images, but the
reproductive processes of the biological sciences and the production of infinitely malleable,
digitally animated images.”238 In this sense, then, the question of ‘authorization,’ or a lack
thereof, takes on a double valence in raising a question about the efficacy of regulations and
legal protections on intellectual property, but also asserting the ambiguous authorship of digital
images that circulate virally in ways that echo the dizzying abstractions of wholly digitized
financial instruments. Sinister figures this disjunction as a kind of action at a distance, in which
such images do in fact possess a supernaturally vitalistic ability to disrupt and ultimately destroy
the human body. In doing so, it effects a dialectical reversal of the immateriality and abstractness
of the digitally financialized economic forces that precipitate bodily dissolution.
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Therefore, I want to suggest that the critical and cultural significance of this cycle of
horror and science fiction films discloses substantial concerns with digital mediation and its role
in culture more broadly. This, then, provides ample reason for the close study of a second cycle
of horror films—of which Sinister is one of the key constituents—that appears to be reflecting
critically on the wave of verité/faux footage horror by self-reflexively incorporating the act of
spectatorship, an act previously reserved for the viewing audience, within the diegetic world of
the films’ fictions. This loosely designated second cycle of found-footage horror films would
include, among others, V/H/S (2012) and its sequels, Oculus (dir. Mike Flanagan, 2013), as well
as the immensely financially successful The Conjuring (dir. James Wan, 2013) and The
Conjuring 2 (dir. James Wan, 2015), in which aural and visual surveillance technologies play a
less central, but still significant role.239
In particular however, Sinister, a Blumhouse production starring Ethan Hawke, directed
by Scott Derrickson, and written by Derrickson and C. Robert Cargill, distinguishes itself from
its antecedents by shifting narrative and stylistic emphasis away from the verité image as such,
and towards the narrativized act of viewing such images, which is figured as deeply fraught by
ambiguity regarding the empirical status of digital images, their authorship, and loss of control
over both their circulation and value. Unlike Paranormal Activity and other similar films in
which the fraught activity of spectatorship is performed by the spectator of the film, Sinister, like
Blow Up (dir. Michelangelo Antonioni, 1966), A Beautiful Mind (dir. Ron Howard, 2001), and
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the proto-postmodern turn at the end of Mimesis, narrativizes that anxiety diegetically.240 In
doing so the film articulates a broad cultural fear regarding the loss of home value and economic
stability during the post-2008 era to a specific concern regarding the pervasiveness and
effectiveness of surveillance technologies in the digital era, and in doing so is exemplary of the
second cycle of verité horror. Crucially, the film renders these anxieties around the economy and
surveillance commensurable through the presentation of surveillance as economic labor, and
indeed as the creative labor of narrative authorship itself. In doing so it anticipates the
professionalization of supernatural detection in the following year’s The Conjuring, a film
which, both because of its financial success and popular reception, stands as a high-water mark
for this second cycle of verité/faux footage films.
Julia Leyda has perceptively argued that the Paranormal Activity films function as “an
ongoing post-cinematic allegory of debtor capitalism” in which “the digital is the link between
the nightmare of debtor capitalism and the horror of the camera as non-human agent that
captures the malevolent actions of the non-human demon.” She demonstrates how the franchise’s
use of digital technologies and narrative concern with the haunted house allegorize and explore
the post-cinematic condition of contemporary capitalism, focusing specifically on credit and debt
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under transnational finance capital.241 Likewise, Annie McClanahan has recently argued that
contemporary gothic horror films express economic anxieties regarding post-crisis financial
precarity by “explicitly link[ing] the formal trappings of horror to the context of real estate
lending, mortgage speculation, and foreclosure risk.”242 While these perspectives are astute, and
much the same could be argued regarding Sinister, this chapter focuses more centrally on the
relationship that the film constructs between images, labor, and speculative value, as opposed to
an emphasis on anxiety regarding debt obligations and risk as sources of precarity, though this is
undoubtedly a crucial factor in the way the film’s narrative and affective horror is constructed.
What makes Sinister distinctive is the way the film figures the articulation between concerns
regarding surveillance labor and property value in terms of the ontological transition from analog
8mm film to digital video, a transition which is accompanied by an attendant loss of control over
the image that occurs in the process. The way in which these media ontologies seem also to
mediate between national and economic forms of speculative securitization is especially
prominent in the film’s use of rhythm and texture, in both its visual and sound design. Sinister
braids intertwining economic, cultural, and technological anxieties pervading the contexts of the
recession, the family, and the parallel ontologies of both digital images and digitally circulating
finance capital. The structure of this analysis follows the film in this respect, attempting to
follow the threads and knots of historical figuration at work in the film, beginning by
establishing the film’s status as a narrative of anxiety regarding imagistic and economic control.
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4.2

Recession Anxiety, or the Haunted House
Sinister’s narrative begins with true crime writer Ellison Oswalt (Ethan Hawke) moving

his wife and two children from a spacious, expensive home funded by Ellison’s book profits into
a much smaller and humbler one. Unknown to Ellison’s family for most of the film, the previous
occupants of the new house, the Stevenson family, were gruesomely hanged in the backyard and
are the research topic for Ellison’s new book project. The film’s narrative makes it clear that
Ellison is under pressure to repeat the success of his single hit book, Kentucky Blood, after a
string of duds has stalled his career as an author. An early exchange of words with the local
sheriff (Fred Thompson) suggests that Ellison’s recent failures may have come as a result of a
failure to “get it right,” indicating that the author’s research and reconstruction of events was
insufficient to produce a viable narrative either ethically or financially. In the sheriff’s words,
Ellison’s “bad theory helped a killer go free. [Ellison] ruined people’s lives,” and the sheriff
discourages the investigation, asserting that “you can never explain something like this,”
suggesting that the Stevenson family murder is something inexplicable and best left alone. Soon
after the conversation with the sheriff, Ellison explains to his daughter Ashley that they had to
move into the home because Ellison could no longer afford the old one, although he holds out the
possibility of moving back to their old home once the book is successful. Later that night at the
dinner table, Ellison’s wife Tracy tells the children, Ashley and Trevor, that they won’t be able
to eat out in restaurants much until their old house is sold. When Trevor suggests lowering the
asking price on the old home to help sell it faster, Ellison responds by claiming that they have
already lowered it as much as possible and that poor market conditions are responsible for their
tight budget while also noting that once his new book is written and sold, the family will be “on
easy street.”
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Ellison’s early conversations with the sheriff and his family not only do the necessary
narrative work of characterization, but also connect together the ethical and economic pressures
associated with Ellison’s forensic reconstruction and authorship of a coherent and ultimately
lucrative narrative out of research data. Since the livelihood of the Oswalt family depends on
Ellison’s ability to piece together the story of what happened to the Stevenson family, his
investigation into what befell the Stevensons is inextricably linked to preventing his own familial
dissolution, even before any overtly supernatural elements come into play in the film. Ellison’s
early exchange with the sheriff allows scenes of Ellison screening home movie footage to be
understood as a form of research labor inflected by an economic pressure to reproduce an
economic success, with the value of such labor framed in terms of the ability to skillfully and
accurately produce narrative meaning out of forensic data, and in turn to transform that narrative
meaning into valuable media content. Just prior to Ellison’s first examination of the home movie
footage, Tracy informs him that if this research project goes as poorly as the last one has, she
will take the children to her mother’s house‒a scenario that would resemble a marital separation‒
despite Tracy’s self-proclaimed motivation of removing the family from the critical scrutiny of
the unfriendly community. In short, the mystery at the heart of Ellison’s investigation is as much
about resolving a crisis of diminishing labor value and the disappearance of money, as it is about
the murder and disappearance of human beings. For the film, these two exchangeable modes of
suffering—economic and bodily—are intertwined and causally interconnected by Ellison’s
forensic labor, labor which is itself situated as necessary to affirm and maintain the security of
the nuclear family in the face of a broader undoing of the social community.
The economic imperative informing his research becomes a central motivation for Ellison
in the film, keeping the Oswalt family in the haunted home even after Ellison begins to suspect
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he and his family are in danger. The more Ellison learns about the case, the more obvious it
becomes that his family is exposed to hazard, while at the same time the potential profitability of
his book project escalates proportionally. Ellison’s decision to place the economic prospects of
the book above his family’s comfort and safety is repeatedly emphasized through the fracturing
of his initially happy relationship to his family over the course of the film. Trevor’s night terrors,
both children’s troubling drawings of murder victims in inappropriate locations (including on the
walls of the new home), and the revelation that Ellison has lied about moving them into a crime
scene contribute to the intense straining of the family relationship across the film.
The children’s “number one rule” —not to go into their father’s office—also establishes
the site of forensic investigation and labor as a forbidden site, marked off for the working father
and distanced from the rest of the family. This prohibition also figures the site and scene of
surveillance labor as both invisible and inaccessible, and to the extent that Ellison’s speculative
labor resonates with the speculative securitization of geopolitical surveillance, reflects the
perceived immateriality and invisibility of both labor and surveillance as something that occurs
either ‘over there,’ and/or ‘nowhere in particular,’ and that is performed seemingly by no-one.243
Eventually, Ellison’s research leads him to realize that he has embroiled his family in a
mortally dangerous relationship to Bughuul, a Babylonian demon that resides within and haunts
images of itself. The structure of Bughuul’s curse, which activates when a family moves into a
home previously occupied by the curse’s previous victims, but which propagates by murdering
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families only after they move out of the cursed home, reinforces the film’s anxious depiction of
home ownership, in which the home is formally figured as a container of traumatic possession
caught up in the seemingly viral nature of declining property values. The operational logic of the
curse connects the families it destroys in a network that geographically spans a wide swath of the
United States and reaches temporally backward to the 1960s, when the curse began and when the
economic and social fabric of conservative midcentury American society began to unravel. Much
of the film’s home movie footage is drawn from the decade of the 1970s, a decade in which
many American families experienced economic stagnation while American capital underwent
explosively rapid transnational growth through financialization.244 In Sinister, moving out of
one’s home and into a home that, as Ellison remarks, “came on the market and was a steal,” seals
one’s fate as a victim of familial and, in The Oswalts’ case, existential disintegration. It is as
though the trauma of having one’s home lose value, as much as the trauma of haunting and
violent death, is what circulates among the interconnected families of victims, and it circulates
via the mechanism of moving from one home to another. The film thereby puts an allegorical,
and yet also oddly literal, twist on the Heideggerian notion of the uncanny as literally “not-beingat-home” in one’s own home, haunted by the specter of “homelessness,” a condition which, in
Sinister, leads directly to flight from the literal home followed immediately by an encounter
with, and the realization of, bodily death.245 The operational logic of the curse installs movement,
exchange, temporal relationality, and circulation as the rules of the game by which such
unheimlich effects are generated.
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The existential danger of moving is signified prominently through the presence of the
cardboard moving box, which functions as a recurring element of the film’s mise-en-scène. After
the film’s opening title credit image of the prior family hanging, the first image of the Oswalts
moving into their new home is a Steadicam shot of the home and a moving truck that introduces
a document box being slid by Ellison’s foot, which the camera emphasizes and that the viewer
sees before seeing Ellison’s face (fig. 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Sinister
Cinematographically, the box itself is emphasized in the shot, while the closely recorded sound
of the box rubbing against the floor of the moving truck singles it out as sonically important,
especially coming on the heels of the aurally intense title credit. The curse of Bughuul is
transmitted to Ellison and his family evidently through Ellison’s screening of the film, which he
finds in a moving box in the attic. In this respect, the moving box becomes more than a literal
container for film images and their mechanical apparatus, but a kind of media object and
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apparatus itself insofar as it functions not only as a storage container for images, but also plays a
crucial role in communicating the material effects of those images to unsuspecting victims. In
this sense the moving box also operates as a figure for exchange-value itself, as a container that
abstracts its specific contents into a nondescript and homogenous form in order to mediate
exchanges between use-values. The box therefore engages, albeit in a domestic rather than a
commercial and transnational register, what Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle call a “poetics of
containerization,” insofar as the process of moving homes is “marked by a certain fixation on the
‘box’ as refractory to feeling and cognition, but also as the possible source, when cracked open,
of an insight into the freight of bodily suffering that the seamlessness of circulation renders
invisible.”246 This transmitting function of the box becomes especially apparent when Ellison
destroys the 8mm film bearing Bughuul’s image and moves his family back into their old home,
only to find that the box of film has mysteriously persisted, and is sitting in his attic in the same
spatial position as it was in the other home. The box thus functions both metonymically and
metaphorically as a symbol of the anxiety attached to moving as a feature of home ownership
(and also as a marker of anxieties surrounding media, insofar as it functions as media, as I
discuss below).
The moving box is a nearly universal component of the contemporary Western
experience of changing homes, and its familiar visual and textural qualities give sensuous weight
to moving as more than merely an abstract concept. If the box activates a poetics of
containerization, in which the obstinacy of opacity is juxtaposed against the embodied affects it
conceals, then Sinister understands this relation as an engine for generating anxiety regarding the
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possibility of loss. Once again, Heidegger’s notion of anxiety is useful here: the moving box,
serves as a signifier of generalized existential anxiety insofar as it indicates both the temporary
loss of those household objects, which would normally be ready-to-hand, and an attendant
invitation to reflect upon the totality of one’s material “involvements.”247 In a general sense, the
flickering dichotomy of presence and absence expressed by the moving box produces anxiety
because temporary loss implies permanent loss: the container can be forgotten and left behind, its
valuable or sentimental contents lost forever. It is this severance from material origins, along
with the possibility of a horrifying return of this original repression of valorization, that Toscano
and Kinkle identify as problematic in the poetics of container shipping. In Sinister it is the fact
that the box cannot be forgotten and relegated to the past that is invoked through the home
movies’ supernaturally cursed persistence through time and across national and domestic space.
It thereby ‘cracks open’ the container, revealing its horrifying contents, and showing how the
“freight of bodily suffering” is itself fungible, insofar as it circulates between homes, images,
and bodies.
This anxious relation to personal property reflects the film’s concern with material object
loss on the one hand and the plague of that which continues to depress the value of real property
on the other. The pressure that it exerts, not only on Ellison but also on the family is especially
emphasized when Ellison finds his son Trevor having a night terror inside a moving box.
Although this sequence functions spectatorially in part for shock value, it also resonates with the
moving box as a container of terror—as a medium that holds and transmits uncontrollable effects
on the human body and psyche. More than this however, it also reduces the subject to a container
and transmitter for spasms of pure affective intensity. This spasmodic intensity is in turn relayed
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through the formal shock of the “jump scare” to the spectator of Sinister, momentarily collapsing
the film’s strata of speculation—economic, surveilling, and narrational—into a momentarily
unified affective figure. In doing so, the film creates a figural constellation of the economic,
securitizing, and meaning-making modalities of speculation. It uses affective intensity (what
Whitehead would call prehension) as a kind of medium through which a diagram of speculation
emerges as an expressive formation, and one that gives rise to a reconfigured understanding of
the ways in which superficially distinct forms of speculation, for example stock market betting
and cinematic narrative comprehension, can in fact share underlying schematic qualities.
The film draws a strong connection between containerization and mediation not only at
the level of the body and of the moving box, but also in terms of the house itself, which takes on
the functional role of a media object in the film. It serves as a container and conveyor for the
demonic curse and its haunted images, but also becomes a text open to processes of inscription.
Ashley’s practice of drawing pictures on the walls in her room makes this especially apparent
(fig. 4.2).
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Figure 4.2 Sinister
Initially, she and Ellison agree that the drawings are to stay inside the room, but as the film
progresses, the art spreads beyond the boundary of the room while becoming more explicit in its
reference to the Stevensons and the curse. The Oswalts’ new house, and indeed many of the
houses in Sinister, are porous, leaky containers that fail to hold their ‘proper’ contents.248 What is
distinctive about the curse, and telling of the film’s post-recession context, is that it becomes
activated precisely through viral movement, of people from house to house and images from
person to person. Therefore, as a figure for the dialectical paradox of value itself, the curse and
its related images come to stand not only for home value in a local sense, value that the
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Stevenson house is unable to retain and the loss of which seems to spread virally from one move
to another, but also of a more global and financialized market value, which emerged from
subprime home loans, proliferated through markets worldwide, and then leaked out from the
market’s every pore during the 2008 financial crisis.249
4.3

Spectatorship as Surveillance, Surveillance as Labor
Ellison’s research connects anxieties around labor, value, and economic security, but it is

also, as I have suggested, fundamentally a labor of surveillance and forensic scrutiny. Ellison’s
research takes a decisive turn once he discovers the box of Super-8 reels in the attic of the new
home, shifting his attention to a close examination of the footage itself rather than an
investigation of the lives of the murder victims or a tracing of the steps of the official police
investigation. His labor of narrative reconstruction is intimately connected to a voyeuristic
scrutiny of the ostensibly private ‘home movies’ of the previous families of victims, including
footage of their grisly murders. In the film, the acts of narrative construction and of surveillance
are increasingly blurred and intermingled. Describing what she terms “surveillance cinema,”
Catherine Zimmer stresses the “multiple mediations that occur through the cinematic narration of
surveillance, through which practices of surveillance become representational and
representational practices become surveillant, and ultimately distinctions between the two begin
to fade away.” For Zimmer, ‘surveillance cinema’ involves not only the iconographies of
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surveillance but also the ways in which narrative structure performs the work of joining the form
and content of surveillance together.250
Sinister does precisely this work, not by explicitly representing the activity of
surveillance as it is conventionally understood (which is to say as involving the visual or
auditory monitoring of the activities of others in such a way that they are thereby placed under
control), but instead through the way in which the film problematizes twin concerns regarding
the ability of the image to yield evidentiary truth and the troubled relationship between such
imagistic evidence and narrative. Notably, despite Ellison’s deep entanglement in (as it turns out,
entirely justified) paranoia, he is in fact not the person who solves the mystery and finally puts
the narrative pieces together ‘correctly.’ Rather, it is the apparently oblivious comic-relief
character ‘Deputy So and So’ (the only name the character is given) who is able to complete the
forensic reconstruction and author the ‘correct’ narrative of how and why the murders took
place. For both Ellison and the spectator of Sinister, first-blush appearances deceive and do not
provide a firm basis for evidentiary reasoning or narrative construction. The ways in which the
film explores and articulates anxiety regarding surveillance can be organized along four more or
less distinct modes of anxiety involving activities of surveillance: ethical anxiety,
spatial/panoptic anxiety, textural anxiety, and material anxiety, ranging from the largely abstract
and impersonal (ethical), to the concrete and medium-specific (material).
In the first, most impersonal sense, Ellison’s surveillance labor is troubled by the
ethically compromised nature of the research. Most obviously, Ellison intends to leverage the
gruesome suffering and violent deaths of the Stevenson family to turn a profit with which to feed
his own family. The ethics of the book project are called into question very early in the film by
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the sheriff, who adds that moving into the actual home of murder victims is “in extremely poor
taste.” The fact that the sheriff’s ethical critique is leveled in the form of an aesthetic judgment is
particularly apt, reinforcing the tension between the ostensibly distinct domains of legal justice
and commercial production. When Ellison initially realizes that he has found film footage of not
just the Stevenson family being murdered but other families as well, his initial response is to call
the police department to report the existence of additional evidence. This reaction demonstrates
an awareness of the fact that, as Benson-Allott has described, Ellison is not supposed to be
viewing these images, and that they are best handled by the proper authorities. As he calls the
police, however, he comes face to face with several copies of Kentucky Blood, which seem to
prompt him to hang up and fail to disclose the existence of the evidence to the police. Ellison
appears to be hamstrung, caught between the economic imperative of writing another bestseller
and the voyeuristic exploitation of the suffering of others, and seemingly pinned between the
book and the film as two forms of media with competing moral and commercial imperatives.
Ellison is corralled by these contradictory impulses, and this ethical confinement is
reflected formally in the film’s mise-en-scène through the spatial layout of Ellison’s office space
(fig. 4.3).
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Figure 4.3 Sinister
This room in the Oswalt family’s new home is separated from the rest of the house, kept under
lock and key, and like Marx’s factory in Capital, access to the room is clearly restricted to
admittance on Ellison’s business only. The room is structured with a screen hanging on one wall,
on which Ellison projects the home movies, and an arc of bulletin boards on the opposite side of
the room, onto which Ellison posts photos, documents, maps, and other bits of evidence and
some of which, true to the conspiratorial nature of the investigation, are connected to each other
with generically and iconographically appropriate lengths of string. In the context in which it
appears here, the conspiracy wall functions diagrammatically to spatialize the speculative
process of narrative construction as a figural constellation of aesthetic fragments. It is here in this
space that Ellison will work on his forensic reconstruction of the Stevenson murder and the
history of the curse. But the conspiracy wall, and diagram, also receive a specific textual
inflection here, insofar as they both function to create a claustrophobic architecture. The circular
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research space, in which Ellison is centrally positioned at the seat of projection, simultaneously
evokes a panoptic structure while confining Ellison by surrounding him with images. The
relationship between central viewing position and peripheral image evokes a panoptic set of
subject/object relations that would place Ellison at the controlling center of the scenario, ideally
positioned to survey the evidence and make appropriate connections between disparate facts. The
rectangular shape of the bulletin boards, with both images and text pinned to them and which
Ellison can manipulate, suggests the boards as a material extension of Ellison’s laptop screen,
and in this sense he is surrounded by screens containing various types of visual media. If the
ability to panoptically survey media is initially aligned with empowerment and control, this
position quickly becomes troubled, and ultimately reversed over the course of the film. The
supernaturally haunted image seems to increasingly possess power over Ellison and the family,
effectively inverting the power relations of the panoptic position, since the image is capable of
looking back at the viewer, returning the gaze from a variety of spatial positions. Thus, the film
figures subject-object relations not as static, but as unstable and contingent, and as malleably
established through the processes of speculative looking.
The reversal of the panoptic gaze is literalized in the film when an image of Bughuul, in a
paused digital video, turns its head to stare directly at Ellison, who is looking away and does not
notice (fig. 4.4).
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Figure 4.4 Sinister
This moment in the film, which is presented as a ‘jump scare’ for the audience, does more than
simply demonstrate the haunted image’s supernatural, frightening sense of liveness through an
unexpected reversal of subject/object relations. It also transforms the relationship between
surveiller and surveilled as it becomes clear in this moment that while Ellison was looking for
the mysterious murderer of families, Bughuul has been surveilling Ellison, and from a heretofore
unknown position.251 The reversal thus enacts a form of what Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and
Barry Wellmann have termed “sousveillance.” As opposed to surveillance, in which power is
asymmetrically held by the surveilling authority, sousveillance (‘sous’ meaning “under” in
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French, rather than the “over-sight” of surveillance) designates a mode of surveillance that
makes use of “panoptic strategies to help [individuals] observe those in authority.”252
Sousveillance is theorized as a tool with which to hold powerful entities accountable by
effectively surveilling the exercise of panoptic authority. Here, however, it is deployed as a
troubling and vertiginous mise-en-abyme of power relations, which undermines the visual
authority of the gaze through its reversibility. In her analysis of Ringu (dir. Hideo Nakata, 1998),
Benson-Allott observes a connection between Lacan’s reading of the anamorphic skull in
Holbein’s painting “The Ambassadors” and this return of the gaze in horror cinema. For BensonAllott the ‘death’s head’ in the painting traumatically, and like death itself, escapes meaning and
signification, a structural role also shared by Ringu’s ghostly Samara and, more importantly, the
videotapes her ghost haunts.253 Like the anamorphic skull in Holbein’s “The Ambassadors,”
Bughuul’s gaze functions as an annihilating trap for the surveilling gaze, insofar as it transforms
the surveilling subject into the object of an even more comprehensive and controlling vision.254
But if Lacan’s point about the skull, however, is that it figures the anchor of the unrepresentable
real at the core of the imaginary-symbolic matrix, then in Sinister this disruption of the real
possesses an animate vitality that goes beyond the static gaze of Holbein’s skull, since Bughuul’s
agency as a destructive force is tied directly to movement, of the head within the supposedly
static image, and of the curse through the supposedly stable home and its value. Circulation
disrupts the stable structural relations obtaining, even in the traumatic case of “The

252

Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, “Sousveillance and Using Wearable
Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments,” Surveillance & Society
1, no. 3 (2003): 332.
253
Benson-Allott, Killer Tapes and Shattered Screens, 124-30.
254
See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1981), 88-9.

183

Ambassadors,” between subjects and objects of both vision and property. While this is also the
case for the circulating cassettes in Ringu, the consequence in Sinister is that the entire
imaginary-symbolic matrix is thrown into flux by the emergence of the traumatic real, rather
than being structurally upheld by it. Bughuul is, in W.J.T. Mitchell’s twist on Walter Benjamin, a
wholly biocybernetic image, paradoxically straddling the lines between movement and stasis,
vitality and inertness, and subject and object.255 As a biocybernetic image, Bughuul quite literally
embodies these dialectical tensions of movement, vitality, and circulation on the one hand, and
stasis, inertness, and objectification on the other. As a figure for the paradoxes of value,
Bughuul’s demonic vitality does more than reverse the flow of surveillance, but does so in a way
that compromises the subject/object relations upon which surveillance is predicated. Bughuul
stands as the figure for a traumatic real that functions less as a Lacanian structuring absence in
the field of vision, than as a Deleuzian vitality of affect that traverses and undermines the
discreteness of the structural elements of subject and object altogether.
This tension between competing ontologies of desire is also reflected in the way the film
troubles the ontological status of Bughuul’s existence as verifiable visual evidence, both in the
scenes leading up to this pivotal scare and in the scares involving the demon that happen
afterwards. Ellison initially notices the presence of the demon in one of the home movies,
entitled “Pool Party.” As Ellison watches first-person handheld footage of a family being
drowned, he notices the demon as a human figure underwater in the pool, who turns his head
towards the camera. (Retrospectively, it is unclear whether Bughuul’s direct address is supposed
to take place in the event depicted, or whether this is his first attempt to surveil Ellison.) Ellison
stops the projector, holding the image as a still on the screen, and walks up to investigate the
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image more closely, but the film, as though of its own will, suddenly catches fire, destroying the
film frame with Bughuul most clearly visible. Although the fire is ostensibly the consequence of
the flammable film stock, or perhaps of Bughuul’s supernatural ability to destroy the image in
order not to be seen and exposed, it is striking that the image catches fire not once Ellison sees it
but once the shadow of his hand crosses the demon’s face. Although Ellison does not touch the
image, his shadow does, and this transmedial interaction between different types of images (and
different forms of indexical signifier) is suggested as the true cause of the fire. This moment is
the first but not the last in which competing ontologies of media, identified principally through
texture, come into tactile conflict with disturbing results. Each jump scare in the film involving
Bughuul, including the one previously described in which the image seems to move to look at
Ellison, involves an ontological and textural transgression between forms of media.
The last and most strongly material form of concern surrounding surveillance is produced
through Ellison’s response to the rupture of the film medium, which is to physically splice the
film back together. After the fire that ruptures the film, Ellison watches an online instructional
video to learn how to edit film, then splices the Super-8 film back together. He also splices film
much later in the film when he discovers the “extended cut endings” to the home movies, which
reveal that the families’ children are in fact the ones murdering their own families, rather than
there being a single serial killer committing the acts. Montage, as a material and narrative
practice, is closely imbricated with the logic of surveillance. Garrett Stewart begins his study of
surveillance and narrative cinema by making the interrogative assertion that “All montage is
espionage.”256 Stewart goes on to heavily complicate the ease of this identity over the course of
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his study, but his central point is that the difference between cinematic découpage and
surveillance turns on an open question of what it means to engage in motivated, quasi-illicit
looking. This question in turn reinvigorates the concerns of apparatus theory regarding the
capacities and limitations of cinematic suturing, and in ways that re-privilege the theoreticallyinformed formal analysis of cinematic narration. Hence for Stewart, contemporary “films of
surveillance…are so fully keyed to the fantastic videography they narrate, given the cinematic
distance from its electronics that their critique attempts to achieve, that the very plan of
camerawork and editing can seem at times folded back into their plots as a quasi-magical
intervention in space-time continuity.”257 Similarly, Zimmer also notes that the innovation of
continuity editing was developed to handle chase scenes, which are themselves predicated on
visualizable crime and discipline.258 The suggestion here is that continuity editing operates on a
logic of motivated viewing of particular events in space and time—that events are viewed for
some particular reason. Likewise, surveillance as a mode of information gathering is also
motivated by the presumption that surveillance images produce factual information or
intelligence that can be narrativized and made meaningful. Surveillance and narrative cinema
both assume motivation and reply on practices of forensic spectatorship (frame scanning,
inference making, hypothesis-testing) in order to produce a causal chain of events, that is, a
narrative, out of a fragmentary découpage stitched together through montage.
Insofar as the folding of narratological form and content in on each other is the hallmark
of narrative surveillance for Stewart, Sinister is indeed a film of surveillance. The fact that
Ellison materially handles the film medium and physically splices the film back together evokes
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the relationship between continuity as a system of formal rules, technology as a prosthetic
means, and knowledge as a governing goal. This knowledge is troubled by the structure of the
home movies themselves, which in each case but the last feature two sections, separated by a
jarring cut. The films open with evidently pedestrian footage of the families engaging in
mundane daytime activities, meaningful only to the families themselves, before cutting to the
more disturbing and valuable footage of those same families being hanged, drowned, and burned
alive. In each case, Ellison is never able to see the murderer, nor is he able to understand the
motivation for the murders. The one instance of Bughuul that appears on film makes an
exception that proves the rule, since the immolation of the medium enacts the disappearance of
the motivating force from the film image, at precisely the point where a suturing edit is located.
The “extended cut endings” finally provide the necessary visual evidence by supplying
additional footage that reveals who the murderers are, but they do so only after they are edited
into, and onto the film at a material level as a form of narrative surplus. Ellison’s labor of
meaning construction, ‘prodused’ through the physical act of editing, is therefore intimately tied
to the presence or absence of visual evidence from which to make inferences and draw
conclusions via processes of surveillance. His ability or inability to author, or forensically
reconstruct and re-constellate a narrative figure, and in turn to ensure his family’s financial
stability, is inseparable from his ability, quite literally, to be a successful content creator.
4.4

Media Transition and the Hauntology of the Digital
The two primary threads of speculative anxiety that are articulated in and by Sinister—

the trauma of economic recession and its deleterious effect on property value and the troubled
nature of an economically necessary surveillance that bears witness to such familial trauma—are
united together in Ellison’s spectatorship of the home movies footage, especially through its

187

remediation as digital video. The film stages the linkage between these two concerns through a
series of textural and ontological transgressions, involving both the film/video image and its
associated sound design, the medium-specific affordances of video compared to film, and the
loss of control over the proliferation of digital images that sits at the core of the logic of haunting
presented in the film. In this attention to texture and to the sensuous qualities of the film as
highly significant stylistic parameters for understanding the stakes of the film’s narrative and
thematic content, I draw on Ian Garwood’s study of hapticity and sensuousness in relation to
narrative sense. Garwood claims that in certain films, “sound and images acquire a ‘living’
texture that engages the viewer’s senses in a particularly intensive way,” which Garwood
identifies with the “sensuous quality of film.” He argues that “a film’s sensuous qualities can be
intimately connected to its storytelling processes.” In other words, the sensuous and textural
qualities of film can function as highly relevant stylistic parameters that shape an audience’s
understanding of a film’s story, and especially its story as a kind of aesthetic world unto itself.
Following this lead, we can see how qualities of aural and visual texture articulate thematic
concerns regarding the status of media in the film, and how the film’s use of texture connects to
its concerns with property and surveillance.259
The very first image in Sinister, prior to the Steadicam shot of Ellison pushing the
moving box, is a title sequence shot that shows the Stevenson family being hanged on 8mm film
(fig. 4.5).
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Figure 4.5 Sinister
The perpetrator is hidden from sight behind a tree, barring visual access to the cause of the
violence. Indeed, it may seem initially that there is no material, causal agent responsible for the
hanging, as the image is composed to suggest that the pole saw used to hang the family is
moving on its own, rather than being manipulated by an unseen entity. The image contains a
number of aspects that gesture towards its status as a film image, including its noticeable grain
and the extension of the image beyond the visible scene to the edges of the celluloid strip on both
the horizontal and vertical axes. The image also seems to lack its own synched soundtrack. The
sound design during this opening section consists of multiple overlapping scratching noises and
sounds of static, which are eventually replaced by the dominant sound of a film projector’s rapid
clicking, the latter of which enters the mix when the title of the film appears and the moving
image freezes to a static frame. The image and sound relations here establish the film’s first kind
of textural transgression through the intermingling of scarcely distinguishable noises of analog
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and digital media technologies. The audio mix features three distinctive sounds of static, one a
very high-frequency piercing sound, one a lower-frequency sound that evokes the sound of
television static, and one an even lower pitched sound recalls the sound of an overworked harddisc drive on a computer. Of each of these sounds, none properly belongs to the film image,
either diegetically or technologically, a point that is forcefully clarified when the sound of a
projector is finally made audible. Rather, this opening uses the sound of media other than film
and sounds which suggest media in a form of mechanical distress (a television without a signal,
computer components operating at maximum capacity) to produce a disturbing soundscape of
media under duress. If the film image here can be said to possess the kind of “living texture” that
Garwood supposes, that texture is skittish and anxious, evoking the sound of television static,
and the connotation of a media transmission without content—an empty container. From the
outset of the film, the mixing of media is associated with trouble, death, and an inability to
identify the source of the problem.
Later in the film, when Ellison first cues up the film of this incident, this sound design is
largely repeated, with the diegetic sound of the projector in Ellison’s office added as a
component of the sound mix. The sounds of dysfunctional media, evoked through scratching
sounds that would generally indicate the possibility of damage to the media object itself
(celluloid being etched, a hard drive burning out), draw specially close attention to the
materiality of the media as an object that is subject to damage, that does not persist immaculately
through time but can (and in the case of the celluloid does indeed), like the film’s cursed
families, come to a sudden and violent end. The emphasis on the material frailty of the image is
also reflected through the visibility of the screen’s surface during projection. Ellison’s makeshift
screen consists of a bed sheet safety-pinned to the wall, and while the film footage is projected,
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wrinkles in the screen material are clearly visible. These wrinkles give the image a textural
quality that forces the viewer to see, as well as hear, the image as having a material presence,
embodied in a particular form of materiality. The physical embodiment of the image, coupled
with its distressed sense of ‘liveness,’ are crucial elements in establishing the credibility of the
supernatural entity that haunts the image itself and transcends the ontological boundary between
an imagistic netherworld and normal, lived reality.
Central to the film’s concern with technologies of surveillance is the fact that Bughuul,
whose living embodiment resides within images of himself, is only ephemerally detectable on
film, but is consistently visible on digital video. It is only on his Macbook that Ellison is able to
detect the presence of Bughuul in each of the other (non-swimming pool) home movies, whereas
they were undetectable when projected on film (and in fact, as Sinister’s director and producer
attest in on the DVD commentary track, simply not present in the film image at all).260 It is only
through the digital video camera’s surveillance of the act of film projection, and through the
affordances of digital video in terms of the ability to pause a video, enlarge an image, adjust
image contrast, and ultimately through the ability to print physical copies of the image, that
Ellison is able to secure documentary evidence that Bughuul exists and was involved with the
family murders. Citing films such as The Blair Witch Project (dir. Daniel Sánchez and Eduardo
Myrick, 1999) and Paranormal Activity, Zimmer notes that found-footage horror films tend to
employ competing logics of image quality and texture with respect to film versus video, with the
cinematic image rendered as clear and transparent, while the video image tends to be rendered as
low-grade, unclear, and ambiguous.261 Sinister, interestingly, reverses this dichotomy, at least

260

C. Robert Cargill and Scott Derrickson, “Commentary,” Sinister, DVD, directed by Scott
Derrickson (Santa Monica, CA: Summit Entertainment, 2013).
261
Zimmer, Surveillance Cinema, 77.

191

initially, by presenting celluloid film footage as heavily textured and material, while the digital
image appears not only clean and transparent, but actually enhances the viewer’s powers of
observation by making evident aspects of the image that were obscure and invisible on film.
However, rather than identifying this visual documentary faculty with security and verification,
the film depicts the technological capacities of video in terms of a terrorizing surplus value,
effectively exchanging the materiality of celluloid montage and its extended duration for the
resolution, enhanced access, and temporal flexibility of the digital image.
In Sinister, the video image carries something extra, a deadly dangerous kind of surplus
visibility, which in turn produces a surplus of value in the form of Bughuul. Insofar as Bughuul
persists through time, and across the series of exchanges of images from one family to another,
and one haunted house to another, the demon represents what Derrida calls the ‘hauntological’
aspect of value: the commodity’s distinct being of ‘time out of joint,’ since it carries within it the
congealed form of labor-time.262 The commodity form is haunted by the ontological
transgressions of exchange between time and space, between quality and quantity, and between
present and past. This hauntological aspect of value is greatly intensified by financialization
which, through the innovations of the credit system, quite literally enables the separation of the
temporalities of purchase and the sale that compose an act of exchange, as well as the
recombination of these temporally disjunctive elements in other speculative configurations.263
Bughuul literally embodies this hauntological quality of the digital image, which is stylistically
manifested precisely at moments of transition and confusion between analog and digital media
ontologies. Bughuul stands ultimately as a figure for the immateriality of value itself, and
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especially of its increasingly digital form in the 21st century global economy. The demon figures
a hauntologically unstable surplus value, both formally in terms of its excessive presence within
the image and in a literal economic sense, insofar as Ellison’s discovery of Bughuul forces him
to accept far more than he has bargained for in investigating the Stevenson murders, ironically
rendering the real true crime story Ellison never gets to write, one in which evidence of
supernatural demons exists, both immensely valuable and potentially apocalyptic, given
Bughuul’s ability to spread through images of itself.
Anxiety associated with the surplus value of digital video is also identified with a
transgression of conventional frame boundaries associated with visual media forms. If the
spontaneous combustion of Bughuul’s effigy indicates an evacuation of the film image, and his
ability to take possession of the video image and move within it indicates a dangerous surplus,
then this logic of the frightening danger of media ultimately extends to Sinister itself, qua media
object, through Bughuul’s two jump scares that come late and at the very end of the film,
respectively. In each instance, the frame encourages the viewer to focus attention on an object
deep in the represented space, while Bughuul’s face pops out into the side of the frame, much
closer in the visual field than the focus of attention, producing a particularly startling bodily jolt.
These scares extend the logic of the curse’s transmediality, that it moves from medium to
medium, from film to video, video to house, house to movie screen, gaining strength with each
new embodiment, eventually seeming to homologously take possession of Sinister itself, and
even perhaps to seem to extend into the viewer’s own home-viewing space, once again
temporarily collapsing the strata of speculating relations that structures the film before retreating
back into the image within the image.

193

4.5

Conclusion: Speculation, Theory
Sinister’s greatest virtue as a reflexive commentary on the cycle of found footage/faux

footage/verité horror may be its ability and willingness to explore the complex and changing
relationships between media platforms and narrative construction, and between surveillance and
labor, and perhaps most importantly of all, its attempt at mutually framing these sets of activities
in terms of each other, generating a productive moment of conceptual and theoretical exchange
between ostensibly discrete social and economic realms that in fact hinge on overlapping
modalities of speculation. In doing so the film, like its protagonist, reveals a cultural,
technological, and economic epistemophilia at its core, that is to say a desire for cognitive
mapping which in this case is also to say a desire for speculation. In an entertainment economy
and cultural ecology that is dominated by transmedia franchising and cinematic universes,
Sinister represents a localized attempt to think the place (or better yet, the circulating movement)
of smaller, more transient media objects within the totality, both within the context of
entertainment, and within the broader economic context of finance capitalism, the financial
crisis, and its continuing aftershocks. As Garrett Stewart observes, “routine screen narratives are
often more interesting as film than as films, or now as digitized cinema more than as movies—
interesting for the way their medium facilitates or defies the logic of their plots, abets or shreds
it.”264 Sinister’s own particular contortions of cinematic narrative, stressed as they are by the
force-fields of contemporary capitalism, index these transformations in both the economy and in
meaning-making, both of which converge on the concept of speculation. In particular, the film
performs this cognitive labor through its formal process of figurally constellating the various
senses of speculation into an immanent affective figure that is as ephemeral and stimulating as
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the low-budget horror genre itself. Insofar as the film’s investment in speculation addresses the
value and circulation of images, it also seeks to do both for the entertainment industry and for
domestic security what Fredric Jameson’s conspiracy films did for the capitalist world system,
namely to “constitute an unconscious, collective effort at trying to figure out where we are and
what landscapes and forces confront us” under the present economic and political
circumstances.265 Low-budget horror, with its own commercial disposability, is perhaps not a
‘poor’ but rather a precarious person’s cognitive mapping, whose images of traumatic circulation
are, in this instance, quite literally and meaningfully ‘degraded’ in form.
Sinister attempts to trace and map out the shifting social and economic forces of postcrisis financialized capitalism, and does so by foregrounding the parallel structures of the viral
circulation of digital images and of the commodified financial abstractions that constitute finance
capital as such. As Peter Osborne has argued, “In the digital image, the infinity of exchange
made possible by the abstraction of value from use finds an equivalent form.” The ontology of
digital photography therefore echoes the commodity form, since neither makes visible its
referential value, evincing no necessary bond between use and exchange-value. De-realized
digital images, like commodities, are therefore subject to infinite exchangeability, and indefinite
degrees of abstraction.266 Sinister figures not only this ontological homology and potential
exchangeability, but of its consequences for the body exposed to them, a body forced into the
precarious self-employment of the neoliberal gig economy in which speculation, and its
ambiguously productive and destructive vicissitudes, can be imagined as compensated and
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creative labor, as an explanatory theoria that helps capital circulate freely, in exchange for one’s
life—Ellison’s bad theory does indeed let the killer go free. In this sense, Ellison’s speculative
labor, in its domestic and traumatic context, becomes a kind of dialectical inversion of the global
and seductively glamorous, if also problematized, Wall Street financial speculation depicted in
The Wolf of Wall Street (dir. Martin Scorsese, 2013), and one that refuses to disavow the body of
the observer in the processes of narrative construction and financial valorization. Unlike
Scorsese’s sophisticated use of computer-generated special effects for the purpose of reinforcing
the illusion and allure of classical cinema’s unobtrusiveness and hermetically sealed diegesis,
Sinister’s understanding of digitality refuses to permit such a disembodied mode of spectatorial
engagement.
Speculation itself, therefore, becomes the common term that unites Sinister’s
economically and nationally allegorical tendencies, and in a manner that formally and
aesthetically draws together the spatial components of Ellison’s detective work through his
surveillance of the visible image and the temporal components of the investigation through his
failed attempt at narrative construction. Speculation, as Sinister shows, stands as the unifying
conceptual intersection at which questions about the relationships between economy and culture,
as well as historical events and their aesthetic representation, can and must be reconsidered and
rearticulated within the political-economic, historical, and aesthetic moment of the present. This
is because, as the film adamantly shows, speculation cannot be divorced or abstracted away from
the laboring body that performs it, nor from the material body in which the abstract circulations
of financial speculation must ultimately land. Hence, the film articulates speculation, in the form
of Ellison’s active spectatorship and forensic narrative reconstruction, as a concept in a way that
necessarily synthesizes both the figurative sense of the speculative, as well as the concrete,
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embodied, and laboring subject of speculation, and of a speculative economy. Moreover, the
precise point of conceptual connective tissue that articulates these senses of speculation is the
figural dimension of each of these speculative modes: the constellative production of a coherent
narrative form out of fragments in the former case, and the capacity for the realization of
fictitious financial instruments via the process of circulation and exchange in the latter.
Yet, as the final image and closing jump scare of the film remind us, we too are
perceptually, affectively, and economically implicated, both as embodied spectators and as
speculators. In doing so, the film once again collapses its speculative strata into a singular,
temporarily unified affective figure, and moves beyond a representational practice of cognitive
mapping and into the realm of what Steven Shaviro helpfully theorizes as affective mapping, by
productively expressing the speculative relation between observers and images as a relation
between the audience and the film.267 This is also to say that the film’s affective figuration of
speculation also aspires to a transformation in the nature of what it means to think or cognize at
all, and that the film’s formal figuration itself speculatively posits a different notion of what
thought can be—a different image of thought, as Deleuze and Guattari might say.268 Sinister
thereby reasserts, in the register of our own material and embodied affectivity, what it claims in
the register of semantic representation and allegory: the circulation, virality, and concrete bodily
implications of speculation as a mode of imagistic and economic abstraction. In doing so, it
reminds us that speculation is, in the end, relentlessly and frighteningly productive.
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5

“DO YOU KNOW WHAT FEAR STANDS FOR?” RACIALIZED
EMBODIMENT AND ABSTRACTION IN NIGHTCRAWLER

5.1

Introduction
The film Nightcrawler (2014, dir. Dan Gilroy) chronicles the success of Lou Bloom, a

psychopathic unemployed thief who, over the course of the film, becomes a self-employed news
videographer, before ultimately founding his own independent newsgathering business at the end
of the film. Over the course of his ascent, Lou learns how to maximize the value of his footage
by exploiting the ability of TV news to stoke viewers’ fear by suggesting that they are constantly
exposed to risk, coerces his primary client, a broadcaster, into a transactional sexual relationship
with him, and employs a homeless day laborer as a personal assistant, whom he later murders for
profit. The film’s tone presents Lou’s success at the end of the film as an acid indictment of
neoliberal self-help culture, in which vacuous platitudes lead to success at the extreme expense
of others, and in a manner that breaks along gendered and racial lines favoring white
masculinity.
In the middle of the film, while out trolling for emergencies to be recorded, Lou asks his
employee Rick: “Do you know what fear stands for? False evidence appearing real.” This is the
answer that Lou provides to his own question, a question posed rather more at than to Rick. It is
an answer that is suffused with irony at multiple levels, not least because Rick will indeed come
to know fear when Lou murders him later in the film, and he will also come to stand for it in a
semiotic sense, as a sign of false evidence, when Lou literally and figuratively stages that murder
as a tragic byproduct of racialized criminality. For Lou is a nascent crime scene videographer,
and Nightcrawler chronicles his rise from amateur obscurity to corporate enterprise, an
enterprise that is built on Lou’s ability to transform accident and crime scenes, through an
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alchemical process of racialized aesthetics, into lucrative video packages. Lou’s question and
answer are also effectively the thesis statement of the didactic film, or at least one side of it, the
other side being the image of Rick’s fearful dying. In the film’s posing of this referential and
affective question, Nightcrawler also posits a critique of contemporary capitalism for which the
question of the relationship between appearance and reality, and the role of certain bodies of
falsified evidence in mediating that relationship, is central.
Yet Lou is not correct in asserting a simple binary dichotomy between appearance and
reality, as the irony of his aphorism makes clear, for he is, in expressing this bit of pithy self-help
wisdom, also engaging in his own act of fabulation, or in other words just making it up. The
dense irony of Lou’s maxim also registers in the way it is itself, rather circularly, a piece of false
evidence presented as real to Rick. Moreover, as the film shows us, Lou makes his entire career
as a successful crime scene videographer through the creation of “false evidence appearing real,”
not the least of which is Rick’s own murder. Hence, there is yet another level of irony in the fact
that Lou is giving Rick this bit of advice to assuage the latter’s anxiety, whereas the film will
show us later on just how the appearing-real of fabricated evidence does indeed generate real
fear for Rick, which in turn, again rather circularly, appears to legitimate the verisimilitude of the
fabricated evidence. Thus, in Lou’s figure of speech fear has the simultaneous and paradoxical
capacities to 1) ‘be only’ false evidence, that is, to be dismissively equated to something other
than what it is, 2) to have the functional power to appear real, even though it is in fact only a
fiction, and 3) indeed to really be real, even if spurred by false evidence. In short then, Lou’s turn
of phrase functions as a condensed linguistic figure for the film’s overall critical and textual
structure, insofar as it encapsulates the ways in which the film offers a formal critique of
capitalism that parallels the three modalities of fear enumerated above. The illusion of fear as
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‘only’ an imaginary sensation parallels processes of equivalent exchange; the legibility of fear’s
capacity to index a symbolic state of affairs parallels the process of valorization; and fear’s
ontological self-positing parallels the fabulation of speculative and financialized fictions.
Hence, what is at stake in Nightcrawler is a certain kind of formal critique of the
contradictions of contemporary capitalism, and one that attends to the relational structures that
are intrinsic to capitalism as a concrete, historically unfolding mode of economic organization.
Moreover, as I have already suggested, there is also both a formal and a conceptual obverse to
the film’s critical account of these structures, namely the film’s emphasis on racialized
embodiment as immanent to each of these aspects of capitalism, about which more below. Yet
what is distinctive about Nightcrawler as a critique of capitalism, and what it shares in common
with the objects of the previous chapters, is its ability to present the ostensibly discrete realms of
material commodity exchange and abstract financial speculation as both intimate and immanent
to each other, rather than as disparate zones of economic activity. Central to the film’s own
critical maneuver is a conceptualization of the valorization process that is supple enough to
account for both forms of circulation. This model of valorization is essentially predicated, like
the conspiracy diagram itself, on the reconfiguration of fragments into a holistic formal unity. As
we shall see, this valorizing reconfiguration is also fundamentally imbricated with the concept of
the transgression of boundaries, both in the spatial and topological sense of the term, as well as
in its ethical sense. The structure of this chapter seeks to follow the film’s own structure in its
critique of value, first by establishing the significance of exchange as a general conceptual
dominant, before more closely interrogating first the process of valorization, and then the
implications of this process for abstract, financialized circulation. The manner in which
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racialized embodiment subtends each of these structures will, as in the film, become apparent
over the course of the analysis.
5.2

Boundary Transgression and Spatial Reconfiguration
Nightcrawler is a film that traffics essentially in the transgression and reconfiguration of

boundaries and limits. To begin with, the film’s narrative is teleologically structured around a
series of commodity exchanges of increasing scale, one that sketches the historical trajectory of
capitalism in miniature. The film’s narrative trajectory follows its protagonist, Lou Bloom, as he
rises from a kind of primordial state of unemployment to become the president and CEO of his
own video news production company in contemporary Los Angeles.269 Indeed, the film so
explicitly signals its structure as a kind of bildungsroman of unbridled neoliberal accumulation
that it threatens, like other similar films such as American Psycho (2000, dir. Mary Harron), to be
confused for an enthusiastic account of the kind of toxic and oppressive behavior it presents. Yet
the bald literality of its narrative structure belies a more nuanced critical posture. Unlike
contemporary post-crisis science-fiction films like, for example, Snowpiercer (2012, dir. BongJoon ho) and Mad Max: Fury Road (2015, dir. George Miller), which deploy either allegorical
and metaphorical means of representing class struggle under capitalism, or else an explicit
rendering of capitalist oppression, Nightcrawler effects its critique through a critique of the
concept of appearance as such, through its presentation of the processes of exchange,
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accumulation, and valorization. As Fredric Jameson has noted of neoliberal finance capital, “we
sense that the problems of ideological analysis are enormously simplified, and the ideologies are
far more transparent….the motivations behind ideology no longer seem to need an elaborate
machinery of decoding and hermeneutic reinterpretation…” He continues, moreover, to suggest
that “This means an older vulgar Marxism may once again be more relevant to our situation than
the newer models; but we also face more objective problems about money itself, which had
seemed less relevant in the cold war period.”270 If Jameson is correct in asserting that the
representational quandaries posed by the emergence of finance capital as a dominant form of
contemporary capitalism alter the critical stakes for critically representing such a system, then
Nightcrawler can be approached as an attempt to interrogate the concept of face-value, as it
applies to both the money-form and to representation as such. This also implies that what is
significant about Nightcrawler is not so much that it attempts to map and critique contemporary
capitalism, but rather that the film’s explicit representation of processes of exchange qua
exchange short-circuits the allegorical distance between form and content, revealing a profound
immanence ‘between’ them, or indeed a mode of figurality binding them together in their
immanence. In other words, the money form’s capacity to exchange and circulate at face value
implies an immanence between its form as money and its expressive capacity for exchange; its
form is, in a way, also its content, like a promise or other performative speech act. Nightcrawler,
I am suggesting, is also like money in this way, insofar as its ‘vulgar’ emphasis on exchange
should be understood as an immanent critique of both exchange and representation as such.
Thus, in response to the film’s apparent self-evidence and privileging of aesthetic surface over
thematic depth, this chapter engages with it through a close reading of its superficial narrative
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and formal elements, taking the film at face value in order to understand how the film itself
complicates any such notion. After all, Jameson follows his own suggestion that a return to
“vulgar Marxism” may prove useful for approaching finance capital with a formalist, if not also
‘vulgar,’ exegesis on the significance of the aesthetic fragment.271 As I have been indicating,
however, and as we shall see, the film’s explicit, face-value representation of processes of
exchange also, like money itself, belies a more complex process of valorization that is effaced in
the production of face-value.
Nightcrawler’s narrative is, as I have said, structured around a teleological series of
commodity exchanges that reproduces the movement of capitalism, from primitive accumulation
to incorporation. After a meditative credit sequence featuring images of the greater Los Angeles
area at night, including an ironically revealing opening image of a billboard with a blank face,
the film begins in earnest with a scene in which Lou attempts to break into a rail yard to steal
scrap metal. The trunk of his Reagan-era Toyota Tercel hatchback is full of various objects,
including several auto wheels and a bundle of copper wire. When a security guard approaches
Lou to investigate, Lou attacks the man and steals his wristwatch. The film fittingly begins its
narrative accumulation with this scene of primitive theft, an act of what David Harvey helpfully
terms accumulation by dispossession. For Harvey, accumulation by dispossession, that is, by
means of blatant theft or privatization, helps ameliorate the problem of the overaccumulation of
capital by making new resources available at a minimal cost, assets which can then serve as
targets for capital investment.272 Crucially, the term signals that ‘primitive’ accumulation does
not cease after some initial, primordial act of resource hoarding, but continues as an ongoing and
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structurally necessary component of capitalism’s necessary reproductive expansion. Moreover,
as Harvey explains, “The umbilical cord that ties together accumulation by dispossession and
expanded reproduction is that given by finance capital and the institutions of credit, backed, as
ever, by state powers.”273 In other words, and as we shall see in Nightcrawler, it is finance
capital that functions to articulate dispossession to the expansion of capital.
Having also pilfered a portion of the chain-link fence itself, Lou drives to a junk yard
while listening to talk radio commentators describe the economic downturn and decry
foreclosure and unemployment, one of them hawking an instructional book for would-be
investors. Lou takes his stolen goods to a junkyard, where he ineffectively attempts to negotiate
the price of the metals with the yard manager, ultimately accepting a price he decries as “below
market value.” The various metals, priced and sold by the pound, are in the most literal sense,
commodities being taken to market by Lou. Lou asks the manager for a job, but the man refuses
to hire a thief. On his way home from the junkyard, Lou drives by a traffic accident in which
police are attempting to rescue a woman from a burning car. Lou observes a crew of cameramen
recording the incident and notices the expensive-looking camera equipment in their van. He asks
for a job, but is again refused. The next day, having seen the incident he witnessed on the local
news, Lou steals an expensive racing bicycle and takes it to a pawn shop where he trades it for
store credit, which he in turn exchanges for a camcorder and a police scanner. This transaction
expands the film’s narrative as well as its economic scope, as Lou comes into possession of the
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means of video production, which effectively enables him to transition from a largely ‘primitive’
mode of accumulation by dispossession to a properly capitalist mode of economic enterprise.274
Although untrained and unskilled, Lou begins driving to crime and accident scenes and
recording the events. He begins selling his recordings to a local news station, thereby making a
return on his initial investment and continuing his humble accumulation of capital. The station’s
head producer, Nina, encourages Lou to invest in nicer video equipment, which he does. Lou
soon becomes a properly capitalist entrepreneur when he hires an employee, Rick, who he pays
in cash below minimum wage, and continues accumulating capital by selling videos of graphic
and violent crime scenes for money. Lou trades in his Tercel for a new sports car, outfits the car
with high-tech recording, police-scanning, and GPS technology, and acquires a laptop computer
for mobile video editing and upload. These technologies enable him to reach crime scenes faster,
and to edit and upload his footage more efficiently. He coercively negotiates into a privileged
professional, and explicitly transactional, sexual relationship with Nina, in which he promises to
continue delivering valuable footage to her in exchange for more money and sexual favors. The
speed of both his technology and his vehicle enable him to reach the scene of a triple homicide
before the police can arrive, allowing him unfettered access to the crime scene. He sells the
footage for $15,000 by explicitly leveraging its exclusivity and the network’s need to negotiate
(during sweeps week) for the highest price possible. After artificially staging and recording a
shootout and car chase between police and the pair of alleged triple-murderers, in which Rick is
himself murdered and Lou is directly responsible for it, Lou earns enough money selling the
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footage to hire more employees and purchase two news vans, thereby moving into corporate
video news production.
As this description indicates, the scale of Nightcrawler’s narrative expands steadily over
the course of its running time, as though the entire film performs a steady zoom out from the
intimate details of commodity exchange to accumulation and investment at a corporate level, and
ultimately to the financialized circulation of representations of social risk embodied in the videos
themselves. The film’s extremely matter-of-fact presentation of these various scenes of exchange
and accumulation constitute this narrative teleology in which, to paraphrase and adapt Marx’s
famous phrase, the film begins with a theft and a sale, and ends with a purchase and the
exploitation of labor through wage employment. In this sense, the film dramatizes the
transformation of material objects into financial liquidity: Marx’s general formula for capital as a
kind of narrative destiny. Moreover, the movement of exchange between commodity objects—a
bicycle for store credit for a video camera for capital, for example—establishes the ontic
transgression of the commodity form as the pulsion propelling the movement across economic
and social scale itself, from primitive accumulation to corporate business. As Lou’s enterprise
expands in terms of its physical and geographical scale, it also simultaneously unfurls a
compressed historical account of the history of capitalism.
By yoking the individual, molecular exchange to the molar, systemic, historical
movement of capitalism, the film effectively and critically articulates the immanence of
historical time to each individuated movement of exchange. Since the original stolen goods are
exchanged for camera equipment, which produces images which are in turn exchanged for cash,
which is in turn used to purchase labor power, and so on until the end of the film, Nightcrawler’s
narrative structure encourages us to think of these two poles of capitalism—the originary and
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dispossessive, and the corporate and impersonal—as existing on an immanent continuum of
relative equivalence. Likewise, the film’s movement across geographic scale, as Lou’s physical
speed and communicative reach expand to cover the entire metro L.A. area, articulates his initial,
minor transgressions such as crossing police tape, to the larger ones of orchestrating the
spectacularly violent shootout and car chase near the end of the film. If we take exchange in
Nightcrawler to be a conceptual figure, then, it is one that operates across both temporal and
spatial dimensions, and indeed connects these dimensions together into an interlinked
representational and critical matrix.
Alongside this spatio-historical movement, Lou himself transforms from an inept
negotiator who is pejoratively dismissed as an unemployable thief, to a savvy, if psychopathic,
manipulator whose transparent regurgitation of entrepreneurial self-help manual bullet points a
la American Psycho is equal parts black comedy in its manifest absurdity and distressingly
effective in its successful practice. By the film’s end Lou is, importantly, no less a thief, but this
theft has become socially legitimized as business. His social status is thereby reconfigured, as the
same qualities that made him unemployable at the film’s beginning (a certain connivance)
become ‘assets’ at the film’s end, when his lack of concern for others makes him an ideal
entrepreneur, now responsible for the hiring and firing of others. In this way Lou represents the
model neoliberal citizen who bootstraps himself from abject joblessness into independent wealth
and passive income through the sheer power of gumption, grit, and self-interest. What is elided,
of course, in such a description is the thoroughgoing violence that undergirds Lou’s success at
every stage, and which an interpretation of the film that would focus primarily on the neoliberal
rhetoric of self-reliance cannot effectively address. In other words, what remains to be explained
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is just precisely how the neoliberal magic trick of wealth creation is accomplished, and more
importantly, what (and who) has to be disavowed in order for such a transformation to occur.
Commodity exchange is the film’s dominant conceptual figure, but the narrative and
affective core of these transformative exchanges consists in Lou’s filming of crime and accident
scenes, which he sells for increasingly large sums of money. Thus, in addition to dramatizing
exchanges between objects and objects, as well as between images and money, the film also
dramatizes exchanges between ‘events’ and the videographic apparatus that captures them, and
in the process valorizes them through an aesthetically violent reordering of space.275 What makes
Nightcrawler’s literalization of the exchange process more than an otherwise straightforward
account of the perils of exploitation is this consideration of the process of valorization itself.
Moreover, the film’s rendering of the process of valorization as a process of aesthetic and spatial
reconfiguration echoes, with disarming fidelity, how it has been theorized by Lindon Barrett.
Barrett’s theorization of value is grounded essentially in the relationship between valorization
and racialization, about which more below, but to continue to track the film’s critical trajectory I
wish to approach Barrett first from the vantage point of reconfiguration. Barrett conceptualizes
value in terms of differential boundaries, stating that “Limits and boundaries prove the
“Essential” matter of value, because they delineate the point of, and therefore, instantiate the
need for the arbitration undertaken by value in the first place. Limits and boundaries prove points
of reckoning and ambivalence at which difference is formally reiterated or reconstituted by the
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operations of value.”276 Barrett argues that the differentiation inherent in value’s operation
effects a kind of violence, through the forcible reconfiguration of existing forms:
In short, violence, the forcible disrupting and altering of Otherwise established
forms, betrays the original instance of all value. First, value is an impeachment of
the Other, the willful expenditure of the Other in an imposing production of the
self. The perspective of the Other thus reveals the relativities of value as ratios of
violence; the discovery of value from the perspectives of the Other reveals the
exorbitant foundations and overdeterminations of value. Violence—to emphasize
the point, is the opening that allows value. It remains the original mechanism by
means of which valuation initiates, then resists, change….Always inherent in
value is the trace of an original, violent expenditure. Value is violence, and, more
to the point, value is violence disguised or dis-figured.277
Barrett anticipates Harvey in identifying a dispossessive violence at the heart of all instances of
valorization, though for Barrett the concealment of violence by value is intrinsic to the structure
of value itself, rather than only an outcome of the process of exchange. As Barrett explains,
value appears in two modes: value as force, and value as form. In the rendering visible of the
value form, the violent force inherent in its construction is displaced and “disguised.” This leads
Barrett to a vividly cinematic metaphor for value as both an object brought into focus by a
camera, and paradoxically also as the hand that focuses the image to bring the object into view:
In order to imagine this perplexity more completely, conjure a surreal television
or movie camera that, by focusing on the background, distorts images in the
foreground of its purview, and vice versa, as do all cameras. The coming into
focus of an object pushes out of focus many Other objects. Imagine further the
true agency of this flux as an invisible hand indistinguishable from its delicate
movements that create the changes in focus. If, further, this camera-hand could,
after each manipulation, embody itself as the object brought into focus, it would
be the equivalent of value…..In short, this camera-hand sees the work of seeing
the work of seeing the work of seeing itself.278
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Although Barrett’s conception of the valorization process, with its mise-en-abyme of
erasures of the Other in the operations of difference, is most clearly in theoretical debt to
Derrida, Barrett’s account of valorization as a process of becoming in which violent, disfiguring
forces at once produce stable gestaltic forms, while disappearing themselves in the process of
value production to remain only immanent to those forms, also sounds a distinctly DeleuzoGuattarian theoretical note. Without arrogating to Deleuze and Guattari (or to Derrida, for that
matter) Barrett’s distinctive theory of valorization, I do wish to stress the continuity between the
way Barrett theorizes value and the way Deleuze, in a more general sense, conceives of the
relationship between molecular forces and molar forms as a process of unending de- and
reterritorializations, a process of which the respirations of capital are exemplary. As the
Introduction explained, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari characterize the general formula
for capital, M-C-M, as a series of transubstantiations of the abstract into the concrete, and the
virtual into the actual, and vice versa. To the extent that capitalism is representational, it is a
figural, rather than semiotic regime of representation.279 Barrett’s account of valorization, in
which the object of value is dialectically immanent to the subject for which value exists, and in
which the process of differentiation is at the core of the reification of the subject-object relation,
effects an inversion of Hegelian self-consciousness that parallels Whitehead’s reversal of Kant.
For Barrett, subjectivity, like value, emerges as the illusory consequence of a process of violent
differentiation and expulsion without any reintegration, rather than any process of rational selfmediation or self-reflection. Likewise, Whitehead’s reversal places aesthetic perception ahead of
the organization of the rational subject who would perceive the objective world. Taken in
tandem, however, Barrett reveals the distressing possibility that Whiteheadean beauty might be
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more properly understood as a mode of violence upon which the ‘superject’ is essentially
founded.
In Nightcrawler, the increasingly violent aesthetic reconfigurations of space, from
domestic space to geographic and social space, is precisely what valorizes Lou’s footage. Early
in Lou’s career as a videographer, he sneaks across police tape into a crime scene (itself a
transparent example of boundary transgression), and into a home where a violent robbery has
been reported. Lou rearranges family photos on the refrigerator, moving them closer to bullet
holes from the robbery, effectively producing a more affectively powerful and therefore
monetarily valuable piece of footage for the station (fig. 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Nightcrawler
This valorizing operation is explicitly constituted by a semiotically violent spatial reordering of
pictorial elements at the crime scene that produces a more semantically charged and saleable
narrative; a kind of inverted mirror image of Kracauer’s view of the utopian potential of
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photography—the foreclosure, rather than disclosure, of an unredeemed material reality, albeit
one that (as we shall see) is materially productive on its own terms. Here, and elsewhere in the
film, the logic of the conspiracy diagram is schematically immanent to the aesthetic process of
valorization, insofar as the spatial reconfiguration of visual fragments functions to produce a
temporally oriented narrative figure making claims to truth, and one thoroughly suffused with
affective and financial investment. Although the conspiracy wall as such is never literalized in
the film, its diagrammatic function is present everywhere in the aesthetic reconfiguration of
fragments, whether photos or bodies, into figures of ‘truth’ in the service of the production of
speculative value. In doing so, the film critically frames valorization itself as a kind of aesthetic
violence and conspiratorial speculation.
After rearranging the photos, the film cuts directly to the television production studio
where Lou and Nina are reviewing the footage. On video, Lou turns from the fridge to capture
the victims on video as they are interviewed by the police, recording the interview through a
bullet-riddled window, while Nina effusively praises the quality of the footage (fig. 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 Nightcrawler
This second image in particular, of the family of victims being interviewed by police, while
being filmed through bullet holes in transparent glass, effectively poses the paradox of value as
Barrett describes it: value as simultaneously both an essential, objective property and as a formal
process of schematic ordering that produces the object as a coherent and sensible form for the
viewing subject. What appears as a more or less transparent document of an event unfolding
effaces the labor of aesthetic reconfiguration necessary to produce such a transparent image in
the first place, although this violent re-ordering does not occur without leaving a trace, here
figured by the bullet hole in the glass as a kind of Lacanian absence as it were, a literal hole in
the transparent symbolic matrix that prevents its completely smooth functioning. Indeed, later in
the film Lou explains to Nina that he is “focusing on framing. A proper frame not only draws the
eye into a picture, but keeps it there longer, dissolving the barrier between the subject and the
outside of the frame.” Lou’s aesthetic sensibility is thus strongly linked to the transgressive
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dissolution of spatial (as well as social and subjective) boundaries, while the notion of framing
evokes re-ordering and a visual, spatialized sense of forcible reconfiguration that valorizes the
visual field. Although Lou’s ersatz film theory differs from Barrett (as well as Deleuze and
Whitehead) insofar as it posits the content of the image and the image’s “outside” as preexisting, given categories that are blurred in aesthetic experience, rather than categories that are
formed out of precisely such a primordially formative mo(ve)ment, it nevertheless asserts the
permeability of the boundary between subjects and objects as an essential component of both
aesthetic experience and the production of value.
Throughout the remainder of the film, this pattern of violent aesthetic reconfiguration
continues and itself expands in scale. Lou moves a dead body at the scene of a car accident to
produce a more affectively engaging image, then sabotages a competitor’s van in order to
produce a subsequent traffic accident, which he also records and sells to the station. Finally, Lou
follows a pair of alleged murderers to a restaurant in a high-traffic neighborhood before reporting
them to the police and warning (without evidence) that they are armed, thereby artificially
staging a violent confrontation in order to create more lucrative footage during Sweeps Week.
Over and over, value is not only linked inextricably to violence, but is produced through an
increasingly violent process of spatial manipulation, one that begins in semiotic terms with the
reconfiguration of photographs of people, and ends in visceral and socio-geographical terms with
the reconfiguration and liquidation of human bodies, particularly bodies that are racialized as
nonwhite by the news station, into videographic value. With icy and distanced literality, the film
formally reproduces the logic of Marx’s theory of exchange-value, in which “the physical body
of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A.” The perceived value of each
piece of footage is reflected in, and constituted in part by, the suffering physical bodies of the
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individuals for which the moving image itself functions as equivalent, and which are forcibly
impressed into the service of a TV news economy epitomized by a fellow videographer’s cynical
remark that “if it bleeds it leads.”
Indeed, the rigorously teleological narrative movement of the film through this series of
exchanges and expansions suggests that Lou’s images are, even if separated chronologically, in
an immanent relation to each other insofar as they are presented as mutually fungible. That is to
say, if Lou’s images (here taken broadly to comprise all of Lou’s aesthetic constructions, from
videotape to racialized social space) are figural in the sense that they are comprised of fragments
that have been aesthetically reconfigured to compose a unified form, they are also figural in the
sense that they mutually reinforce each other through the functions of prefiguring and
fulfillment. At the smallest scale, Lou’s aesthetically reconfigured crime scene videos are used to
support a larger social narrative about the threat posed by racial minorities transgressively
encroaching on private spaces tacitly designated as white. To the extent that these images are
rendered both valuable and as authentically documentary through Lou’s creative process of
aesthetic figuration, they also function to reconfigure social space in ways that reinforce the
racial differences subtending the news packages themselves. Lou’s videos thus both prefigure
and fulfill the sociogeographic organization of Los Angeles into racialized neighborhoods
crisscrossed by the color line.
5.3

Valorization and Racialization
Importantly, both for Barrett and for Nightcrawler, the violence that undergirds the value

form is of a specifically racialized nature. As Barrett explains, a differentiating function is
necessary in order to distinguish subjects from objects, and objects from each other, both of
which are prerequisites for the emergence of commodity exchange and the money form—there
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must be different, if potentially equivalent, objects in order for exchange to be possible in the
first place. For Barrett, however, this differentiating function is inextricably tied, both
structurally and within the history of the West, to race, which Barrett speculates may well be “the
preeminent “New World” value,” insofar as it “amounts to a series of actions and transactions
never represented as such, but represented as formal essences instead.”280 Barrett looks to the
emergence of the transatlantic slave trade as the historically originary event of differentiating
violence establishing the distinction and disequilibrium between white subjectivity and the
disavowed Otherness of blackness.281 Barrett’s position echoes that of Hortense Spillers who
writes, regarding the objectification of captive slave’s body, that it “brings into focus a gathering
of social realities as well as a metaphor for value [emphasis in original] so thoroughly
interwoven in their literal and figurative emphases that distinctions between them are virtually
useless.”282 For Spillers, famously, this split between white subjectivity and black objectivity of
the flesh, which is here grounded in the operation of black flesh as money, forms the grounding
opposition upon which the American socio-symbolic order is fundamentally founded, in what
Stephen Best, describing the American slave’s assumption of the money form, has termed “its
unique scandal of value.”283
The profound “interweaving” of race and value is not limited, however, merely to the
money form or to the emergence of value as a conceptual and practical tool. As Ian Baucom
argues, the transatlantic slave trade was, and is, an essential component of the emergence of
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capitalism over the ‘Long Twentieth Century.’ If Arrighi innovatively pointed out how the
history of capitalism is marked by alternating cycles respectively dominated by commodity
production and speculative financialization, Baucom shows just how fundamental the
transatlantic slave trade, particularly in its innovation of and reliance upon speculative credit and
insurance contracts, was to the emergence of the longue durée of capitalism.284 Rather than
emerging at a chronologically late date, Baucom follows Arrighi (and Harvey) in asserting that
financialization is not only an essential component of capitalism from its outset, but also that it is
historically grounded in the way the credit system developed to allow slave traders to buy and
sell black bodies using credit, which in turn transformed black flesh not only into money, but
into abstract speculative value in the form of fictitious capital. As Baucom explains, the
fungibility of slaves not only as commodities, but as loans among participants in the slave trade
“is at once obscene and vital to understanding the full capital logic of the slave trade, to coming
to terms with what it means for this trade to have found a way to treat human beings not only as
if they were a type of commodity but as a flexible, negotiable, transactable form of money.”285 It
is on this basis that Baucom later claims, after quoting at length Jameson’s essay “Culture and
Finance Capital,” that
Jameson is here describing the “today.” As he indicates, however—and as the
utter appositeness of this description not only to the “situation in which we find
ourselves today but to the eighteenth-century situation I have sketched confirms—
he might equally, and indeed is equally, describing a yesterday this today
replicates. At the heart of that yesterday-constellating-today is the separation of
value from the concrete, the emergence of speculation as a hegemonic enterprise
and of speculative forms as the bases for and objects of a new form of knowledge
and power, and the global circulation of what, paraphrasing Derrida, he calls
“specters of value.”286
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As this quotation indicates, Baucom’s assertion of an historical immanence between the
eighteenth-century emergence of both finance capital and what he calls the “speculative culture,”
and the contemporary resurgence, since the early 1970s, of finance as an increasingly dominant
organizational principle in the global economy, is grounded as much in a Benjaminian
conception of time as an accumulation of wreckage as it is in Arrighi’s circular or spiral model
of a historical time that replicates the rhythms of commodity exchange.287 Baucom’s “yesterdayconstellating-today” is a figural mode of temporality, one predicated on immanence and nonlinear isometry, rather than chronological development regulated by strict linear causality. In this
respect, Baucom’s account of the historical resonance between our own contemporary moment
and that of the slave ship Zong not only reverberates with Auerbach’s theory of figural time, but
demands that any account of contemporary “speculative culture” come to grips with the
subtending role of racial blackness in the grounding of that culture.
Hence Nightcrawler, like Barrett’s account of valorization and like Baucom’s account of
financialization, also posits the raced body as being transformed into a kind of speculative form
of money, yet there are two key differences that must be addressed at this point. Firstly,
Nightcrawler deals essentially with the contemporary, neoliberal regime of speculative
capitalism, rather than with the historical moment of slavery as such. As the above discussion of
Baucom’s deployment of Benjamin and Arrighi suggests, the chronological disjunction between
the temporal moments of contemporary neoliberal finance capital and eighteenth-century
transatlantic finance capital does not necessarily obviate the formal-historical relation between
them. Indeed, in a properly Benjaminian mode of understanding, the chronological gap may well

287

Ibid., 24.

218

serve to make possible the flash of recognizability necessary for historical understanding.
Nevertheless, there is a key difference between the modes of subjectivity (or lack thereof)
ascribed to the racialized body under these two subjective regimes. As Saidiya Hartman explains,
the captive body’s access to subjectivity is fundamentally, if ambiguously, transformed by the
nominal end of slavery. Whereas the body of the slave amounts to no more than Spillersian
‘flesh,’ that is, objective matter that is only regarded by slaveholding society as minimally
sensate, the freed slave becomes encumbered and re-fettered by new mandates of social and
personal responsibility as a consequence of gaining access to the guise of formal equality.288
In the same way, perhaps, that Baucom and Arrighi argue for an historical homology
between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, it may be worth speculating on the possibility of
a similar resonance between the nineteenth-century encumbrance of personal responsibility as a
means of reinstating social domination, and the emergence of neoliberal doctrines of selfmaking. Such a resonance plays out in Nightcrawler in the relationship between Lou and his
employee Rick, which is entirely organized around Lou’s delivery of the platitudes of neoliberal
self-help and entrepreneurial rhetoric to his employee, while in fact using these vacuous
principles as a mechanism of absolute exploitation, up to an including bodily liquidation. Lou’s
highly formalized form of speech and comportment, which the film suggests he has learned by
taking an online business course, is rich with platitudes and riddled with the clichéd jargon of the
neoliberal economy. During Rick’s “interview,” which takes place at a diner, Lou evasively
describes the job as “a fine opportunity for some lucky someone,” and appears to take scrupulous
notes regarding Rick’s answers. After suggesting that the job is in fact an unpaid internship, Lou
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explains that he is “giving [Rick] a chance to explore career options and get insight into my
organization,” an organization which is, at this point in the film, entirely fictitious since Lou is a
lone freelancer (they eventually settle on $30 cash, per night’s work). Indeed, Lou presents
himself during and after the interview as an accomplished business owner, when in fact he
himself has only just begun the trade and has scarcely more experience at it than Rick does. The
authority that Lou assumes through formalized, even stilted speech effectuates the exploitation of
Rick’s labor, as the latter appears to take Lou’s demeanor at face value. Later in the film, Rick is
navigating Lou’s route to a location when Lou asks if Rick has read his “traffic memo,” which
quickly becomes a conversation about Rick’s impending “performance review.” When Rick asks
for a pay raise, Lou responds by asserting confidently that “trying to leverage your salary in this
economic environment is near impossible,” brushing off Rick’s request despite the latter’s plea
that he is sleeping in a garage, not to mention the fact that Lou will use Rick’s death to leverage
his own financial value later in the film. Lou consistently deploys the language of neoliberal
entrepreneurship (“Sell yourself!”) in conversation with Rick in order to create the appearance,
on the surface, of formal equality between them, and of Rick’s freedom and independence to
negotiate for himself, while in fact leveraging this formal equality to burden Rick with
responsibility, to minimize Rick’s remuneration, and eventually to frame Rick as responsible for
his own murder.
Secondly, the discussion of race in Nightcrawler is vexed to some degree by what might
be called a structuring decentering of racial blackness as such in the film.289 The only character
that the film posits as racially black, or we might say, is assigned by the cinematic narration what
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Fanon calls the “racial epidermal schema” of optically perceptible blackness, is the narratively
peripheral police detective who investigates Lou in the second half of the film, and who sees
through his dissembling account of the pivotal triple murder he records.290 Indeed, Rick’s racial
identity is also complicated by the fact that the film carefully refuses to assign him, or allow the
viewer to assign to him, any racial categorization other than ambiguously nonwhite, opting
instead to evoke a plurality of diverse racial signifiers and stereotypes. His background as a
professional landscaper prior to his employment by Lou raises the specter of the stereotype of
latinx day laborers, while the circulation of video of his murder evokes what Tommy J. Curry
has termed, in the wake of the murder of Mike Brown and in explicit reference to the
contemporary proliferation of videos of young black men’s murders by authority figures, the
genre of “black male death and dying.”291 Moreover, the choice the British-Pakistani actor Riz
Ahmed in the role in turn evokes yet another, more global and postcolonial scale of racialization.
One way of approaching this quandary is to interpret the film’s complex negotiation of racial
politics as a kind of serialized dialectical synthesis of local-Angeleno, the national-American,
and the global-transnational geosocial scales across which racial differentiation occurs. Under
such an interpretation, Rick functions to visualize the transcendental intersection of these three
scales of racialization, and in the process critically linking the local cash-for-labor economy to
the distinctively American history of blackness as speculative capital, and on to global flows of
speculative finance capital.
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Despite whatever hermeneutic value or political purchase such an interpretation might
have, however, this is not the path this analysis chooses to take, at least not directly. Rather, I
would suggest that the complex and racial signification at work in the characterization of Rick
functions first to signify racialization in a more general sense, as a schematic construct that is
predicated on racial blackness as the founding articulation of race and value per Barrett. Instead
of figuring Rick according to any specific “racial epidermal schema,” the film’s calculated
ambiguity turns such schematizing around on itself, making visible the process of schematization
itself, but only as a necessary, yet paradoxically invisible, process of ordering. Through this
condensation and displacement of differentiated racial signifiers, the film’s characterization of
Rick simultaneously racializes him, and disavows the subtending function of racial blackness in
the construction of an ontology and epistemology of whiteness that is capable of perceiving and
receiving Rick as a raced individual at all.
Along these lines, Jared Sexton helps to clarify these schematic issues by modifying
Lyotard’s assertion in Libidinal Economy that “capital cannot form a body,” by claiming that
“whiteness cannot form a body.”292 In his original formulation, Lyotard provocatively parallels
the desire for conceptual closure across Marx’s oeuvre to the productivity of capital as a system
always in excess of itself, stating that
….theoretical discourse ceases to be presented according to its closure even
though this is what it seeks [emphasis in original]. What Marx perceives as
failure, suffering (and maybe even lives through as ressentiment) is the mark on
his work of a situation which is precisely the same as that of capital, and which
gives rise to a strange success as much as to an awful misery: the work cannot
form a body [emphasis in original], just as capital cannot form a body.293
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For Lyotard the desire for closure, for the conceptual unity of a coherent body, both in terms of
Marx’s body of work and in terms of capitalism’s structural fluidity, manifests as a double
movement:
And this absence of organic, ‘artistic’ unity gives rise to two divergent
movements always associated with a single vertigo: a movement of flight, of
plunging into the bodiless, and thus of continual invention, of expansive additions
or affirmation of new pieces (statements, but elsewhere musics, techniques,
ethics) to the insane patchwork – a movement of tension [emphasis in original].
And a movement of institution of an organism, of an organization and of organs
of totalization and unification – a movement of reason. Both kinds of movements
are there, effects as force in the non-finito [emphasis in original] of the work just
as in that of capitalism.294
In this remarkable passage, Lyotard turns Marx upside down by suggesting that the desire that
animates Marx’s attempt to theoretically survey the vast scale of capitalism’s field of operations,
this “movement of reason,” is the same motive force animating capitalism’s vertiginous
expansion in excess of its own boundaries. Moreover, for Lyotard this “movement of reason" is
always a double movement: on the one hand toward closure, boundary, and body, and on the
other toward expansion, transgression, and “the non-finito.” Crucially, the internal combustion
that animates the double movement, of capital and its critique, is the speculative application of
reason itself. Speculative reason paradoxically strives both to delimit, bound, and totalize, as
well as to expand, surpass, and invent. In this respect, as Sexton notes, Lyotard comes close to
endorsing the Deleuzo-Guattiarian account of capitalism as a churning process of de- and
reterritorializations that constantly forms and deforms the structures it creates and subjects to
critique.
For Sexton, however, the key analytical content of Lyotard’s comparison between Marx
and capitalism lies in the application of Lyotard’s speculative model to the process of
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racialization. For Sexton, whiteness cannot ‘form a body’ for itself, but its desire for totalization
and finality motivates it to “manufacture a particular type of delimited body” in order to achieve
mastery over the “traumatically uncategorized, incoherent experience” that Sexton terms “the
event of miscegenation.”295 Thus, the invention of a kind of violently restricted racialized body
functions as a necessary panacea for the fundamental paradox of speculative reason itself.
Importantly for Sexton, his concept of “the event of miscegenation” does not describe interracial
sex acts or the existence of interracial individuals as such, but rather stands as a figure for “an
abject scene of excessive passion and violent upheaval operating beyond or beneath the
semblance of racialized order….It is a trauma wrought by…the knowledge that categories of
racial difference obtain only in the force of convention, a pernicious and deadly cover story for
the formation of power.”296 Hence, the speculative formation of discrete, bounded, racialized
bodies is undergirded by the conceptual threat of a vertiginous, traumatically inchoate
ontological status, a kind of negative version of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘univocity of Being.’
Moreover, it is these bodies that bear the burden of speculative reason’s failure to adequately
address its own fundamental concerns.
Thus, whatever analytical purchase the specific interpretation of Nightcrawler’s treatment
of race sketched above, or any other such interpretation for that matter, may have, it is itself
undergirded by this complex process of racialization, which is analogous to Barrett’s account of
the process of valorization as a general form of the way in which forms, or bodies, are
speculatively produced and subsequently reified into essential and eternal objects. Any particular
interpretation of the film’s racial politics must first contend with the process of racialization
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itself, and not only because it is ontologically prior to any ideological categories of racial
identity, but also because the film itself emphasizes the speculative and processual manner
through which such categories come about. It is in this sense that I claim that the film is far more
concerned with the process of racialization than with the ideologically molar outcome of that
process, namely white supremacist racism, which can be pessimistically predicted in advance.
As I have suggested above, Lou’s practice of violent aesthetic reconfiguration extends
across a series of scales, from the intimately photographic to the broadly social and geographic.
Ultimately, these figural exchanges reach their apotheosis in the liquidation of Rick to the racist
spectacle of value he is orchestrating for Sweeps Week. In this culminating event of violent
valorization, Lou tells Rick to get a shot of a presumably dead criminal, but the man is still alive
and fatally shoots Rick. The next scene, in which Lou shows the footage of the chase and
shootings to an awestruck Nina, constitutes the film’s affective and formal apogee. As Lou and
Nina watch the footage, they are framed on either side by a monitor that sits between them (fig.
5.3).
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Figure 5.3 Nightcrawler
Ethereal choral music plays nondiegetically as they watch Rick’s dying moments, pausing the
video on a still image of Rick’s near-death return of the gaze into Lou’s, and Nightcrawler’s,
camera. Lou and Nina turn to face each other, now with only Rick’s face between them, as Nina
softly remarks: “I’m floored. It’s amazing….I mean, just amazing….I want it, obviously” (fig.
5.4).
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Figure 5.4 Nightcrawler
“How much do you want it?” Lou replies. “You tell me,” Nina retorts, before Nightcrawler cuts
away from them. In this climactic moment, the film articulates the spatial and racialized nature
of value to an eroticization of price arbitration, as well as to the power of value to produce
reality-effects on the basis of an aesthetic fiction. If previously in the film Lou’s coercive
approach to establishing a sexual, if not romantic, relationship with Nina is treated as deeply
disturbing evidence of Lou’s psychopathic drive towards accumulation and profit, Nina’s
surprising reversal, and indeed her erotically charged sotto voce praise for Lou’s work transforms
what was previously only a formally existing relationship into an evidently authentic and ‘real,’
actualized one, a relationship imbued with affective content. Thus, the film stages a visual
exchange between Lou and Nina in the horizontal dimension, in which the two, visually
separated by the frame, become one. What were isolated fragments in only a nominal relation to
each other have become reconfigured into a new figure. That Nina’s erotic desire is ambiguously
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directed both at Lou and also at the gruesome footage behind them yokes together the actualizing
powers of speculative value, with respect both to the news event and to Nina’s desire. This
exchange transfers the weight of the moral revulsion of Nina’s coercion from the sexual
relationship to finance capital as such, with the former receiving an equally disturbing
actualization as compensation for its displacement of violent harm and exposure to risk. In
addition to the exchange the film stages on the horizontal plane, it also stages an exchange on the
three-dimensional plane of depth between these spectatorial and profilmic ontologies, in which
the violence of Rick’s murder visually and ontologically subtends the erotic union on Nina and
Lou. As in Sinister, the temporary formal-aesthetic collapse of ontological planes allows the
affective exchange to occur.
5.4

Financialization and the Derivative Form
This figural image also functions to articulate the film’s broader treatment of the

relationship between the production and circulation of commodified images of racialized
suffering, and in doing so it instructively indicates how to understand the speculative dimension
of news footage in the film as a whole. In addition to the exchanges that take place between Lou
and the television station, and between the suffering body and the camera that records it, Lou’s
sale of those violent images to the station, and their economic and social circulation around the
Los Angeles broadcast area, elevates them into a textual and financialized economy organized by
speculative value and fictitious capital. Bloom’s videos are productive of a kind of additional,
surplus, speculative value predicated not so much on the production of images, but on their
circulation of representations of social risk. They are, in this sense, derivatives. As Edward
LiPuma and Benjamin Lee have argued, financialization is distinguished from industrial capital
by the displacement of production by circulation as the dominant principle shaping global
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economic flows of capital.297 In the film, the significance of circulation is nowhere more evident
than in the meditative establishing shots and interstitial images of seemingly uninhabited
landscapes and urban spaces situated between scenes of dialogue and action. These images,
which not only open and close the film, but also permeate it, often depict cell towers against the
backdrops of the hazy sky and the sprawling urban cityscape (fig. 5.5).

Figure 5.5 Nightcrawler
Fredric Jameson describes in The Geopolitical Aesthetic how communications and information
technologies, precisely in their function of economic reproduction, rather than production as
such, allegorically figure the transformation of the object world into informatic capital within the
globalized, financialized network of the capitalist world-system.298 Here, it is not only the

297

Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee, Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 9.
298
Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 13.

229

presence of these images but their structural role as superficially empty spaces, a role supported
by their sparse visual composition, that signals the significance of that which is not explicitly
visualized: the transmission of digital information-capital itself. These images depict a material
world saturated with an aether of circulating data, a swarming movement immanent to the
landscape’s placid appearance. Like Deleuze’s description of Ozu’s infamous ‘still life’ shots as
time-images that “reach the absolute, as instances of pure contemplation, and immediately bring
about the identity of the mental and the physical, the real and the imaginary, the subject and the
object, the world and the I,” the film’s interstitial landscapes and ponderous night scenes give
form to the abstract materiality of the circulation of commodified, financialized data.299
The fundamental economic instrument through which this shift to circulation over
production is effectuated, LiPuma and Lee argue, is the derivative. As the Introduction
explained, derivatives are essentially liquidity-producing wagers on changes in the price of an
asset, and crucially the pricing of derivatives depends essentially on the ability to quantify the
volatility in the price of the underlying asset, or in other words, to measure and represent the
social risk inherent in the wager.300 They are, in this sense, fictitious abstractions that are
invented for the purpose of hedging financial risk. Importantly, LiPuma and Lee note that the
kind of representability involved in quantifying social risk is heavily freighted with ideological
assumptions about the nature of the underlying social relationships to which the representation is
immanent (i.e. that South American and African assets are understood to be more volatile on
account of ideologically perceived political instability and corruption). Lou’s footage, like a
financial derivative, is also priced according to the perceived volatility of the underlying asset,
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which in this case is the threat of, as Nina plainly explains to Lou, “urban crime creeping into the
suburbs. What this means is a victim, or victims, preferably well-off and white, injured at the
hands of the poor or a minority.”
In learning how to aesthetically represent and render visible this hypothetically perceived
social volatility, Lou learns how to create valuable footage that the network will circulate, which
in turn naturalizes and objectifies the ideological figure of racialized threat to white, “suburban”
order, which in turn spurs a demand for more footage. This cycle of production and circulation
evinces Barrett’s ‘invisible hand’ at work, focusing itself to create an image of itself as
something other than that same very act of aesthetic and ideological focusing. Thus, the full
significance of Lou’s reconfigured images includes their figural operation, in Auerbach’s sense,
as figures that mutually reinforce and presuppose each other. To the extent that Lou’s individual
aesthetic configurations exist on an economic continuum with the geographic configuration of
the color line in Los Angeles, they also exist in a relation of mutually imbricated and immanent
co-figuration. This relationship is not unlike the relationship between financial models and actual
trading activity, which relies on what Arjun Appadurai, building on the work of J.L. Austin,
Judith Butler, and other scholars of finance, has recently termed “retro-performativity,” which he
explains as a situation “in which certain performatives are seen to create, through their agency
and effect, the very conditions of felicity that they also casually pre-suppose.”301 This is most
forcefully evinced by Lou’s orchestration of the film’s culminating car chase and shootout,
which is both an effect of Lou’s own performative framing, as well as the presumptive condition
that authorizes and legitimates his professional existence at all.
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LiPuma and Lee likewise note that derivatives are “quasi-performative,” in the sense that
they “help to create the culture of circulation that they presuppose for their circulation.”302
Alison Shonkwiler affirms the generativity of finance capital, claiming that finance capital
functions by “comparing hypotheticals and actuals, and trading on the difference, thereby
realizing that which had been hypothetical or unreal.”303 This performative dimension of finance,
which echoes Barrett’s theory of valorization as a process of form effacing a subtending force, is
expressed not only through the actualization of Lou and Nina’s relationship through the
mediating form of value, but in the film’s dramatization of the emergence of the news ‘event’
itself out of Lou’s aesthetically and epistemically malleable images. On Lou’s first night of
work, he unsuccessfully attempts to record various scenes of police making arrests and attending
to accidents. In one case, a police officer aggressively urges Lou to stop taping and back away.
“I’m fairly certain I’m allowed to film this,” Lou tepidly states. “Film what?” the officer replies.
Lou stammers: “I don’t know. What’s happening?” This exchange demonstrates Lou’s
inexperience (and also his initial inability to discern socially appropriate spatial and ethical
boundaries), but also raises a question, quite literally, about the circumstances under which Lou’s
images are legible as an event as such. The event must be subject to a valorizing process of
formal and aesthetic manipulation before it can be rendered as a narrative event; the situation
must be created as such, as a narrativization that makes the event recognizable as such. As
Hayden White explains in “The Modernist Event”:
…in conventional historical inquiry, the facts established about a specific event
are taken to be the meaning of that event. Facts are supposed to provide the basis
for arbitrating among the variety of different meanings that different groups can
assign to an event for different ideological or political reasons. But facts are a
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function of the meaning assigned to events, not some primitive data that
determine what meanings an event can have. It is the anomalous nature of
modernist events—their resistance to inherited categories and conventions for
assigning meanings to events—that undermine not only the status of facts in
relation to events but also the status of the event in general.304
Modernist events, in other words, are characterized by White by a break between fact and
meaning, which can only be rendered over through the process of narrative fabulation that
reverses the intuitive causal relation between them. If convention and common sense dictate that
the facts of the event precede and inform narrative accounts of the event, modernist events invert
this relation, establishing a mode of historicism in which the narrative representation supersedes
the event, and facts come only later, if at all. Lou’s labor process, like White’s examples of
Oliver Stone’s J.F.K. and the news crews that reported the O.J. Simpson chase, produces the
historical, factual event as a function or outcome of aesthetic representation. Thus, as modernist
events, Lou’s videos are narratively and aesthetically performative, generating the ‘facts’ that
they purport to be transparent, objective representations of in the first place. As Lou
professionalizes, he comes more adept at forcing the formation of events, a process rendered
cinematically by a montage of Lou renaming video files on his computer (fig. 5.6).
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Figure 5.6 Nightcrawler
As Grant Farred has claimed in a different context, “the event knows itself first through its own
naming.”305 The critical difference here is that Nightcrawler’s events are not naming themselves,
but being themselves named, by Lou—a speculative formation, undergirded by the immanent
forces of aesthetic judgment and ontological violence.
Lou’s footage is situated, therefore, at the nexus of the commodity form and the
derivative form, insofar as it is tied on the one hand to the exchange of objects for
representations of other objects, and on the other to the speculative act of objectifying and
circulating representations of social, racialized volatility. What unites both forms of valorization,
and what connects them ultimately to the film, is the abstract logic of commodity fetishism: the
appearance of an objective, unified, and self-identical form that belies the violent force that
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simultaneously undergirds that form and is rendered invisible in the form’s production. For both
Barrett and the film, this logic is also fundamentally a racialized one, in which value is, in
Barrett’s words, “forcefully emergent from and provisionally triumphant over a relative parataxis
of Others.”306 Importantly, this is equally the case for the derivative form, in which it is the
aesthetically and ideologically informed act of judgment inherent in the quantification of risk
that is both necessary and elided in the production of speculative value.
To conclude this chapter, I would like to return once again to the pivotal moment at
which Lou’s value to Nina, and hers to him, and Rick’s to them both, congeals, since the
derivative nature of Lou’s images also further explains the veritably aphrodisiac power of the
image of Rick’s death. On a macroeconomic level, one of the perceived values of the financial
derivative is its capacity to create liquidity, or the ease with which assets can be rendered into
cash, in the marketplace (at least until a crisis occurs, reducing liquidity). The ability to create a
derivative instrument enhances the opportunity for fungibility and the consummation of
exchange. This function is also aesthetically rendered by the film, in the sense that the
liquidation of Rick that transforms him into a kind of financial liquidity also renders him, to
borrow Alessandra Raengo’s turn of phrase, as a kind of perverse “lubrication” for the figural
union of Nina and Lou. Writing about the ways in which the ontology of racial blackness might
be conceptualized as “liquid,” both in the sense of its fungibility and circulation as an abstract
commodity and also as its intimate sensoriality, Raengo identifies lubrication as an ethically
troubling, eroticizing function of blackness’s liquidity. Pivotally, the liquidity of blackness, or I
would argue, of any racializing epidermal schema, is grounded in the capacity to abstract a
qualitative, aesthetically received component of the lived experience of blackness, and to make it
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quantitatively fungible and available for circulation. As Raengo points out, this situation is
fundamentally shaped by a kind of chiasmatic disjunction between abstraction, circulation, and
movement on the one hand, and materiality, embodiment, and stasis on the other.307 Indeed,
Saidiya Hartman concurs in explaining the problematic as one in which “the fungibility of the
commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of
others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and as property, the dispossessed body of the
enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality
and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.”308 In the film, Lou exploitatively transforms
Rick from a kind of raw material resource into a wage laborer, and then into an essentially
fungible, valorized image. By the end of the film, Rick is both economically and racially
liquidated, insofar as his transformation into an image that is also a circulating commodity
crystallizes the dialectical union of movement and stasis, mobility and death, financialized
abstraction and intense bodily suffering. Moreover, Rick’s liquidity functions as a kind of
pornographic lubrication insofar as it is precisely his rendering into exchange-value that
facilitates the transformation of the relationship between Lou and Nina from a formal into an
affectively actualized one.
During this consecratory exchange, Rick’s face is positioned between the two, effectively
functioning as a mediating boundary that visually separates Nina from Lou. As the boundary
between the exploitation and eroticism of Nina’s and Lou’s relationship dissolves, Rick is
situated formally as another kind of visual boundary between them, one onto which Lou’s
coercive violence is, as I have suggested, effectively displaced through this framing operation.
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The transgressive violence inherent in Lou’s coercive exploitation of Nina is represented as a
displacement onto the racialized Other, an Other that functions here as a differentiating boundary
line, but it is a double displacement: firstly into the body of the commodity videotape from
which Rick’s gaze is produced, and secondly into the here-abstracted body of Rick himself, as a
homeless day laborer paid in cash and murdered at work, and as registered in his fearful,
uncertain facial expression. The aesthetic and thematic condensations and displacements of
value, race, violence, and fetishistic desire in this image function to figure and articulate flows of
economic, affective, and racial liquidity, and to transform lucrative volatility into a critical image
of violent contemporary precarity. This figure also allows the commodified, displaced, and
elided body if not the chance to speak, then at least the power to disquiet, and perhaps for a
moment, even to haunt those who would see in it something other than value.

6

CONCLUSION

Throughout the preceding chapters, the concept of the figure and its variations—the
figural, figurality, figuration—have been deployed as the project’s central operative theoretical
principle, rather than the more familiar and well-worn concept of allegory. Although Benjamin’s
notion of allegory, as a mode of representation through which the particularity of an immanent
historicity can emerge through the accumulation of fragmentary ruins, is the basis for his later
theorization of the messianic power of aesthetic constellation and the mimetic faculty, it is
nevertheless not the operative concept here.309 The reason for this is that despite Benjamin’s
melancholic appeals to a messianic futurity (or perhaps also precisely on account of their
melancholic aspect), his theory of allegory organizes a relationship that obtains primarily
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between the past and the present, leaving the future ambiguous and highly ambivalent, and in
Benjamin’s later writings precariously balanced on the knife’s edge separating redemption from
annihilation. If, as Jameson suggests, “allegory is precisely the dominant mode of expression of a
world in which things have been for whatever reason utterly sundered from meanings, from
spirit, from genuine human existence,” then its capacity for expressing the historical specificity
of the present moment—in which the dominant relationship between images and history is not
one of severance but of productive, if disturbing fungibility—must be reconsidered.310 For, as the
preceding chapters have argued, although the constellative dimension of Benjamin’s theory of
allegory remains a highly relevant feature of our contemporary economic and aesthetic
landscape, the fact of the contemporary moment’s ontogenetic productivity, as evinced not only
by the structure of financial instruments and the logic of financial markets, but also by the textual
forms emerging within the context of financial turbulence and crisis, indicates something else at
work—a reversal, in fact—in the relationship between images and historical time.
Indeed, this has been the thesis of the project laid out here, that the ontogenic
productivity of finance gives a novel and productively expressive function to representations,
under the rubric of the concept of the conspiracy diagram and its figural logic. The concept of the
figural diagram shares with allegory an emphasis on the significance of fragmentation and
reconfiguration, but for the conspiracy diagram this figural aesthesis is immanent to the
production of a future-oriented historicity, the operational logic of which is also shared by
contemporary global financial markets. If allegory is a mode of expression turned toward the
past, and moving into the future only facing backward, as Benjamin says of Klee’s Angel of
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History, the figural is posited here as a mode of expression that reverses the temporal polarity of
the Benjaminian constellation, as the obverse of allegory, to preemptively produce the futurity it
aesthetically constellates. Ultimately, this is the crucial distinction between Benjamin’s theory of
allegory and Auerbach’s theory of figural prophecy: whereas the Benjaminian theory of allegory
endows past with a “weak messianic power, a power on which the past has a claim,” Auerbach’s
theory of theological hermeneutics endows the present with this power, through which it makes a
claim on the future by interpreting the past. It is in this sense that even Benjamin’s desperate
attempt to conceive of his own location in the stream of historical time, over against the forces of
commodification and outright fascism that conspired to annihilate this historicity, has evidently
been subsumed under capital, which find in the structure of allegory a convenient technique for
producing new and increasingly abstract profit-generating objects. Financial speculation, then,
functions as the obscene double of Benjamin’s own melancholy: not a withdrawal of historical
object-cathexis, but a manic overabundance of cathexes, fungibilities, and exchanges, through
which the ambivalent future becomes determinate in its actualization.311
It is within this fraught context that I wish to turn at last to Arrival (dir. Denis Villeneuve,
2016), as a film that is essentially about the relationship between figural constellations and the
capacity to actualize the future, and this across at least two distinct levels. At one level, Arrival is
very much about the ways in which the constellative structure of the object of a formal analysis
can reconfigure the epistemic and spatiotemporal schemata through which any such analysis is
possible for a subject, and about the ways in which the ambivalent future becomes determinate in
its actualization in the present. It is also, at another level, a film that articulates analytical strands
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that are dispersed throughout the entirety of the project, effectuating something like a unity,
although I wish here to leave the question of the film’s unifying efficacy open, for reasons
having to do with the methodology of the project that are made clearer below. For now, suffice it
to say that it is precisely the question of the capacity of fragments to recombine that is at stake.
The film, which is based on the short story “Story of your Life” by Ted Chiang, tells the
story of a linguistics professor, Louise (Amy Adams), who is called in by the U.S. government to
help facilitate communication with extraterrestrial aliens, called heptapods, who have recently
landed twelve spaceships at geographically dispersed sites around the world. Over time,
exposure to the alien language, a nonlinear visual mode of communication in which semantic
information is expressed through differential graphic appendages to a circle (fig. 6.1), causes
(although the chronology of the plot complicates any notion of causation) a reconfiguration of
Louise’s phenomenal experience of time, along the lines of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Figure 6.1 Arrival
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Louise’s mode of apprehending space, time, and causality is transformed from a linear-sequential
to a nonlinear, evidently a-causal mode of perception and thought. This reconfiguration becomes
central to the resolution of the film’s narrative, in which Louise’s newfound(?) ability to perceive
future events allows her both to ascertain the purpose of the alien visitation (to confer their
nonlinear temporality to humanity), and to avert a geopolitical crisis between the nations
involved in alien research.
The linguistic figures of the heptapod language, which the film refers to as logograms,
form the conceptual and aesthetic core of the film. Like the photographs in Blow Up, and like
their arrangement into a dispositif, which is implicitly quoted throughout Arrival (fig. 6.2), the
legibility of the alien figures, along with the consequences of that legibility, animates the film’s
narrative movement.

Figure 6.2 Arrival
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The heptapod language functions by presenting a circular visual figure, which is modified via the
addition of inkblot-like radial articulations. These articulations indicate nouns, verbs, and other
parts of speech, and are recombined and spatially modified in relation to each other in order to
compose more complex ideas and statements (fig. 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Arrival
They are, perhaps even more so than the photos in Blow Up, interstitially situated in the space
between Lyotard’s discursive and figural regimes, since they are simultaneously both linguistic
sentences, and visual representations whose meaning is wholly dependent on the material and
spatial transformations of the figures’ radial curlicues. The plasticity of this mode of expression
is emphasized by the strange materiality of the alien figures, which are depicted as smoky and
gaseous clouds, which congeal into rigid shapes, only to disperse again.312 The heptapod
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language, therefore, articulates the chiasmatic tension of Lyotard’s concept of the figural to the
respiratory rhythms of abstraction and materiality that are characteristic of the flows of capital,
and of the dialectical tension between concretion and abstraction that is characteristic of
financialization as such. This becomes especially clear when the ultimate purpose of the
heptapods’ visit, which involves teaching their language to Louise in order to allow humanity to
achieve something like World Peace, which in turn allows humanity to provide aid to the aliens
3,000 years in the future, is explained.
Moreover, the absence of sequential order in the heptapod language generates confusion
between interpreting parties, since the semantic fragments in each logogram can be reordered
and reconfigured in a variety of ways. This is the case, for example, when Louise and the CIA
bureaucrat disagree about whether fragments indicating that “many become one” and “weapon
opens time” are expressing utopian benevolence or violent aggressivity. Hence, Arrival’s
logograms participate fully in the figural logic of the conspiracy diagram, as reconfigurable
fragments that offer the potential of disclosing and providing experiential access to a geopolitical
totality. The aliens’ ultimate purpose is to teach their language to humanity, and in so doing to
create a geopolitical figural diagram—a plan which is achieved by giving each of the twelve
nationalities involved in the codebreaking operation a different piece of a representation of their
entire language. It is only through the production of a geopoltitical unity between the U.S.,
China, Russia, and others—a kind of benevolent conspiracy of international cooperation brought
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about by the redemptive power of the aliens’ messianic arrival, and what the film suggestively,
and like A Beautiful Mind, refers to as a “non-zero sum game”—that the future of the human race
can be secured. This production of a geospatial unity and of an historical futurity on Earth turns
out also to be necessary, as suggested above, for the survival of the aliens, who reveal that they
will need human assistance to deal with an undisclosed problem thousands of years in the future.
Thus the film also effects a kind of subjective-objective reversal, in which Louise’s and Ian’s
investigatory work and process of aesthetic reconfiguration in the service of translating the
heptapod language becomes, on a grander scale, the object of the heptapods’ own scheme to
reconfigure humanity so as to be capable of saving the heptapods at a later chronological date. It
is then, perhaps the heptapods that are the true Auerbachian interpreters here more so than the
humans, since they are directly intervening to reconfigure the past, in order to produce a
redemptive future.
If the aliens’ production of a geopolitical aesthetic has a ring of preemption about it, the
preemption of future time is essential to the formal structure of the film’s narrative, based as it is
around an editorial sleight of hand involving presenting interstitial proleptic flashforwards to
domestic scenes of Louise and her daughter, disguised initially as analeptic flashbacks to prior
events. This is how the film renders Louise’s nonhuman experience of nonlinear time for the
viewer, as well as how Louise is able to solve the puzzle and prevent warfare against the aliens,
which she does by cognitively accessing a future interaction with a Chinese general, in which he
provides her with information that she uses in the present to prove her good intentions and
explain the nature of the heptapods’ gift to humanity. Paradoxically, the event during which
Louise learns this information is a peace celebration ceremony for the resolution of the alien
crisis, which undermines any notion of linear causality within the film, instantiating instead a
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preemptive logic of temporal immanence, in which the production of the future is foreclosed by
the anticipatory present. This is also to suggest that the film resonates with the logic of financial
securitization, insofar as it presents a world in which futurity itself is produced as a byproduct of
preemptive speculation. The film’s exploration of the logic of preemptive securitization reaches
its ambiguous apogee in the film’s denouement, in which Louise chooses (although again, the
question of choice is very much in question here) to have a child, all the while knowing that the
child will grow up to die young from a rare and incurable disease, and in doing so suggests an
embrace of the fraught historical impasse, in which futurity, as embodied by the child, is both
affirmed and, precisely through that affirmation, negated.
Through this structure of cinematic plotting, which is necessarily chronological, the film
gives expression to the non-chronological immanence of preemptive time, the time of figural
prophecy, what Auerbach calls the “plane of providential design,” which here becomes legible as
a form of Deleuzian pure immanence. This brings us back again to the question of immanence
with respect to the figural relationships that obtain between subjects and objects, even as those
poles are themselves constituted through a process of emergent articulation. Arrival stages this
problem through its complication of subject-object relations; it is a film in which a subject’s
exposure to an object, in the form of an informatic diagram, effectively reconfigures the subject’s
mode of spatiotemporal experience. It is as though Louise shares Benjamin’s experience of
allegorical shock, but with the temporal vectorization reversed—it is the present and the future
that are jarringly juxtaposed, rather than the present and the past. In this process there is a
dialectical reversal that cuts to the core of what both financialization and the conspiracy diagram
are about: the production of future time. This formal juxtaposition in turn functions also to
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articulate the film’s broader breakdown of discrete subject-object relations in the film, in favor of
a transversal mode of embodied schematic reorganization.
Furthermore, as in Nightcrawler, the ability in Arrival to produce a sexual union between
Louise and her counterpart Ian (Jeremy Renner), and in turn to reconstitute the nuclear family
and the hope for the future it entails, is effectuated through the appropriation of schematic racial
blackness. In Arrival, this is achieved through the film’s intense cinematographic emphasis on
the hapticity of the heptapods themselves, which are depicted as rather like seven-fingered
hands, whose epidermal hue, despite its extraterrestrial origin, is evocative of blackness (fig.
6.4).

Figure 6.4 Arrival
Not only are the heptapods designed to resemble hands and to emphasize tactility, and not only is
their spaceship designed as a rough-hewn, highly textured surface, but both the aliens and their
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craft is consistently lensed by cinematographer Bradford Young so as to accentuate the
phenomenal tactility of the image (fig. 6.5).313

Figure 6.5 Arrival
Indeed, in the same way that the heptapods are shrouded in opaque mist, much of the film is
composed in shallow focus, which has the dual effects of generating a haptic sense of texture
about the image itself, as well as of making the shapes background figures blurry and distorted,
effectively complicating the image’s capacity to transparently transmit information that can be
readily assimilated in accordance with a pre-existing cognitive schema. It is only on account of
the alien visitation that Louise is able to meet Ian, and only on account of the heptapods’

313

Note that the accompanying image (fig. 6.5) is lit so dimly as to be almost illegible outside
the confines of a darkened theater. I have chosen to reproduce this image (and other similarly
dark images from the film), rather than merely describe it, since I take its melding of tactility and
visual darkness as a deliberate aesthetic provocation on Bradford Young’s part, and one that
gestures toward the ontological generativity of aesthetic experience within the film.
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conferral of a new temporal and causal cognitive schema that Louise is endowed with the ability
to produce a unifying future for humanity, a future that the film explicitly suggests also includes
saving nations like Venezuela and Sierra Leone from collapsing into anarchic and raciallycharged looting. Although Arrival makes no overt pretense to a critique of the transcendental
capacities of white reproductive futurity, such a critique is nevertheless legible, or perhaps at
least affectively sensible, in the way the film uses contrasting textures, juxtaposing the
smoothness of Louise’s features, particularly when she becomes immersed in the heptapods’
gaseous cloud (which does at this point seem to take on a liquid, more so than a gaseous aspect,
in no small way on account of the film’s use of digital animation to render her floating hair) (fig.
6.6), with the haptic materiality of the aliens and their ship.

Figure 6.6 Arrival
The highly condensed analysis above suggests that Arrival has the capacity to function, in
the analytical constellation that is this project, as a kind of unifying force, drawing together
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disparate threads of the preceding chapters and articulating them into a kind of totality through
which these threads all converge in the form of a discrete aesthetic object. As I have indicated
above, however, I wish to leave any question of conceptual unification or totalization as open as
possible, for the reason that both Arrival and the project as a whole are precisely about the
question of whether and how the exposure to aesthetic form can transform the schemata of
perception, and to productively and preemptively create historical time. These questions lie at the
heart, not only of Benjamin’s account of the transformations in the protocols of perception
wrought by modernity, but also of Deleuze’s appropriation of Foucault’s concept of the diagram
as a means of explicating the immanence of power and structure, as well as of Whitehead’s
inversion of the Kantian sequence of causal determinations. This is, after all, what is ultimately
at stake in Arrival’s narrative: the possibility of some kind of historically progressive alterity
with respect to the subjectively restrictive and limiting synthetic a priori determinations of space,
time, and causation. Yet it is precisely this isomorphic immanence between Arrival (or really any
of the other objects under discussion above) and the analytical project itself, between the
function of form within the objects of this analysis and the form of the analysis of the functions
of those objects, that is both mediating and complicating any schematic application of an
analytical method here. This is, ultimately, why the question of analytical unity can only be
raised here in self-reflexively performative terms, rather than in terms that reassert a position of
transcendental subjectivity with respect to the objects of analysis.
This peculiar recursivity is partially an effect of the generic orientation of the analysis,
which takes as its objects texts whose forms deal essentially with investigation, formal analysis,
and practices of knowledge production, matters that are also the essential content of the analysis.
Hence, the synecdochic, highly dialectical and isomorphism between the objects of analysis and
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the analysis of the objects, insofar as the theoretical logic of the conspiracy diagram becomes the
method by which the inner workings of that logic are accessed and explained. In part it is also an
effect of the nature of the diagrammatic itself. As Deleuze explains, “The diagram is no longer
an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social
field. It is an abstract machine.”314 Likewise, the diagrammatic methodology employed here is
also coextensive with the “social” field of objects so constellated, and is also machinic in the
same terms, insofar as the force of constellating objects into a formal structure is taken to be
aesthetically and cognitively productive. There is a kind of vertiginous movement across the
heuristic distinction between the subjective and the objective that is characteristic of, and also at
stake both aesthetically and epistemologically, in the operation of the conspiracy diagram, and
this both at the level of the particular case studies of the analysis and at the level of the general or
whole analysis itself.315 This in turn raises a problem for formal analysis, in that it turns out that
the logical strength of such an analysis of form rests, ultimately, on whether the aesthetic objects
it gathers do indeed cohere into something like a recognizable unity, or in Deleuze’s terms, do
indeed forcibly cohere into an expressive form. That is to say it is, paradoxically and
problematically, perhaps only on aesthetic grounds that the intellectual force of such a project
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013 [1980]), 34.
315
The term “operation” is used advisedly here to gesture toward the performativity of the
figural as an analytical tool. In a similar context, D.N. Rodowick suggests that “perhaps
philosophy can operate its own figural discourse.” He notes that in order to do so his own study
of the figural (from which the present analysis has benefitted substantially) that the figural must
circulate, as Shklovsky said of aesthetic estrangement, via “knight’s moves” through the
theoretical network it activates. It may be that there is something inherent in the notion of the
figural as such that demands, in the manner of a Kantian regulative concept, a certain degree of
methodological deregulation in practice. Rodowick later suggests as much in his account of the
theoretical movement from semiotic discourse to figural becoming See D.N. Rodowick,
Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media (Durham: Duke University Press,
2001), ix, 46.
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can be adequately evaluated. Yet, this turn away from the deductive and toward the aesthetic is
precisely characteristic of the contemporary historical situation of finance capitalism, and the
concomitant inversion of the priority of the Kantian categories, that the analysis itself seeks to
unwind. This in turn threatens to produce a vicious circle by which it becomes impossible to
think beyond the limits imposed by our own determining conceptual schemata, even as this
impossibility is itself a historical effect, with its own intellectual history. Philosopher Quentin
Meillassoux colorfully refers to this problem, in which unmediated access to a thing in-itself
could only even be access for-us, as “the correlationist two-step.”316 Meillassoux’s solution to
this intractable philosophical dilemma involves a valorization of speculative thinking, by which
he means thought that claims access to the absolute in-itself, but only at the hefty cost of
invalidating the principle of sufficient reason in favor of absolute contingency.317
This study does not purport to reply to Meillassoux’s sophisticated arguments, but
perhaps the notion of contingency offers a useful clue. Fredric Jameson has recently and
suggestively noted the similarity between artistic curation and the construction of financial
derivatives, in that they both “put all these different elements or entities together, they last for a
minute, and then they’re gone again; the individual work is no longer very significant.”
“Theory,” Jameson goes on to add,
is also essentially a curatorial process. We’ve got various texts from the past, say
Aristotle or Kant, and we put them all together in an ephemeral combination.
Deleuze is the great master of this. You have a theoretical show in which these
various things are plugged into each other, and then another one comes on line
later on. Since theory is not philosophy—something I want to insist on—the
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Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency trans. Ray
Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008 [2006]), 5.
317
Ibid., 28-49, but especially 34 and 42.
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question of what it is becomes an interesting one; it approaches the situation of
arts as much as it does anything else. 318
Under these terms, the preceding analysis effectuates something like a curatorial double
articulation, in that it is itself a curation of theorists and aesthetic objects designed to produce a
set of diagrammatic effects (i.e. reconfiguring how we comprehend the relationship between the
financialized economy and the capacities of visual representation), and that these objects are
themselves curatorial, in that they are also gathering fragments in hopes of articulating an
expressive unity. This project’s curatorial immanence then, is perhaps only expressive of the
particular and ephemeral and contingent historicity it articulates.
“Historical ideas,” Kracauer writes in his unfinished History: The Last Things Before the
Last, “are nodal points—points at which the concrete and the abstract really meet and become
one. Whenever this happens, the flow of indeterminate historical events is suddenly arrested and
all that is then exposed to view is seen in the light of an image or conception which takes it out
of the transient flow to relate it to one or another of the momentous problems and questions that
are forever staring at us.”319 If the present study is capable of producing such an image, then it
will have succeeded.

318

Nico Baumbach, Damon R. Young, and Genevieve Yue, “Revisiting Postmodernism: An
Interview with Fredric Jameson” Social Text 34, no. 2 (2016): 145. I would add Fred Moten to
the list as not only a great master of curatorial theory, but as a master theorist of curation itself,
under the rubric of the aesthetics and politics of the ensemble. See Fred Moten, In the Break: The
Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
319
Siegfried Kracauer, History, The Last Things Before the Last (Princeton: Markus Wiener
Publishers, 1995 [1969]), 101.
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